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ZIMBABWE: FROM LIBERATION TO INDEPENDENCE

WHAT HAPPENED IN KAMPUCHEA

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In this issue, we continue with reviews at a theoretical level of questions relating to national development and national independence and liberation struggles.

The paper by N. Ernest Maganya attempts to look at the various strategies for rural development that have been adopted in Tanzania since the colonial period. The very fact that there is a definite continuity of the basic approaches to this question, which is unbroken down the line but changes in form at various stages, shows the continuity of a fundamental economic fact: that the division of labour which forms the basis of imperialist expansion is still the essential presumption on which our whole ideology of development hinges.

V.L. Kyulule adds to the theme of development from another angle, that the idea of "relevant technology" as has been propagated under current "new international economic order" efforts. In his view, whatever technological innovations are being made, insofar as they seek to retain the basic structure of industry and agriculture and simply offer palliatives to this be considered a substitute for the acquisition of what he shows to be a historical requirement for a definite level of technology determined by the given historical context.

The article on Zimbabwe seeks to examine the ideology of national liberation from a historical perspective, in order to arrive at a coherent theoretical understanding of the development of the national independence and liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. In the view of the author, the classical approach to the analysis of these questions, which takes the pronouncements of the various parties and states involved in the struggle at face value, must be re-examined to grasp the actual context of ..... historical movement.

We also present two divergent views on the tragedy of Kampuchea. Samir Amin looks at the post-1975 context from the viewpoint of a country which makes an attempt at removing feudal vestiges and neocolonialism within certain difficult historical circumstances. His viewpoint, which sums ..... the issue as essentially one of a peasant revolution which is of important significance to other neocolonial countries, is starkly different from ..... viewpoint of the interview extracted from a student's organisation journal edited in Eastern Europe. In its perspective, the Kampuchean tragedy has its basis in the ideology of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, with its petty-bourgeois theories of purity, love hardships, etc, which were carried to their sad and baffling logic by the Pol Pot- eng Sary regime.

The Editorial Committee also takes this opportunity to call the attention of the readers that from the present issue it has been reconstituted, as is usual for the end of an academic year. However several members continue from the old committee and hence the tasks of the production of this journal shall continue with the same zeal and commitment. We welcome our new members and call upon all of us to brace up for our tasks on behalf of all comrade students and members of the public.

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE



# GRAPPLING WITH THE RURAL QUESTION, THE EXPERIENCE OF TANZANIA

Mdayiragije Ernest Maganya

## THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE RURAL PROBLEM

It is now true that "the rural problem" has become a subject of international discussion. Many conferences have of late been organized by international bodies with the aim of understanding "the rural question" and therefore providing answers to it.

Whereas it is true that some of these conferences have attempted to understand the fundamental problem involved, it is nevertheless true to point out that in most cases, this problem has not been comprehended sufficiently well. This has been so mainly because some analysts have tried to understand the rural question by studying the present without bothering to look into the past.

To comprehend issues involved in the rural question be they economic, technical, political and social in most of third World countries, a brief analysis of the colonial economy is necessary. This paper will briefly go into the colonial economy of Tanzania or Tanganyika as it was then known. This analysis will help us situate the origin of the rural problem within the context of the colonial economy. Subsequent analysis will attempt to show how both the colonial and post colonial state attempted to solve this problem and lastly we shall propose tentative solutions that in our case we think, will deal with the problem in a manifold manner.

### 1.1 THE COLONIAL ECONOMY

In Tanzania as in most of the 3rd World countries, the colonial economy was created as a result of the export of productive capital by developed capitalist countries.<sup>1</sup> This export was in the form of investments in plantations cash crop production on peasant production basis, extractive and primary processing industries and social and economic infrastructures.

In Tanzania the form of the export of productive capital was mainly accomplished by the establishment of a plantation and peasant economy.<sup>2</sup> The plantation economy specialized in the production of cash crops, an undertaking that involved high costs of production whereas within the peasant economy production of cash crop was undertaken by individual peasants on a small scale level of production.

It is important at this juncture to point out that both the plantation economy and the peasant economy affected in one way or another, the entire socio-economic formation of Tanzania. To us therefore to try to understand the peasant question (which we haven't so far explained) with the usual dualistic conception of the colonial economy is not only theoretically wrong but will indeed mystify the problem we are trying to comprehend.<sup>3</sup>

In Tanzania as in many other colonial countries where there was a plantation economy, it is true that the demands of this economy directly or indirectly affected the so called traditional sector. One of the most important characteristics of a plantation economy is that it is labour intensive. Its success depends on the availability of cheap labour power and in Tanzania, this demand created areas that are often referred to as labour reserve areas from where cheap labour power was taken.

These areas which can be considered as the traditional sector in the sense that they were not directly connected with the "modern" sector meaning here the industrial sector, plantation, economy and to some extent the cash crop growing areas on the basis of small holder cultivation were thus connected albeit indirectly, to the "modern" sector.

The extremely low wages given to the plantation workers, poor peasants employed by rich peasants and even much more importantly, workers employed in



industries, depended to a great extent on the subsistence economy. To understand this important phenomenon of the colonial economy let us discuss however briefly, the question of labour power as commodity.

Labour power sold to plantations and industries like any other commodity, is subject to the law of value. The law of value among other important factors point out that, a price of a commodity is determined by the amount of hours necessary to produce it. In practice however, we know that because of the operation of the law of supply and demand, the price vacillates around value and is rarely equal to value.<sup>4</sup>

When the problem of labour power as a commodity is considered, it is here seen that the cost of producing a worker or to be more specific his labour power, depends on many factors. In the first place a worker must eat in order to work. Secondly he must have a house (in most cases must rent one) and clothes not only for himself but also for his children and wife. Lastly and in our view point the most important aspect, a worker must bring up children by providing them not only with biological and social necessities of life, but also with education. Like this, a worker reproduces future labour power to work in the industries, plantations, etc.

Coming back to our discussion on the so called traditional sector, a sector that acted as reservoir of labour powers for the plantations and industries, it will be seen that this sector was very important in the reproduction of the colonial economy. Indeed, one could go to the extreme by stating that, it was a conditio sine qua non for the reproduction of the colonial economy.

The essence of super-exploitation and the concomittant super profits got from plantations and extractive and primary processing industries is explained by the subsistence sector (which is usually taken to mean an economy less involved in the monetary sector) which act as a supportive sector to the monetary sector. The wages paid by plantations and industrial owners and even by rich peasants in the cash crop growing areas, were not equal to the cost of production of the workers. The wage paid was just enough to reproduce the worker a one and not his family.

Moreover, and this is a point worth stressing, plantation workers and to a less extent the industrial workers, were not permanent workers. Particularly in the plantations (except for those who became squatters and therefore a little more expensive) the workers worked for a period long enough to enable them pay taxes, dowry and generally to establish themselves in their home villages in a manner that they can reduce the frequency of selling their labour power.<sup>5</sup>

Given this type of migratory labour power, it was not possible to move with the entire family every time one went to work in a plantation. The family, therefore, remained home reproducing future labour power (children and current labour power (when the husband came back)). Like this, the "subsistence" economy was very central in the production of cash crops in cash crop growing areas and plantations. Indeed, in the cotton, sisal, tea etc. exported to Europe were so many hours contributed by peasants from what appeared to be less integrated areas - integrated with the "modern" sector.

It would seem that we have made a digression from the main topic of rural development to that of political economy. It is therefore important to establish the relationship between this type of economy and the rural question. However before we can do so, we would like to point out that we have deliberately reduced the rural question (at least for the moment) to the subsistence traditional sector for the following important reasons.

First and foremost, we have attempted to show (albeit briefly) that the subsistence sector was/is not so traditional as some would like to have us believe. It is a sector that has been penetrated by capital through several indirect ways. Failure to grasp this fact as we shall show later,



can lead to some of our policy makers proposing inadequate rural development strategies.

Secondly, the supportive role of the subsistence sector deprived this sector of the attendant social and economic infrastructures that are found in the "modern" sector. However, whereas there was the absence of modern social and economic infrastructures, it does not follow therefore that pre-colonial relationships remained intact. This point that supplements the first, brings us to one important observation that in the subsistence areas of the rural sector, the rural question can not only be reduced to the absence of the development of productive forces.

True the colonial state did little in terms of provision of improved means of production in insecticides, pesticides and technical advice. This as we have been pointing out did not mean that the pre-capitalist/pre-colonial relations of production remained unchanged. Whereas the "domestic mode of production" was formed by people whose process of production was based largely on common labour and the organization of production, exchange and consumption was to some extent under lineage heads, the impact of capital penetration resulted in the individualization of the above mentioned relations of production.<sup>6</sup>

When we shift our analysis onto the cash crop growing areas, a slightly different rural problem is identified. The impact of money economy is much more visible and its impact on the nature of class formation is very big indeed.

One of the most important development is the beginning of class differentiation among the peasants. In the cash crop growing areas there develops a differentiation of the peasantry along the following lines: the rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasant and in rare cases, rural proletariates.

Whereas on the one hand the rich peasants own large areas of land and modern means of production and can employ outside labour power on a permanent basis, the same can not be said of the middle peasants. This section of the peasantry relative to the rich peasantry has a smaller area of land and less developed means of production. Indeed they can employ outside labour power during peak seasons, otherwise they depend on family labour.

The poor peasantry is the most marginalized section of the peasantry. They own very small pieces of land and marginal lands at that. This, together with rudimentary instruments of labour that they have, usually leads to insufficient products - insufficient to reproduce them for a full year. The result is of course that they are forced to sell their labour power to the rich peasants and middle peasants to supplement what they produce for subsistence.

Apart from the development of differentiation among the peasantry and the concomitant unequal ownership of land and means of production, the cash crop growing areas were favoured in terms of provision of technical services, agricultural inputs, advanced instruments of labour and indeed in general, received a lion share of both social and economic infrastructures. The colonial state reacting to the demands of industrial capital in developed capitalist countries, favoured cash crops and did all that was possible to make sure that cash crop production kept on increasing.<sup>8</sup> Having carried our analysis of the peasant question in Tanzania during the colonial rule at a very general level, what important observations can we make? What follows here below, is an attempt to concretise the peasant question in Tanzania in the following topics:-

(a) The change in the relations of production.

This change is manifest at two levels. One, in the so called subsistence or traditional sector and secondly in the cash crop growing areas. In the first we note a development of the process of



individualization of the production, distribution and consumption structure of the "domestic" mode of production with little differentiation among the peasantry. In the second, a process of peasant differentiation takes place.

- (b) Retardation in the development of productive forces and the concomitant decrease in the productivity of labour. Again here, this problem must be understood within the context of the two types of rural areas mentioned above. The provision of expert agricultural inputs and several instruments of advice, labour was different between the cash crop growing areas and subsistence areas.
- (c) The dichotomy between the urban areas and the rural areas and regional differentiation.

Although there are several other problems involved in the rural question, the above mentioned topics are the cause whereas these other problems can be considered as effects. Thus problems of prices, management and planning etc. were influenced by the demands of the colonial economy that was structured to serve foreign interests.

Having identified what we consider to be the most important aspects of the rural question in Tanzania, let us briefly go through what we have decided to call the colonial and neo-colonial rural development strategies before we can go into socialist rural development strategies.

## 1.2 THE COLONIAL AND NEO-COLONIAL RURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

### 1.2.1 Colonial Strategies:-

Both the colonial and neo-colonial rural development strategies were motivated by the demands alien to the interests of the population of Tanzania, as we have had the occasion to point out. The raison d'être behind these strategies was to increase production of cash crops while at the same time making sure that the subsistence sector - the supportive sector, was productive enough to support the colonial economy.

One of the most important agricultural project after the Second World War was The Groundnut Scheme. This scheme was launched in the 1940s to meet the increasing demand of edible fats created by the effects of the 2nd World War. This project was to be based on "very large Government run state farms." Application of "modern" means of production and here particularly mechanized production and the use of artificial fertilizers, pesticides and insecticides was seen as the only sure way of increasing production.

As a result of the above, sophisticated machines that in most cases were not "appropriate" to the type of soils and physical features of the chosen areas were imported in Tanzania. Together with these were artificial fertilizers, pesticides and insecticides and like the machines, these were applied without prior scientific testing of the soils and other important pre-requisites.

Without going into the details of the project, the "blind faith" in the "technology package" did not bring about the desired objective - increase production. Indeed, the project had to be stopped within the first ten years of its operation. The cost incurred by the colonial state was very high indeed. Whereas the estimated total cost of the project was £24 million by the time the project was abandoned, the amount of money spent had risen to £ 35 million.<sup>9</sup>

Indeed as one economist has correctly put it:

Blind faith in machinery and large-scale operations organized by Government led the most experienced



agriculturalists of the day to use £ 25 m. on a project that had so many flaws that if it had not failed for one reason it would still have failed for several others.<sup>10</sup>

The failure of this highly mechanized and well staffed project partly led to increasing emphasis on Land Improvement and Soil Conservation Schemes. These schemes were to cover the whole of Tanzania though a few areas were identified and much efforts devoted there. The following schemes were particularly important.

- (a) The Uluguru Land Use Scheme
- (b) Iringa Dipping Scheme
- (c) Sukumaland Development Scheme
- (d) Mbulu Development Scheme.<sup>11</sup>

These schemes aimed at increasing the productivity of labour not only in the cash crop growing areas but also in the subsistence sector. That the colonial government was now interested in food crops was not surprising. The early 1950s were particularly hard years in the agricultural history of colonial Tanzania. This was so mainly because of insufficient rains.<sup>12</sup>

Since as we have pointed out, the subsistence sector was very important in the reproduction of the entire colonial economy, the colonial state had no choice but to "improve" the conditions of agriculture even in the subsistence sector. This explains why the Land Improvement and Soil Conservation Schemes tended to be generalized.

Like the Ground Scheme, these emphasized the importance of "expert" advice in the form of extension officers and stricte control of the execution of the projects by colonial officials. The "experts" whose experience was mainly based in the "text-book" and the colonial administrators who viewed the African "cultivator" as the most conservative and thus the most likely peasant to dispise modern techniques- of agricultural production, could only regard the peasants as mere recipients of western "Civilization".

Given this understanding, the peasants were bull-dozed into accepting these "modern" practices of agriculture. The schemes were no more successful than the Groundnut Scheme and indeed, given the politically charged atmosphere, (it was towards the end of the nationalist struggle) the nationalist leaders availed themselves of this opportunity and indeed drew a lot of support from the peasants by articulating and concretising the grievances of the peasants - grievances that in the main, came from the forceful implementation of the schemes.<sup>13</sup>

Mainly because of the failure of the land improvement schemes and also because of the increasing political support by the peasant to the nationalist struggle, the colonial state towards the end of its life, resorted to another strategy. In the literature of rural development, this strategy is often referred to as the improvement or focal point approach.

The focal point approach though aiming at increasing production was politically motivated. This approach did not involve any movement of the peasants rather, it aimed at identifying particular peasants. The identified peasants who in many cases were rich peasants, were then helped by the colonial state. Extension services, provision of necessary agricultural inputs and in some cases means of production such as tractors, ploughs, and even loans were all given to key farmers in given areas.

The justification behind this selective approach to rural development was based on the belief that when efforts are concentrated on a few "enlightened" peasants, it would be easy to achieve positive results and that once the few selected ones succeeded, then this success would have had a trickle down effect. It was thus expected that the success of the identified peasants could be appreciated by the rest, thereby acting as a motivating factor.



Apart from the fact that this type of strategy increased differences amongst the peasants and created an extremely loyal peasantry, (which was in fact the aim of the strategy) the poor peasants who were expected to learn from the successes of the rich peasants were unfortunately very dull and But this was expected for the only lesson that could be learnt was increased exploitation and it has yet to be proved how exploitation can motivate a poor peasant to adopt modern ways of production.

#### 1.2.2. Neo-Colonial Strategies:

To the colonial officials and experts in rural development and ropology, both the land improvement and focal point approaches failed because an African peasant left in his place of birth, there are several environmental and cultural factors that make the introduction of modern techniques of production difficult. Both the failures in the land improvement and focal approaches were attributed to this fact.

Given this, the other best alternative was to shift selected peasants to completely new areas. The policy of settlement villages that began during the colonial era and was emphasized even more by the post colonial state, aimed at creating new villages where the peasants could be easily introduced to modern techniques of agricultural production.<sup>15</sup>

The new settlement schemes were not to be run on a household basis - the household head planning and managing production and therefore distribution but had to be organized as a factory - with a manager, an accountant and other administrative officials. This structure comes up clearly in a report by the Economic Survey Mission to Tanganyika prepared by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development" in November 1960 - one year before independence. Having made a review of previous strategies, the Mission advised the new government thus:

...the transformation program should rely to a considerable return on investment and effort by using selected, sparsely populated areas for planned settlement schemes and cattle ranches.

It was further pointed out that:

Many of the larger schemes would be best organized on partnership basis, in which traditional African farm, the land but a public authority provides capital works, productive services and an element of skilled management.<sup>16</sup> (emphasis ours).

As the above quotation shows, the aim was to create artificial conditions of if you wish, "hot house fashion" type villages in which a package of technology in the form of machines, (tractors and in some places even combined harvesters) various types of inputs and administrative and management staff could be imposed. The peasants were expected to be mere producers, with little or no say in the management of the settlements.

Apart from a few voluntary formed settlement schemes such as those organized under the Ruvuma Development Association (R.D.A.), the supervised settlement schemes ran into a lot of difficulties and the whole policy had to be abandoned.<sup>19</sup> Over-mechanization, problems of loan payments, imposition of outside and in some villages, expatriate managers and the initial free help given to the settlers contributed to the failure of the strategy. Indeed as J.K. Nyerere later pointed out:

It is important, therefore to realize that the policy of Ujamaa Vijijini is not intended to be merely revival of the old settlement schemes under another name. The Ujamaa village is a new conception based on the post Arusha Declaration understanding that what we need to develop is people, not things, and that people can only develop themselves. The policy is in fact



the result of learning from the failures which we had, and from the success of those small groups which began and grew on a different basis.<sup>17</sup>

Once more, the transformation approach strategy proved that important as technology may be in the transformation of the rural areas, there are other apriori conditions to be fulfilled for the technology so transferred to be effective. Apart from the fact that technology to be useful must be adapted and adopted by having the necessary minimum technology, the need to provide appropriate relations of production within which this process of adaption and adoption can be performed, is even much more important.

Rural development based on the Ujamaa Vijijini strategy aimed at providing the necessary relations of production which would involve the peasants in the process of forming their own villages and in the management of the activities of the villages. It is to this conception of rural development that we now turn to.

### 1.3 TOWARDS A SOCIALIST RURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

#### 1.3.1 Ujamaa Village strategy

The theoretical assumption behind this strategy was the establishment of villages on the basis of traditional way of living, a way of life in which people lived together, worked together, worked together and distributed the society's products equally.<sup>18</sup> It was here assumed that though capitalism had made inroads even in the rural areas, the penetration was not deep enough as to have destroyed the fabric of the old society.

With this theoretical assumption and given the fact that settlement schemes failed partly because of overinvolvement in the management of the village affairs by outside forces, the new strategy emphasized spontaneity and voluntarism. The party and the government could only motivate and advise the peasants but as to where to build a new village and the election of village management, this was entirely the responsibility of the peasants themselves.

J.K. Nyerere in a little quoted paper had the following to say on the new strategy:

An Ujamaa village is a voluntary association of people who decide of their free will to live together and work together for their common good. They, and no one else, will decide how much of their land they will cultivate together from the beginning, and how much they will cultivate individually. They, and no one else will decide how to use the money they earn jointly whether to buy an ox-plough, install water, or do something else. They, and no one else, will make all the decisions about their working and living arrangements.<sup>19</sup>

We can not, in a paper that is intended to be a project document, go into the details of the problems involved in the implementation of this strategy. Suffice to point out here that; most of the failures can be explained by understanding concretely the theory behind the Ujamaa rural development strategy.

This strategy assumed that it would have been easy to re-introduce traditional way of living or if you wish, the pre-colonial relations of production. It was then thought that the most difficult task was that of introducing modern ways of production thereby modernizing the traditional society.<sup>20</sup>

But as we pointed out in our theoretical discussion, capitalism had penetrated the entire breadth and width of Tanzania though this penetration took various forms. It was therefore unrealistic to expect that Ujamaa villages would have been easily accepted in the subsistence areas. The process of penetration of capital in these areas assumed the form of indiv-  
dualization of the process of production, exchange distribution and



consumption as we have already pointed out. No amount of persuasion through politicisation or otherwise would have achieved any success if this very important development had not been understood by the policy makers.

The result was of course decreasing productivity of labour in the communal farms whereas in the private farms there was relative increase in production although total production was brought down because of the amount of hours lost in communal farms.

Towards the end of 1970s it was increasingly appreciated that to increase productivity of labour in rural areas, it was necessary to involve the Party and the Government in the affairs of the village. Moreover, since the call for the formation of Ujamaa villages on a voluntary basis was accepted by few peasants mostly from the poor areas, it was necessary to involve the entire rural population of Tanzania.

The Second Five Year Development Plan in view of the failures discussed above argued against the policy of concentrating attention on limited areas which are capable of making movement to complete Ujamaa living over a short period of time....<sup>21</sup> The plan therefore emphasized the need to incorporate all parts of Tanzania into the main stream of socialist construction in the following way:

The alternative approach is to move towards Ujamaa on all possible fronts mobilizing the full range of government and political institutions behind the principles of Ujamaa. Under this approach we would seek, in the next five years to ensure that large segments of society will make some movement towards socialism.<sup>22</sup>

Both the 2nd Five Year Plan and The Presidential Circular No. I of 1969 while still emphasizing the need to form cooperative villages they at the same time emphasized the need for increased production. In fact, after 1969, more emphasis was put on production regardless of whether this was to be realized through communal or private means. Indeed this strategy of rural development is often referred to as development village strategy.

### 1.3.2 Development Village rural development strategy:

The period between 1970 and 1978 has been the most dynamic phase in the history of rural development in Tanzania. Since so many things have happened, we can only highlight the most important features.

The most important development to note is the increasing involvement of the Party and the Government in the formation of development villages. Under the so called "Operation" vijiji campaigns, the movements to new villages once these had been identified, was no longer voluntary. Where the peasants proved too slow to learn and understand the advantages of living together, force was used.<sup>23</sup>

The Party and the Government were so much concerned with seeing to it that most of the peasant should be living in development villages that in 1973 the Party issued a statement to the effect that all peasants should be living in development villages by 1976. To appreciate how this call was implemented either through force or persuasion, we shall once more quote from J.K. Nyerere in The Arusha Declaration Ten years after (1977) where he says:

In my Report to the 1973 TANU conference I was able to say that 2,028,164 people were living in villages. Two years later in June, 1975, I reported to the next TANU Conference that approximately 9,100,000 people were living in village communities. Now (1979) there are about 13,065,000 people living together in 7,084 villages.<sup>24</sup>



Thus between 1973 and 1977 there was a movement of about 11,056,836 peasants into planned villages. Of course the number of peasants settled into planned village is not as big as the figure above. The total number of peasants has been increased by the registration of settled villages as a result of the "1975 Villages Administration Act". More will be said on the importance of this act in the whole question of rural development.

Though the re-settling of peasants into planned villages and the registration of villages was a very important undertaking, a much important development was a change in the administrative structure of the villages.

It will be noted here that in the previous rural development strategies, there was a serious problem of village management. Indeed to a greater extent, the failures of these strategies can be attributed to management and administrative problems.

In the supervised villages of the era of transformation approach to rural development, we pointed out that too much dependency on outside management tended to create a dependent and suspicious peasantry, a peasantry that had no sense of responsibility. On the other hand, the Ujamaa village approach that was based on spontaneity and voluntarism tended to produce a leadership that was much too independent and was thus prone to corruption and one man management practices.

Even much more important, was the inability of cooperative unions to increase production in the rural areas. Indeed, given their historical role of buying cheaper from the peasants and selling dear to the Marketing Boards, most of the cooperative movements became centres of corruption.

In fact, as early as 1966, the Party and Government were already aware of the problems of the cooperatives. Thus it was revealed in a report by a Presidential Special Committee of Enquiry into Cooperative Movement of 1966 that the "basic defect is the shortage of appropriate manpower to staff the cooperatives. There are two aspects of the shortage of appropriate manpower although they are interrelated; dishonest employees and inadequately trained employees".<sup>25</sup>

In 1968 the Cooperative Societies Act was passed by the parliament. The most important aspect of the act was to give opportunity to some of the ujamaa villages be registered as primary cooperative unions. It was expected that it would have been easy for the Regional Cooperatives to provide help to the registered villages in the form of loans and various agricultural inputs.

However, the period between 1968 and 1975 proved that Regional Cooperatives were incapable of playing the role of productive institutions. There was very poor administration of loans and corruption continued unabated. The cooperatives deriving most of the profits (most of which went into the pockets of the cooperative officials) from marketing i.e. through the process of buying low and selling dear, were not interested in introducing scientific ways of production.

Given the above discussed problems of management and administration in the villages and cooperatives, the successes scored in the re-settlement of the peasants would have been lost if new changes had not been introduced.

One of the most important aspect of the 1975 Villages and Ujamaa Village Act<sup>26</sup> was the establishment of village governments. Whereas there had always been some forms of village governments, these governments are based on completely new principles. A village registered under this Act became a "legal entity" or to be much more precise, a "body corporate". Indeed to quote from the Act; once a village is registered, it becomes "a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and shall be capable in law of suing and of being sued in its corporate name...<sup>27</sup>



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Another important aspect of villages registered under this Act, is the ability to make bye laws. In part V of the Act, Section 20 it is stated that, "subject to the provision of this Act a village council may regulate its own proceedings and may make bye-laws governing its procedure".

As it can be seen from the above, one of the most important objectives of the act was to give more powers to the village governments; powers to organize not only the marketing of crop of the peasants but even much more important to organize production.

Given the fact that most of the Regional Cooperative Unions were marketing and not productive institutions, they became irrelevant and were duly dissolved in 1976. For the first time in the history of rural development, the peasants were given the power to manage their affairs - the long time middle man was removed.

It is however important to point out here that the abolition of regional cooperatives did not leave the peasants completely independent. In order that their crops be sold, it is necessary to have a link between the village governments and export agencies. With this view in mind, the various crop authorities were given this intermediary role.

Crop Authorities unlike the old regional cooperatives are not only interested in collecting the produce from the peasants but are also interested in providing both agricultural inputs (fertilizers insecticides, pesticides etc.) and technical advice mainly in the form of extension officers.

Before we conclude our discussion on the changes in the administrative structure of the villages, we would like to end with a comment on the question of village leadership.

Before the 1975 Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act, the village Chairmen and the village secretaries were not paid employees. Partly because of this there was a tendency for the village leadership to be less concerned with development problems. Now both the Village Chairman and the Village secretary have been placed on the pay roll.

An even more important development are the conditions for electing village leaders. Whereas before any body regardless of whether he or she was a Party member could qualify for village leadership, now for one to be elected a leader should first and foremost be a Party member. Hence for one to contest for a Village position and here particularly the Chairmanship and secretaryship, one has to be scrutinized by various Party committees.

Furthermore and here with particular reference to the village secretaries, these positions are not contestable. Applications from prospective candidates having been scrutinized by various Party Committees, two names are sent to the highest organ of the Party - the Central Committee. From these two names, one is nominated and once nominated become a permanent employee of the Party.

It can be seen from the above that village leadership is now centralized and that although the villagers themselves have a say in the election of their leaders, the involvement of the Party sees to it that the right leadership is voted in. It is thus hoped that given these organizational changes, village management and administration shall become much more efficient.

Having briefly gone through what we have chosen to call the "development village rural development strategy" let us finish this section with notes on the problems of transfer of technology to the rural areas.



### 1.3.3. Development Village Strategy and Transfer of Technology

There seems to have been a positive correlation between changes in the administrative structure of the rural areas and an increase in the transfer of technology from developed countries into the rural areas. Indeed, the period between 1970 and 1978, has seen an increased interest by multinational corporations and here particularly the World Bank in agriculture in Tanzania.<sup>29</sup>

The most interesting aspect of the World Bank loans is the "Minimum package Approach" (M.P.A.) whereby a "technical package" of seeds, fertilizers, insecticides and pesticides is given to the peasants on a loan basis. With this "technical package" it is thus expected that a "green revolution" in Tanzania can be achieved.

Within the context of the developing countries, countries that have little or no independent chemical industries, the import of a technical package of seed-fertilizers and insecticides and because most of the peasants can not afford to pay for the inputs, the government has to subsidize them.

In Tanzania, it is too early to make any definite statement on the failures or successes of this policy. Such projects like the National Maize Project which is organized by the World Bank and has a first class technical package, is still in its initial phase.<sup>30</sup> However drawing from the examples of other countries that have been going through a "green revolution" and from the initial experience of Tanzania, a few problems can be indicated.<sup>31</sup>

Seed selection is a very important step towards increasing the productivity of labour in agriculture. However, improved seeds can only grow well when certain conditions are met. One of the conditions is that the high yielding varieties (H.Y.V.) need fertilizers and insecticides/pesticides to be able to "give" more. Characteristic of the use of H.Y.V.s is that when used they tend to "technologically lock in" the peasants or to be precise, the importing country.

A peasant who uses a given variety of improved seed will need to have fertilizers and insecticides. Whereas no one would dispute the fact that the use of H.Y.V.s and the concomitant inputs are necessary for increased productivity, it is nevertheless true that under certain conditions, they are very devastating.

To emphasize this point once more, given the objective technological conditions of the developing countries - countries that have little or no independent chemical industries, a technical package of seed - fertilizer - insecticide can bring about two problems. The peasants being forced by the conditions of the use of H.Y.V.s find themselves forced to use fertilizers and insecticides which they can only have through loans and subsidized prices. In most cases a peasant accumulates so many loans that he eventually is discouraged from growing particular types of cash crops since most of his income goes into the payment of loans.<sup>32</sup>

On the other hand, the multi-national corporations being motivated by profit maximization are interested in supplying the peasants with more fertilizers and insecticides. This is done without proper soil and environmental scientific analysis and instead of increased productivity of labour, the blind use of these necessary inputs can lead to serious crop failures.<sup>33</sup>

The topic on technology transfer in agriculture is so wide and important to be covered satisfactorily in a paper that is intended to introduce the peasant question in Tanzania a very general level with the aim of identifying certain important areas for further discussion.

The aim of this small section was to try to show the relationship between the increasing efficiency in the management of rural development and the increasing interest of the multi-national corporations in the problems



of rural development. We are not here suggesting that this interest is in itself bad but rather that given the fact that most of third world countries lack producer goods industries and above all chemical industries, increased import of technology can lead to increased exploitation.

We can therefore conclude from the above analysis that effective improvement of the conditions of production in the rural areas entails introduction of appropriate agricultural technology at all levels in Tanzania. This includes the establishment of not only complex chemical industries and seed-multiplication centres at the national level but even more important the establishment of "appropriate" chemical industries, multiplication centres etc. at the regional, district and village level.<sup>39</sup>

### III. CONCLUSION

In the foregoing discussion we have attempted to situate the rural problem in Tanzania in a historical perspective. We have made a review of both the colonial and post-colonial rural development strategies pointing out major problems.

The analysis of the various rural development strategies has made us come to the conclusion that the problem of rural development can not be reduced to the question of technology alone. Both the groundnut scheme and transformation approach to rural development have shown that transfer of piece meal technology is not a sufficient panacea.

On the other hand we have also shown that the question of relations of production constitute one of the most important rural problem. When we were discussing the Ujamaa Village strategy we did point out that the traditional society can not be taken for granted. The entire colonial period has at the same been a period during which capitalism has penetrated the whole of Tanzania although this penetration took various forms.

The need to introduce communal production as we pointed out cannot be motivated by the need to live as "our forefathers" did however egalitarian and less exploitative the society might have been. Indeed it is important to point out here that communal production is not only a political necessity but indeed a technological necessity.

When the rural problem is viewed in a long term perspective, the question of communal production become as we have pointed out a pre-condition for the introduction of mechanized agriculture. This, is more so for a country such as Tanzania that is aiming at creating a socialist society. The only other alternative for large scale mechanized agriculture is a creation of capitalist farmers. This, given the nature of capitalism in third world countries, is impossible for it pre-supposes the displacement of the small peasants from their farms. Whereas this was possible during the transition period to capitalism (particularly in Britain) because most of the displaced peasants went to work in industries, this is almost impossible for 3rd WCs for where are the industries enough to absorb the displaced peasants even if the development of capitalist mechanized agriculture was possible?

Lastly we also saw that the problem of management is very important. Thus, the transformation approach to rural development failed partly because the peasants were not sufficiently involved in the management of their villages. On the other hand when discussing the ujamaa village rural development strategy we indeed pointed out that spontaneity and voluntarism can not work. Rural development to be meaningful and successful should be coordinated nationally.

The period between 1970 - 1976 as we pointed out has been that of reorganization of the management of rural areas and rural development. This period has seen an increased involvement of the Party and the Government in the formation of development villages. However, this has not meant an increasing central control of village administration but rather there has been an attempt to strike a balance between the centre and the periphery through the creation of village governments.

Lastly we saw that the village governments) of marketing conditions for the transfer of technology the attendant danger of increasing exploitation among those therefore, there has been no one variable among those has been able to solve the rural problem as we have like it in the preceding pages. We thus rightly conclude that rural development strategy should encompass several

### FOOTNOTES

1. For a better theoretical exposition of the development of capitalism and export of production V.I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Progress Publisher Moscow, 1975.
2. Refer to Brett, E.A., 'Colonialism and Underdevelopment: The Politics of Change, 1919-1939' NVC Publishers, 1973.
3. For a detailed application of dualist theory to Comparative Development Strategies in East Africa, see Iliffe, J., op. cit., pp. 150 - 174.
4. K. Marx, 'Wage Labour and Capital in Socialism', Moscow, 1973, pp. 150 - 174.
5. Iliffe, J., in 'Agricultural change in Tanzania' states that, "In a study made in Songea District was told that a man normally left home only once a week, stayed away for nine to eighteen months each year, incident in a man's life, rather than a pattern in much of Southern Africa", p. 17
6. or the concept of the "domestic mode of production" operated refer to Meillassoux, C., "The Social and economic basis of Kinship", Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 10
7. In Tanzania, these areas includes: areas with a long history of cash crop production
8. This was particular so after the 2nd world war which saw a lot of shortages in industrial countries
9. Coulson, A., "Agricultural Policies in Tanzania: A Review of African Political Economy, Number 1, 75, 76.
10. Ibid
11. Iliffe, J., op. cit., pp. 33 - 4
12. Deborah Bryceson, 'Peasant Food Production and the Historical Development of Tanzania', University of Dar es Salaam, November, 1976



lastly we saw that the increasing control (by the centre and the village governments) of marketing and production has created favourable conditions for the transfer of technology by multinational corporation with the attendant danger of increasing exploitation of the peasants. Indeed therefore, there has been no one variable among those mentioned above that has been able to solve the rural problem as we have attempted to conceptualise it in the preceding pages. We thus rightly conclude that any meaningful rural development strategy should encompass several aspects.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. For a better theoretical exposition of the relationship between the development of capitalism and export of productive capital refer to, V.I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of capitalism in Selected Works, Progress Publisher Moscow, 1975.
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4. K. Marx, "Wage Labour and Capital in Selected Works, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, pp. 150 - 174.
5. Iliffe, J., in Agricultural change in Modern Tanganyika, (1971) states that, "In a study made in Songea District in 1953, Prof. Gulliver was told that a man normally left home only once or twice in his life and stayed away for nine to eighteen months each time,... Migration was an incident in a man's life, rather than a pattern of life as it has become in much of Southern Africa"., p. 17
6. or the concept of the "domestic mode of production" and how this operated refer to Meillassoux, C., "The Social organization of the peasantry: the economic basis of Kinship", Journal of Peasant Studies, 1 (1) For the process of individualization of production, distribution and consumption "syllogism" of the domestic mode of production see, Bernstein, H., Capital and peasantry in the epoch of Imperialism, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 10
7. In Tanzania, these areas includes: Kiliňajaro, Dukoba and Mbeya areas with a long history of cash crop production.
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13. Iliffe, J., Nationalism and Reaction to Enforced Agricultural Change in Tanganyika During the Colonial Period", in Socialism in Tanzania Vol. I edit. E.A.P.H.; 1972, pp. 17 - 24.

14. Henry Kapulu gives a penetrating analysis of these two approaches in his "The Social and Economic Organization of Ujamaa Villages", in his thesis (unpublished) pp. 18 - 27, University of Dar es Salaam, 1973.

15. The Economic Development of Tanganyika; The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, November, 1960; Government Printers, Dar es Salaam.

16. Newiger, H. (1968), "Village Settlement Schemes: The Problems of Cooperative Farming in Ruthenberg" (ed) (1968), pp. 249 - 273.

17. Nyerere, J.K., Freedom and Development, Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 67.

18. Nyerere, J.K. in his "Socialism and Rural Development" (1967) points out that; "in a socialist Tanzania the, our agricultural organization will be predominantly that of co-operative living and working for the good of the community. This means that most of our farming would be done by groups of people who live together in a village; they would farm together, market together, and undertake the provision of local services and small local requirements as a community Freedom and Socialism, Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 351.

19 Nyerere, J.K. op. cit., p. 67

20. On the need to introduce modern ways of production into the traditional way of life Nyerere J.K. says, "The principles upon which the traditional extended family was based must be reactivated. We can start with extended family villages, but they will not remain family communities and they must certainly be larger communities that was traditionally the case. Also, modern knowledge must be applied by these communities and to them; and the barriers which previously existed between different groups must be broken down, so that they co-operate in the achievement of major tasks, Freedom and Socialism, op. cit., p. 348.

21. The Second Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July 1969 - 30th June, 1974 (Dar es Salaam Government Printer, 1974), Vol. 1., p. 27.

22. Ibid

23. It was then argued that, a peasant who refused to move into a planned village was like somebody who is sick but refuses to go to the hospital to be treated, mainly because of ignorance. A good neighbour does not leave this man to die in his house but should take him to the hospital even if it may mean using force. The patient will only appreciate this forcible action after having been cured.

24. Nyerere, J.K., The Arusha Declaration Ten Years After, 1977, p.

25. Saul, J., quoted from Rural Cooperation in Tanzania, THH; Dar es Salaam, 1975, edited by Cliffe, L., Peter Lawrence, et al, p. 207.

26. The Villages and Ujamaa Villages (Registration Designation and Administration), Act, 1975.

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29. Gerhard Techannel, Tanzania and the World Bank, mimeo University of Dar es Salaam



20. Tash Tashan, The Social Economic and Environmental Implication of white technology in Tanzania, ILMU, University of Dar es Salaam, March 1976.

21. Refer to V.P. Postgate, Fertilizers for India Green Revolution The Shipping of Government Policy, Asian Survey, Vol. 14, No. 8 (1974)

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24. For the World Bank policy on rural development, in general refers to Rural Development Sectoral Policy Paper, World Bank, February, 1975, It is also important to refer to World Bank Report on Agriculture and Rural Development in Tanzania, Report No. 541 TA, December, 10, 1974, Vol. II.

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DISTRIBUTION OF PEASANTS LIVING IN VILLAGES ACCORDING TO REGIONS, 1969 - 1975

REGION	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Arusha	-	50,200	14,018	19,918	20,112	25,356	275,675
Dar Es Salaam	-	1	1	1	1	4,713	40,000
Dodoma	-	26,400	239,366	400,330	378,915	504,952	630,658
Iringa	-	11,600	216,200	207,502	243,527	244,709	604,391
Kigoma	-	6,700	27,200	114,591	11,591	111,477	452,285
Kilimanjaro	-	2,700	2,016	5,009	4,934	3,176	4,508
Landi	-	70,673	203,128	75,080	169,083	218,888	266,664
Mara	-	84,700	127,370	127,370	127,570	108,068	233,632
Mbeya	-	32,900	64,390	98,571	103,677	86,051	934,800
Morogoro	-	6,000	10,513	23,951	19,732	25,909	123,256
Mtwara	-	173,027	371,560	441,241	466,098	534,126	667,413
Mwanza	-	4,600	18,641	32,099	49,846	40,864	437,095
Pwani	-	48,300	93,603	111,636	115,382	167,073	357,641
Rukwa	-	1	1	1	1	2,986	34,800
Ruvuma	-	9,000	29,433	29,430	42,385	62,730	378,511
Shinyanga	-	12,600	12,265	12,292	12,052	18,475	940,335
Singida	-	6,800	51,230	59,420	59,420	141,542	247,814
Tabora	-	16,709	18,408	15,115	19,995	48,730	553,770
Tanga	-	7,700	35,907	77,957	77,957	67,557	105,184
Z/Magharibi	-	5,600	9,491	16,777	13,280	15,968	26,432
Total	1,531,200	1,525,240	1,980,622	2,026,164	2,560,472	9,140,229	

Source: Kujenga Ujamaa Tanzania, Mchaka Kumi ya Kwanza - Kimwiga chapa na  
Printpek Tanzania Limited.



THE NUMBER OF VILLAGES AND PEASANTS SINCE 1967

Year	Total No. of Villages	Village Population	Average membership per village	% of Total population
		150,00	239	1.5
1967	536	531,200	272	5.3
1970	1,956	1,545,240	345	15.4
1971	4,464	1,980,862	357	19.8
1972	5,556	2,028,164	360	20.2
1973	5,628	2,560,472	511	23.5
1974*	5,008	9,140,229	1,260	70.4
1975	6,944	13,067,220	1,939	81.6
1976*	6,745	13,847,000	1,798	86.4
1978	7,668			

Source: Maendeleo Vijijini (Prime Minister's Office - Dodoma, 1978)

\* As a result of the 1975 villages and Ujamaa Villages (Registration Designation and Administration) Act, some permanent villages were simply registered and others amalgamated, hence the changes in the figures.



APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY FOR THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES:  
A MYTH OR REALITY?

V.L. KYULULE

A B S T R A C T

This small paper has attempted basically the following things;

- (a) Stressed that UDCs efforts at technological advancement have not paid off. Reasons have been suggested:
- (b) the concept 'appropriate technology' in rediscussed to reveal some errors; for it has been misconceived and wrongly applied.
- (c) that AT should mean acquiring 'historically necessary' Science and technology; which some authors have differently referred to as: 'core technology', 'bridge-head technology' or 'main muscle of industrial power' etc.
- (d) doubt is expressed therefore, as to whether achievements envisaged in (c) can be realised with the help of finance capital and its cohorts. It is strongly suggested that cooperation with the socialist countries would help very much.
- (e) however the preconditions are that UDCs must undergo basic political structural and institutional changes if (c) has to materialise.
- (f) this paper continues the debate, does not close it.

Secondly I am grateful to Dr. Nkonoki whose remarks helped me construct my own point of view.

Dar es Salaam  
October, 1979

ABBREVIATIONS

UDCs	Underdeveloped Countries
DCs	Developed Countries
AT	Appropriate technology
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNCSTD	United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development
WIPO	The World Intellectual Property Organisation
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
ACAST	The Advisory Committee on Application of Science and Technology (to Development to UN)
S and T	Science and Technology.



## Introduction

The debate on the choice of techniques and technology for economic development dates back from the early 70s. Partly the debate is a reflection of the disappointment of the politics of independence and nationalism. Partly the debate is a realisation that somethings have gone wrong somewhere. For what the independence governments had promised during their campaign manifesters have not been forthcoming. There is no democracy and equality. Unemployment is rife, Wages are below subsistence. Industry does not advance and the urban-rural dichotomy is all the more accentuated. As a result most countries have sank deeper not only in poverty but in neo-colonialism as well. Leys (1975) Mandani (1976) Gutkind and Wallerstrain (1976). But the creed of the masses remains the same: they want material betterment of their lives, abolition of exploitative economic relations and equitable redistribution of resources. In the wake of this saga most third world countries became frantic and went all along to maintain the exploitative relations. Those who decided to challenge the realities of underdevelopment came face to face with imperialism and its new strategies of exploitation. Hoxsa (1978) Nabudere (1977) Woddis (1976). In any case most of the third world countries have attached much importance on technological advancement. They all agree that without a technological break through, economic development will be remote. The fundamental question however is how does a country go about it? This has remained a basic question whether an UDC has opted for capitalism or Socialism! whether it is aligned or non aligned. The situation becomes more complicated for the UDCs that seek socialism and non-alignment! it was in an attempt to answer this question that several countries embarked on importing huge technology from abroad (Ghana) (Mali) etc. These technologies were far beyond the capacity for most countries to control economically and politically. As most of these strategies flopped and 'technological determinism' lost currency, some countries rejected it (Arusha Declaration 1967) (Common Mans Charter 1966). UDCs decided to adopt a more 'sober' and realistic approach towards technological development.

The UDSs attributed their failures to mostly what they thought had been an erroneous equation of technological development with industrial development. In countries where the rural sector was the most dominant contributing 80 per cent of the GDP, it would then not be 'real economic, to advance industry. But that attention must be focussed on Agriculture.

....there was evident need to improve technologies (not industry) in the agricultural and urban informal sectors of the economy and to undertake programme of adaptation and design in order to systematically and purposively improve and expand the overall range of choice.<sup>1</sup>

The idea articulated here is that the technological changes would not exclusively look at the industrial sector as the initiator. Hence the debate on whether to start heavy or light industry was almost concluded. They would start with light industries specialising on consumer goods. With this in mind the pressure for import substitution industries became the order of the day, although this was offset by the high import content registered in the said commodities meant for domestic consumption. Whats more all along production and processing basically remained for export i.e. techniques and technologies acquired were those that enhanced the export prospects of a commodity.

Whatever the case though the growth rates of GDP has increased from 4 to 6.5 per cent generally), 2 this has not eradicated unemployment it has not roused wages nor has this produced plenty. Today in fact the poor world is becoming poorer. The argument is simple. Without technological advancement there is no economic development and without the latter there is no political independence. Technological advancement however cannot be achieved without what is to-day known as 'appropriate technology' (hereafter AT). The spirit of this concept stresses that traditional technologies alone cannot help the UDCs undergo a technological transformation. On the other hand it rules out the importation of super technologies (mostly implying capital intensive,



highly specialised technologies). In other words the UDCs are at a stage of development which would require more or less an intermediate technology something relevant to the situation of underdevelopment. A recent book on AT has attempted a definition:

...appropriate technology is technology which is most suitably adapted to the conditions of a given situation. It is compatible with the human financial and materials resources which surround its application. 3 (our emphasis)

The Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development to the United Nations (ACAST) says about the same that:

...appropriate technology might be broadly defined as that technology which is appropriate in a given technosocio-economic framework at a given point of time, it is that technology which contributes the most to the social and economic aspects of development. 4

At once the concept appears vague and stands lacking in all analytical and scientific value (Edquist C and O 1979), because it stands loosely in the context of the problems of underdevelopment. Those who have already discussed choices of technology seem to have been dealing not with the essence but symptoms of underdevelopment Cooper C (ed) (1973) Rosenblatt (1979). The problem is not whether we can use advanced technology but (a) why we cannot have the capacity to adopt advanced technology (b) if the international and national socio-economic structures institutions can facilitate the technological transformation. And as if in an answer to the above position, ACAST says inter alia that:

...any consideration of appropriate technology should include three factors of highest priority: that the technology should contribute to fulfil the basic needs of the mass population, that it should be employment generating and that it should be capital saving. 5

Hereafter and in this method AT is seen not as means to an end but as an end in itself. That is we must provide an AT that solves immediate problems of unemployment and basic needs. The dangers inherent in this conception of AT and the methods concomitant: leave a lot to be desired. Problems of unemployment, shortage of basic goods less capital, less kills, hunger and ignorance are the symptoms of 'underdevelopment'. One cannot understand the nature of these problems from the scientific and technological point of view without understanding the nature of imperialist science and technology. Technology that does not help accumulation at the place of production is inappropriate in the long run; whether it is labour intensive; provides for basic needs for the mass of the population etc. AT must help build up an independent, indigenous science and technology Sagasti (1979). AT must not be an end in itself it must be a means towards something which is anti-imperialist in the economic sense.

#### The Erroneous Conception of AT:

Even before dust has settled down on this debate over AT, handbooks have already appeared on how to use AT everywhere. At the same time AT has become one of the major issues already of UN development cooperation at bilateral as well as multilateral levels. Increasingly also it has therefore become a mere slogan; a veritable carrot stick from the advanced countries. In this matrix of opinions conceptions and expectations the real content operational strategy of AT has not been scientifically grasped. Pathetic enough it has been misconceived by the UDCs intellectuals and politicians. The simplicity brevity and at times its substitutability in diction, has increased confusion; nor will the many papers, handbooks, conferences and shops be able to resolve the contradiction in practice before they can articulate the correct theoretical premises for third world AT. In other words AT must answer basic questions; whose AT? AT in what epoch? AT with what class and ideological means both at national and international levels?



## AMERICAN IDIOCY SERIES - NO. 1

### SOY SAUCE AND PRAWNS

News item: May 1959: The United States has prohibited the transshipment of a cargo of Chinese canned prawns and soy sauce destined for Canada.

NEITHER CANNED PRAWNS NOR SOY SAUCE  
MAY AMERICA'S BORDERS CROSS;  
CANADIANS, AMAZED, CONFUSED,  
ARE IRRITATED AND AMUSED.

SOY SAUCE ENDANGERS SECURITY,  
THE REASON'S THERE FOR ALL TO SEE,  
SO DEEPLY RED IT'S PURPLE NEARLY  
- CRIMINAL NATURE PROVEN CLEARLY.

AND AS TO CHINESE BIG PRAWNS CANNED,  
THEY OBVIOUSLY MUST BE BANNED;  
IN ARMOUR CASED FROM TAIL TO HEAD,  
WHEN BOILED THEY TURN A FIERY RED.

AN IRON CURTAIN AMERICA BLINDS,  
HYSTERIA GRIPS THE WHITE HOUSE MINDS;  
'STRATEGIC GOODS' - WHAT IF THEY'RE EDIBLE?  
SUCH IDIOCY IS SCARCELY CREDIBLE.

YUAN SHUI-PO



AT in what concrete sense? Outside these parameters, we will come out of AT, not withstanding the goodwill. It is this goodwill, example that has encouraged people all over the third world to do something about AT. 7 And so we have to put the record straight before imperialists and its cohorts gets the upper hand. Populist concepts like AT are good breeding ground for imperialism. Such a concepts blur class struggle and make the oppressed see friends in enemies and vice-versa. Imagine on occasion when even the most 'appropriate technology' of brick making would require an expert from abroad. The validity of any AT will only be weighed by its 'effective contribution towards doing away with underdevelopment not high costs, unemployment, large-scale production problems etc., which are simply by-products of underdevelopment. AT must grapple with the essence of underdevelopment. In case this brief commentary does not succeed to expose the fallacies of AT as is presently conceived; we will be ready to express these views as a basis for a renewed discussion on AT. It follows therefore that our critique should attempt to get out of the present populist fog on AT. With this in mind we intend to do the following:

- a) attempt a conceptualisation of what AT should mean scientifically in our present epoch.
- b) highlight the errors which are conceptually derived in planning and implementing AT.
- c) then we shall embark on assessing the general problems of creating real AT in the era of finance capital.
- d) we shall of course problematise point (c) in the context of what to-day is very fashionable i.e. regional, international and multinational cooperation. Most of the works we read and all the conferences so far on AT have called for international cooperation in order to solve the problems of science and technology. 'In most cases the advanced countries define the nature of cooperation. Say, what kind of international cooperation can battle with underdevelopment? Certainly not any king!

#### Our Conception of Appropriate Technology:

We shall borrow Sachs, I. definition in for a start:

...the concept of appropriate technologies is not synonymous with labour intensive, intermediate or village technologies...

To be effective, the appropriate technologies approach must be applied along the whole spectrum of technologies to all technological choices, granted that a development strategy must rely on a mix of technologies with different characteristics and capital intensities. The crux of the matter is to be able to select and then to manage the most suitable mix...<sup>8</sup> (our emphasis)

The above is a complex process. It covers also the whole process of acquiring scientific and technological know how. It implies a democratic national and international system from where the technological choice can be made. Secondly this choice cannot be any choice, but must be able to increase national scientific and technological self reliance and a dynamic advancement of the socio-economy in question. Hence AT must be essentially for production. It must generate skills in agriculture industry and other productive activities. In this context AT should not be seen as an end in itself but rather it must act as something that transforms dependence into independence (i.e. technologically). Our conception of AT suggests, at this juncture, that scientific and technological cumulative achievements must first identify and endogenise the critical scientific-technological bridge-heads<sup>9</sup> that should act as the motif-force of a self-reliant science and technology. The latter does not mean autarky. It simply conceptualises that base, which once acquired permits a country institutionally and structurally to adapt, design and innovate technology according to the concrete situation obtaining in an area. This implies that AT cannot be seen as that which is merely within



the poor man reach, easy to manage less expensive less sophisticated etc. This is certainly calling for the maintenance of the status quo. That's why some critics have seen this strategy as perpetuating dependence hence inappropriate. Why has it happened that in most of the UDCs people can only handle less sophisticated machines, cannot keep up pace with technological changes? This importance is historical. Once that moment by passes the UDCs; they were left jogging in the low-tide muddy waters. This quandary has been very well articulated by Fungo 10 when he says:

...dependence was based on an international division of labour in which the dominant centres reserved for themselves the economic activities that concentrated on technical progress... the dependence was maintained by controlling the assimilation of new technological processes through the installation of productive activities with the dependent economies all under the control of groups integrated into dominant economies.  
(our emphasis)

In other words the AT problematic has to be viewed within an historical perspective. We do not have to repeat here the bloody annals of colonial history i.e. how colonialism first destroyed UDCs political power and then destroyed their economies. And this was specifically directed to the motor of politico-economic motion--the productive sector. Peripheral economies were to serve accumulation interests of the metropole and so was its science and technology. Hereafter all 'progress' in S and T was void of: (a) productive economic activity for expanded reproduction at the place of production, (b) assimilation capacity by those involved in the process; for the simple reason that the colonised were 'made to produce what they did not consume and consumed what they did not produce'. There was then an incongruence between the productive forces and relations of production. This breakdown had the logical ramifications in the future development of technology -- to-day it is amplified as poverty in science and technology. The frontiers of S and T were sealed to the colonised. The latter saw things in their disconnected form, without that crucial and dynamic link between science and production techniques. This disconnection has been maintained by the nature of the international division of labour and imperialist monopoly of S and T. This was not the case with historical development of S and T in advanced countries. Between the 15th and 18th; countries like Britain, Holland, Spain and France were involved in the theft of knowledge, especially mathematical and scientific formulae (physics and chemistry) from countries like China, Arabia, India, Africa, etc. World Knowledge appropriate by and accumulated first in Britain, then in the whole of Europe at a particular conjuncture and moment provided the dynamism for a scientific and technological revolution. 12

This certainly was a result of a long process that had began in the hellenic period up to the Renaissance. Moreover this took place concurrently with what Sagasti 13 calls the shift from a 'polytechnic' era of varried local technological responses towards a 'monotechnic' era, in which the variety of responses was reduced and a few specific production techniques predominated in each field of activity. The merger of both currents i.e. the evolution of thinking and transformation of production techniques constitutes what is known as a scientific and technological revolution. And when capitalism emerged as a dominant mode of production, it created the necessary dynamism and dialectic between science and production. Hereafter S and T in the DCs was for production. If this happened in Europe the opposite took place in the colonised world. The process of capitalist advancement in S and T was also a process of underdevelopment in our science and technology; so that we cannot understand UDCs poverty, timidity and closed frontiers that bind them, without linking it up with what has happened in the DCs must search for a new approach characteristic of their concrete situation - Underdevelopment, sounds sarcastic and erroneous; for the simple reason that most of the UDCs given conditions are with in the way of finance capital. The latter has penetrated all the economic sectors of the UDCs. No, most of the AT suggested by the DCs are not in the long run to the best interest of the UDCs who want to get rid of underdevelopment i.e. create independent integrated self-sustained economies. The 'leap' must be performed and enable the UDCs to join the ranks of the DCs.



Everyday we read in the papers that poor countries are becoming poorer. Certainly this poverty cannot be ended by UN resolutions and debates. The world market is an exchange forum (for commodities not words). The better the commodities the higher the prices they fetch. Success in this competition cannot come about by moralisation. It is a question of acquiring 'advanced' S and T. The UDCs must acquire this technology which always puts the ICs on an advantage. For instance how much of foreign currency would UDC get from its AT derived goods? The gap increases and the UDCs keep on losing; and this seems to be going on in an arithmetical progression if not geometrical. Notwithstanding the techniques, technologies both in human and physical terms the UDCs still register poor growth rates, vast unemployment and malnutrition. This means that an analysis on AT will have to shift from purely scientific and technological terms and must acquire a social character. We must perceive AT in its proper institutional, structural, class and ideological perspectives both at national and international levels. In other words to talk of acquiring AT is to talk of politics and the latter means power politics—to be precise. Kaplinsky R. has this to say about the above issues:

...acquisition of technology breeds conflict because the technology which is acquired is a primary input for the generation of surplus. Control over this technology is thus crucial not only because it leads to control over the generation of this surplus but also because it is an important element on the control of the distribution of the surplus....<sup>14</sup>

And so acquisition of genuine AT will proceed hand in hand with the resolution of the political question both in the UDCs and internationally. The same colonial structures and institutions cannot bring about this transformation. The same colonial education pattern cannot achieve the new goals, the same politicians cannot be expected to turn the tables against themselves. There is a social pattern in the UDCs that benefits from the inherited colonial systems and they cannot relinquish that on their own. At the international level there are the MNCs that have the monopoly in S and T. How do we resolve this historical conjuncture so real and so retrogressive? On the resolution of this problematic centres the debate on AT — out of which two variants will emerge: utopian and scientific. We will come back to this, however, let us persist on finding out the correct version of AT. UDCs correct conception of AT must grasp the overall matter, historicity and dialectic of science and technology. Like human societies S and T has grown both quantitatively and qualitatively. To-day for example the world has reached capitalism and is on the threshold of moving into socialism. It means that progress for mankind lies with capitalism or socialism i.e. if compared to feudalism and primitive life. In other words we cannot bank on outlived modes of production in order to register progress. We will simply regress. Analogous to this the world has so far reached a certain historically determinate threshold of S and T. Certain S and Ts belong to feudal or slave mankind; not capitalist or socialist mankind. UDCs must opt for that AT which has a dynamism of its own, more progressive and more human. There is a historically necessary S and T at each phase of human progress that performs the leap into a new culture of progress. When mankind did not find new vistas of S and T to keep man on the move he stagnated. When he found new skills he progressed. Each historical conjuncture has specified determinate historically necessary S and T. Marx was able to see this very early. He said:

...modern industry had... itself to take in hand the machine, its characteristic instrument of production and to construct machines by machines it was not till it did this that it build up for itself a fitting technical foundation and stood on its own feet. Machinery simultaneously with the increasing use of it in the first decades of this century appropriated by degrees the fabrication of machines proper. <sup>15</sup> (our emphasis)



Any serious and independent technology must first build on this and then creatively surge forward. Only in this way can we talk of appropriate technology with a capacity and capability to adapt, innovate... and be dynamic and so be able to turn the tables against imperialism. The UDCs must acquire a revolutionary technology, something close to what Marx said that the revolution in production is ushered in when small scale producers can apply tools that together produce power (motor); can transmit and use other tools. This has to be a single unified process. An activity that not take care of this unity of process empties technology of its dynamic. UDCs scientific and technological activities must first restore and then maintain it. Hence they (UDCs) should not dwell for too long on windmills, wheelbarrows, handheld wooden maise shellers, but must move quickly to historically necessary S and T. Matters stand the UDCs cannot undergo qualitative change in thinking and its concomitant transformation of production techniques if, they continue to capitalise on the 'refuse of past S and T. This conclusion emanates from partly what we have discussed already and from the following hypotheses that:

- a) imperialism does not advance the productive forces i.e. advance it in the sense characteristic of the period of competitive capitalism.
- b) for any progress in S and T to take place in ne-colonies the latter must undergo a fundamental socio-economic transformation
- c) without the support of the world socialist system's division of labour; UDCs can hope for very little progress in S and T.
- d) S and T handled by UDCs does not generate the links between knowledge and evolution of production techniques. The two aspects remain separate and everything will be alone to perpetuate the anomaly.

In the final analysis finance capital under the mask of the AT call; go ahead to lay down programmes that are partly short run palliatives and constitute the UDCs simply as elements of constant and variable capital for accumulation needs of monopoly capitalism.

#### Appropriate Technology should mean Historically necessary Science and

We must in this case categorically refute the contention by the I scientific and technological revolution assumes different forms which consistent only with the needs of the industrially advanced countries would prove unsuitable for the economically retarded UDCs. However scientific and technological revolutions have one basic character, they raise productivity. The latter increases accumulation which enlarges out for investment.

Today when several scientific and technological leaps have taken the UDCs must identify and establish the scientific and technological bridge heads.<sup>18</sup> that are necessary to transform the UDCs i.e. engineer S and T as well as petrol chemical complexes, the power plants etc. T historically necessary science and technology can be summarized thus Parsatharathi:

if the third world countries are not able individually or collectively to hold the bridge heads (that are the main muscles of industrial power) which these half-dozen front-line high-technology/strategic modern industrial sectors represent, the 'alternative' largely rural oriented technological structure will not be able to function, and where it does function it will deepen the already grave economic and technological dependence of the UDCs to the DCs.

He adds:

Once the critical sectors have been firmly secured on a self-reliant basis under national control, the rest of the economy can be internalised, <sup>19</sup> including wheelbarrows!



and this is what Russia, USSR, Cuba, Mongolia, China<sup>20</sup> Korea and now Yugoslavia have/are doing. The third world must follow this trend otherwise no amount of appropriate technology at the local level would save the UDCs from where they are. We should not forget what Lenin said about this that:

Without a highly developed large scale industry advancement is impossible anywhere, still less is it possible in peasant countries.<sup>21</sup>

Only advanced technology can help the UDCs compete with the DCs. It is not we lamenting our plight. We have to act. And correct action is that one which looks for historically necessary science and technology. Take for instance the sudden talk and excitement over solar energy and solar technology.<sup>22</sup> What the DCs say is that solar energy would be useful to the tropics...because they have a lot of sun heat. But is that all? Where is the technology for that accomplishment? Listen to this:

in the gathering pace for solar technology development, developing countries are now concerned about their ability to cope. In solar pumping and power generation a major area of application of solar technology in developing countries, the western multinationals often backed by funds from their governments are now taking the lead...<sup>23</sup> (our emphasis)

Or take the fuel crisis, couldn't we resort to some plant juice to resolve the problem? We have much raw material but we do not have the technology. What we need is historically necessary S and T that can make use of this raw material. If we don't go ahead for it, every new invention in the applied sciences will appear as magic and yet another milestone for our effective domination exploitation and oppression.

### The Problem is Political

Our conception of appropriate technology presupposes self-reliance and disengagement. It presupposes shifting from the capitalist international division of labour into an egalitarian international division of labour. The UDCs require a particular kind of help they require a concrete type of administrative managerial and political arrangements. These considerations therefore automatically discriminate: they delineate as to who cannot and can embark on a proper footing for AT they suggest on the proper structural and institutional framework that can enhance the process and progress towards an authentic AT. These strategies do not see in the MNCs as friends indeed for the technological need. There are thus two lines in this political question. There must be changes first in the UDCs themselves that are ready to democratise S and T and conscious and ambitious enough to mobilise the masses of the people for advanced S and T. On the other hand there must be corresponding international climate to enhance these internal developments. This presupposes class struggle at national and international levels. This is where cooperation with the socialist countries maybe extremely important. We need not here dwell over the limits that the MNCs set up when dealing with the UDCs. In a way we have been doing this all along in this paper. What is appalling however is the extent the UDCs shun serious cooperation with the socialist block! Well some are afraid of social imperialism<sup>24</sup> others believe in non-alignment (whether they are capitalists or socialists). Suffice it to say that political theories have emerged that obscure the basic law of political economy whereby to day there are two dominant modes of production: socialist and capitalist and that the lesser modes (or spheres) are articulated by either. Even the so called transitions to either; smack of the dominance of either. In most cases theories and philosophies have to emerged to justify ignorance or indecision! Many of the projects advanced and sanctioned by finance capital are actually examined from the point of view of cost benefit analysis i.e. their purely economic viability. No other laws apply but those of commodity relations. It follows that science and technology will be distributed on this basis; for this part and parcel of the global intensification of the commodification process,<sup>25</sup> in which case also economies of scale are of considerable importance. The logic of this demands that the creation of AT within the imperialist framework be guided by proletarian vigilance. Otherwise finance capital acts as the



decelerator of UDCs in their attempt to freely utilise the historical achievements of mankind in science and technology. This is so not withstanding UNICSTD (Arusha, Vienna and Nairobi, WIPO efforts to battle with the ICs and their multinationals. And they hope this strategy will in the long run prove positive. Only they cannot explain why the gap between DCs and UDCs increasingly widens.

On these grounds we think that genuine AT can be achieved and nurtured within the world socialist system of division of labour. We are aware of the progressive developments taking place among the CMEA 26 countries where in their system of division of labour and specialisation provides also for the muscle of industrial power in terms of Heavy Industry. This is the missing link in the cooperation with the capitalist countries. In this context AT compliments the basic industrial structures of Dept I which is the most dynamic in generating growth of an economy. Another point which has proved disastrous to most UDCs is lack of confidence. In most countries the leadership is never sure of the support of their masses. They cannot therefore embark on realistic programmes in fear that such moves would disrupt peace and order. This fear or rather timidity has been articulated as a moral principle. They would always look at USSR and 'VOW' never to create 'Siberia' in their own countries. But a critical survey reveals that Siberias exist in all the UDCs in one form or another. The difference is that USSR decided to have a Siberia between 1930s and 1960s. It is difficult to speak of the same to day. But most of the UDC's Siberia has been extended almost indefinitely. What we are saying here is that we cannot shove aside laws of political economy and dwell on utopia in the hope that the latter will materialise one day. We will not enter here into the details as to how to advice on social and institutional changes for effective AT. For very much depends on those in power, in anyone country. If they don't what 'appropriate technology' it simply does not come. Such a will need not always be objective in fact it is always subjective - i.e. permeated with class interests. How then do the progressive elements in a system influence and determine revolutionary changes? This depends on how intelligent the revolutionaries are, but one thing class struggle is a science that requires first class precision; because mistakes are always remedied at a very high cost.



## Conclusion!

The salvation of the UDCs lies in acquiring first the historically necessary science and technology; what Barsathasarathi has referred to as bridgehead technology and Ranis-27 has called core technology. Indecision, procrastination and industrial strategies of dubious success will only enhance underdevelopment. The UDCs need advanced technology if only they wait to impart to their development that dynamism and acceleration which is required for the said countries to come a little closer to the DCs. This is all the more urgent for the UDCs that intend to build socialism. Why is this necessary? In the sense that:

a) Two decades of consultation with imperialism (1960-1980) has not reversed the trends! The DCs are flying' while even running is fettered in the UDCs. The UDCs cannot afford this stagnation. In fact it is unfair to our coming generations...because we are not ready to suffer the hazards of advanced technological transformation; this generation is selfish!

b) Some countries among the UDCs have almost emptied the coffers of revolutionary rhetoric; what people want now is material progress. The latter does not come from mere slogans and fortnightly resolutions. They are only achieved by mobilising the masses towards correct strategies of development. The latter include acquiring modern S and T. And it is not true that the UDCs are helpless in front of the contradiction between accumulation and consumption. China has proved that both can increase without choking the other.<sup>28</sup> And yet there are very few petty bourgeois leaders who are ready to follow the Maoist type of 'programmes'. They will always harp on one fact: "we can't ape China, Cuba, Korea... we are different and we must follow our characteristics". These differences are always exaggerated and that helps justify fascism, political weakness or outright surrender to imperialism.

Without an advanced science and technology there is no political or economic independence. There is only backwardness and dependence. This beast known as 'NOT YET TIME' is very treacherous; the UDCs must undergo basic socio-economic changes and immediately send as many men and women all over the world to train in the critical bridge-head technology. It is an open secret that Msumbiji has sent thousands of young men and women to Cuba, GDR and Russia. On the other hand most of the UDCs do not have discipline in their programmes of action. They are quick to find scape goats for any of their problems. Inefficiency, laxity corruption nepotism and laissez-faire attitude have contributed very much to UDCs miseries. Certainly something could be done to reduce some of these problems.

Why for instance can't the UDCs make some science subjects or even some branches compulsory up to University level? We could encourage literary works of scientific nature e.g. novels; pamphlets; ABCs of Science for children etc. Also we do not know who has 'destined Adult Education as a preserve of politics, history and languages alone! It could as well be equipped with basic scientific information. In other words we are suggesting an establishment of a peoples scientific culture. This means much work for the many National Scientific Councils proliferating in most UDCs. It looks like most of them are nominal institutions that have created posts for some peoples; rather than actually dependable institutions that can initiate independent research and popularise findings for production. What is worse, is that in some countries such institutions have been feared by their own governments and so have never adequately been financed by them. Let us not forget that "no technological development is possible unless the political system is willing to give strong support to technological activities, way beyond the mere lip-service which most governments pay..."<sup>29</sup> Fourthly planning for economic development must ipso facto mean planning for science and technology; some regimes have tried to separate the two and so scientific and technological decisions are met by petty bureaucratic blocks in the form of legal jargon and petty politics. Whatever the case the place of science and technology in human progress is clear:



...a country not involved in some respects at least of advanced science tends (un) to be outside the main stream of human development with the most serious consequences for its intellectual life and its productive power.<sup>30</sup> (our emphasis)

If the UDCs do not woken up to the realities we have discussed in the then, they will find themselves being 'talked to death' in the world and it is anybody's guess that after imperialism has bought, much to 'wheelbarrow appropriate technology' we shall be advised to move to 'cutting-appropriate technology' and this generation will have a liability to our future sons and daughters. There are no changes (qualitative ones) without sufferings... This truism is the ABC of dialectical and historical materialism. We have yet to be proved wrong about the

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## ZIMBABWE: FROM LIBERATION TO INDEPENDENCE

Mzirai Kagero

As the Lancaster House conference on the constitutional settlement of the Zimbabwe question appears to be near conclusion, the present phase of the independence struggle and its context within the process of national liberation as a whole requires an urgent and objective analysis. This is for one or two reasons, which are themselves not peculiar to this question but must be considered crucial at this phase of the Zimbabwe struggle. On the one hand it is important to have a clear conception of the class context of any political struggles rather than proceed from their political forms to grasp their real content. On the other hand, to proceed without this context endangers the practical relation of theory to practice, and it is precisely in this connection that we consider the present contribution as of some significance, if it shall have been able to comprehend the real situation conceptually at a broadly scientific level.

The difference between political forms and their real content is perhaps the main point at issue, the starting point of these notes. We need to get out to distinguish between the self-consciousness of the parties involved in the Zimbabwe struggle, and identify their real class context, and therefore the forms of their ideological articulation and political organisation. This is in recognition of the fact that there has been a broad discussion of the question of liberation but only too often the real relations underlining the struggles have been less than brought out, in which case the subjective consciousness of the various political forces organised in various factions are taken as the point of departure of analysis.

Materialist analysis starts from the comprehension of real relations through which the material life process in society is carried on. From a conception of these relations, the classes that are involved in the process of production should be viewed from their objective relation to the total context. This enables the comprehension of the consciousness of each class from its objective position. Its own consciousness is its inverted consciousness, taken from the viewpoint of its own interests in the total context. There is no scientific comprehension of the real context, that is, a scientific conception of the real movement of history, except by the class which, at a certain point of the development of the material productive forces, is the historical agent of the negation of the relations of production with which material production has been at work hitherto, and has turned into its fet-

The process of imperialist penetration, the export of capital into various sectors of the colonial economy and the resultant requirement for a broad economy servicing this penetration of capital is the point of departure of analysing a colony or a neocolony. The total capital entering the process of imperialist domination does not exist simply as isolated units of capital but relates in a definite way as to have a distinct social form in which all this process develops. This is the context of the objective differences between different colonies and subsequently neocolonies. The difference begins at the mode of penetration of finance capital, and hence determining the process of class formation, of the classes that are created through the penetration of capital and the development of this servicing economy, a comprador structure. The particularity of the specific context thereby determines the character of the nationalist movement and the politics of the petty-bourgeoisie after that, in the sense of the articulation of the total interests of accumulation of each class, within their definite context of domination by imperialism, which proceeds from the particularity of its colonial context.

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A broad characterisation and tracing of class formation in Zimbabwe was recently given by O.T. Mshambi and B.J. Kisanja, relying mainly in the report by Maputo University. We consider the characterisation as adequate in terms of the manner in which differentiation has occurred among the original African peasantry (which also becomes a peasantry on account of colonial/imperialist domination) into a petty-bourgeoisie, working class and peasantry. What we would need to do here is to draw certain interpretations or correlations of this situation in terms of the politics of the nationalist movement.

The way in which the nationalist movement has developed cannot be adequately comprehended without a discussion of the development of "classical" national liberation struggle in China in particular, if the Vietnamese case be considered similar to that of China. The historical character of the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe cannot be considered to be in the same as that of China, in the sense of the difference between the decadent semi-colonial and semi-feudal situation in China, and the resolution of the national question thereby demanding the revolutionary negation of the total comprador national bourgeois context. The historical specificity of the total comprador national bourgeois context. The historical specificity of the national question in China resulted in a situation where it was no longer the national question in bourgeois context which would lead the struggle for its resolution from its semi-colonial context.

The historical context of the national liberation struggle in China is the requirement of the negation of the national bourgeois or comprador context as the minimum demand of the removal of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal context. Since it was the comprador context as a whole which required to be removed, its class articulation was by a revolutionary working class which was the leading force in the Chinese Communist Party. It was able to mobilise the poor peasants who were being relegated to the proletariat, as its main force.

This brief characterisation of China's class relations and the class composition of the Chinese Communist Party is vital to identify the historical context of the struggle in Zimbabwe. The question is whether the process of penetration of capital, the formation of classes in Zimbabwe and the development of the nationalist movement in that country and in the general situation is one of the realisation of petty-bourgeois accumulation or its negation. If the context was one of the negation of the comprador national bourgeois context as the minimum demand, the mode of its resolution would require, and could only arise due to, and develop from, a revolutionary working class, as the only class capable of leading the negation of petty-bourgeois accumulation.

On the contrary, the development of nationalism in Zimbabwe has been one of the requirement of realisation of the historical interests of petty-bourgeois accumulation within imperialist domination, like everywhere else in Africa. The existence of an internally-self administering settler regime, which proceeded to declare its own independence, in a context where the region as a whole was considered an imperialist stronghold for its general economic and strategic interests in Southern Africa, the development of armed struggle in the Portuguese colonies and the situating of the question within a general contradiction between colonial/settler domination and African nationalism - under imperialist domination on the whole and hence the necessary class alliances and ideological relation to the struggle in Zimbabwe - has been the rather complicated context of the development of the nationalist struggle in Zimbabwe. This process also must be seen in the general contradiction between the forces of imperialism and socialism and how the particular level of internal class formation and the class and ideological alliances of internal context relates to the external context or broader conditioning. It is this framework of relations that provides the context of the process of the struggle.

The identification of the historical context of the material interests of classes must start from their conception as qualitative, existential requirements springing directly from the condition of existence of these classes, in terms of their total interests. Too often this qualitative context is reduced to a quantitative question, in which



case the substitution of material requirements of the existence of classes for their requirement for "more" in the system. The quantitative characterisation fails to depict classes in definite contexts in which case their total interests as determining the form of articulation of their class interests vis a vis other classes. In sum, one must proceed from this historical characterisation and then identify their form at momentary and specific levels. Otherwise class interests are assumed qui generis, and either one has a schematic view of necessary struggle, from a similarly axiomatic point of view of the generic propensity of classes, etc.

This distinction is the basis of the different characterisation of the two levels of struggles for national liberation in the two contexts with the one having reached the level of national liberation struggle and the other still on the level of national independence. We shall try to see as we go along the conditions in which nationalist struggle for independence could have been transformed into national liberation struggle, the historical context of such requirement and within Zimbabwe's own development of independence struggle, its historical moment enabling such opportunity, and the context of its weakness and incapability of constituting itself as the leading force of the movement.

As we proceed, and in particular in relation to the class characterisation of the "frontline" states, one clarification of conception at least in terms of how certain class categories are conceptualised in this view, requires to be made. This relates to the concept of what is the "comprador" petty-bourgeoisie. The above characterisation of the Zimbabwe petty-bourgeoisie given by Maputo University report, divided into three categories: bureaucratic, self-employed and comprador, which in our case would be referred to as sections of the petty-bourgeoisie. In this context a comprador is identified as one who serves directly the interests of finance capital, either by being employed or that of holding shares etc. In its broader use for countries with different petty-bourgeois contexts, Kenya has been an example of a comprador petty-bourgeois control, or Zambia for that matter and many others, while countries like Tanzania are quite frequently been referred to in a different sense.

While this direct meaning of comprador is not objectionable, the question of what constitutes a comprador cannot be left at the level of private foreign capital and those who serve in it. While the form of ownership of capital in the countries referred to as dominated by a comprador petty-bourgeoisie might differ from such form as "national capital", it would still be pertinent to ask whether a petty-bourgeoisie is any less comprador when it is dominated by multilateral agencies, and whether this can be considered in any qualitative or significant divergent sense from its formal alternative or "opposite."

One reason why this question is useful is the fact that the structure of capital which develops with colonialism is not changed by the formal change of forms of ownership, and there is also no departure from its class context which directly relates to the rise of service agents of this process of capital penetration in mining, industry and agriculture. The profiteering strata at the level of distribution with bureaucratic personnel who are put into positions of "leadership" of these corporations invariably become instruments of the dominant fractions of commercial capital which the "nationalisation" of the commanding heights of distribution sought to replace, while multinational corporations continue to dominate the economy at the level of production. This is due to the compradorial class interests of the personnel administering distribution and in pursuing these interests, they cannot but serve the same dominant fractions of commercial capital they sought to replace.

The situation has shown that the accumulation of the broad service strata - who have but comprador functions in terms of activities enabling and facilitating the reproduction of capital in the neocolony-to produce



engage in further accumulation and branch into other sectors, in line with the ever-expanding comprador structure of the economy as a whole. In this context, from the viewpoint of the total structure of capital in relation to imperialism, and the class interests of the various sections of the petty-bourgeoisie mushrooming around this skeleton of exploitation, we can safely identify this as a comprador structure and hence dominated by the leading section of this context, a compradorial petty-bourgeoisie, even if it assumes a nationalised form.

Having gone over the opposition between bureaucratic, self-employed and compradorial petty-bourgeoisie as essentially antithetic (while we do not say that the Maputo report considers these categories in that form) we could proceed to discuss the political articulation of class interests within a developing comprador nationalist context. Our concept of comprador here is as opposed to the authentic development of a national bourgeoisie, or at least a bourgeoisie which controls broad sectors of industrial and agricultural capital. In this sense, we shall treat the politics of nationalist movements in Africa in a general sense as struggles of the petty-bourgeoisie for accumulation within a comprador structure, as the leading interests of the broad nationalist movements. The specific contexts thereby determined the form in their respective situations.

From the conception of the total structure of capital in the developing colonial context and the mode of class formation which takes place given this aggregate context, the starting point of the analysis of the politics of nationalism must be the total politics of its leading class, the petty-bourgeoisie, within the class struggle at its specific level. The total political of the petty-bourgeoisie has sometimes been equated with the politics of one or more of its main factions. The result is the treatment of factional politics without their derivation from the total politics of a class.

In a historical situation of the nationalist struggle of a comprador structure, the comprador stratum in the bureaucratic, commercial and in the employ of monopolies shall be the leading section of the petty-bourgeoisie within this structure of capital, and hence also its leading section in the structure of politics. Given the predominance of the petty-bourgeoisie over other classes since it is the leading class of the historical epoch, the compradorial stratum shall be the leading section of the total petty-bourgeoisie, and in turn also the workers, peasants and marginalised strata-landless peasants, lumpen proletariat or migrant labourers. The leading compradors become the heroes of all these classes of all these classes and strata, with each class and the various strata pushing for the class representation of its own demands through this popular comprador.



It is these nationalist leaders, who are essentially comprador in the sense that they do not constitute a stratum or fraction of capital struggling against finance capital but are structured to relate to various levels and sectors of the reproduction of this dominant finance capital, who form the leadership of all the classes of the neocolony. The struggle for national independence takes place within a definite context of class formation relative to the social form that the penetration and domination of capital has taken place. After independence the main struggle is between the cynical representatives of the interests of the rising petty-bourgeoisie, and that progressive section of the leadership which stands more or less for the interests of the peasantry, which are the two main contending classes at the time of national independence. It is this context which determines the general politics of the petty-bourgeoisie after independence, and its context is seen in each particular country. All these sectional struggles and class and sectional alliances take place within a qualitatively comprador context but the relation between the comprador neocolony and imperialism shall take definite forms that condition this sectional struggle within the petty-bourgeoisie, while the form and extent or dimensions that this struggle takes is the main element in the determination of the motion of relations between the neocolony and imperialism. There is no qualitative change of this context of class and sectional struggle till the resolution of the basic question - the socialisation of finance capital in the country, its concentration and centralisation within a planned socialist-directed economy, and hence the negation of the structure of capital as it has developed under colonialism, and the negation of the context of compradorial petty-bourgeois accumulation after independence which follows from this colonial context, including the changes that occur owing to the multilateralisation of finance capital and the changes of form relating to this and the requirements of petty-bourgeoisie accumulation.

The leading role of a class is the essential question characterising any political movement, and the leading role of the proletariat as a class is the main thing in characterising a national liberation movement as different from a national independence movement. The rise or change of a national independence movement to a national liberation movement demands if not the defeat of a strong petty-bourgeoisie in the movement, then its relative weakness from the start, and also the requirement of the reproduction of the ideology of a proletarian character in the pursuance of the armed struggle. The objective and subjective requirements must both exist, including the conditions for their reproduction, in order that a liberation struggle be sustained within or through a given historical epoch.

The difference between China and this context lay in the historical epoch of the decadence of the comprador interests, while in this context under different conditions, comprador interests are on the ascendancy, and are the leading interests in the total class interests for national independence. In Mozambique, the petty-bourgeoisie was far less developed than in Zimbabwe, the character of the peasantry different, and also room for nationalist politics and the international situation of its development were also quite different. Instead of its replication the Zimbabwe struggle is the antithesis of the Mozambican struggle insofar as the international situation is concerned and in particular the tactics of imperialism in reformulating and redesigning manipulation and controlling strategies after 1975. While the non-decadence of comprador interests gives the key role to the petty-bourgeoisie, and ensures a very small (if in relative terms) proletarian content in the composition of the nationalist parties and liberation forces, the international situation has encouraged and sustained the petty-bourgeois context of the leadership, and in some cases even its compradorial vis-a-vis the liberation struggle itself!



The class character of the Chinese Communist Party has sometimes been confused with its ideological character. Ouwony-Ojwok drew out this distinction quite clearly in a critique of what he described as Shivi's misrepresentation of the national liberation struggle in China.<sup>2</sup> The point of contention is that it would not have been possible for the Chinese Communist Party to carry out the revolutionary struggle because it "expounded proletarian ideology" if its composition was not proletarian and hence controlled other class elements mobilised and brought under its leadership in the Party and the army. While a "proletarian" ideology can continue or start being expounded by a petty-bourgeois party, real proletarian revolution cannot be made without the leading role of the proletariat itself.

This brings our consideration of the Zimbabwe question to one issue, to borrow a term by M.L. Baregu,<sup>3</sup> the critical minimum of unity required for national liberation struggle, which thereby must be based on the fundamental or basic demands. In other words, the minimum unity of class forces in any context is directly related to the minimum demands of all these classes and not on any axiomatic basis. This distinction is important due to the trapping of proceeding from very broad characterisations of historical struggles, without drawing out the qualitative class relations and their political articulation. This important principle remains at the level of a formula, cannot enable one to determine the forces to be united with, and the leading forces in a definite context, as Ibbo Mandaza comments,<sup>5</sup> on the case of the united front of various sections of the Uganda petty-bourgeoisie under the leadership of Yusufu Lule, etc. As Baregu put it, the requirement of struggle by classes is conditioned by this situation in general, while the point made by Mandaza essentially relates to dangers of an ill-defined "united front."

The question we must pose here is the distinction between class domination and united front of different classes, and how to distinguish between the two. We shall define or characterise the national liberation struggle in China as one where there was a real united front. The coalition of petty-bourgeois factions in Uganda was not in any real sense a united front firstly because it was a sectional replacement of a different petty-bourgeois section without any real movement of class domination in the total context apart from sectional accumulation. The class composition of the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe, on the other hand, is again different from the two. It depicts not the united front of the petty-bourgeoisie, workers and peasants but rather the domination of the workers and peasants by the petty-bourgeoisie, and their being mobilised into the struggle under the leadership of the petty-bourgeoisie. The peasants and workers, in any case were not involved at Moshi.

The difference between petty-bourgeois domination and united front lies at the level of the class context of the leading role, main force and nature of this united front. With a conscious proletariat as the leading force and a party based on the proletariat, their united front with the petty-bourgeoisie and peasantry is based on its leading role, and not in the leading role of the petty-bourgeoisie. Once the petty-bourgeoisie, the comprador strata, are still in the leading role, there is no concept of united front because there has not been a conscious and revolutionary articulation of qualitative class interests, the formation thereby of a proletarian party and its strategic and tactical line of building a united front with other class elements through and under its leadership. So while on the surface it would appear that both the Chinese and Zimbabwean struggles include or have very similar relative compositions, it is completely another issue when the form of this composition is related to the relations between the classes involved, and hence the composition of the party and army from the context of the total class situation, and the pursuance of the struggle on the basis of the articulation of these relations within the party and army.



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Class composition, class leadership and reproduction of all these relations at the level of the execution of the struggle - this is the mode of reproduction of a concrete struggle. Its basis is the totality of the internal and external contexts, and this context within its particular historical form becomes the basis the real reason for dominant forms or phases of the struggle, and the ideological representation of the struggle. Depending on the particular context, it would then be a question of the analysis of the total movement from one party or a multiplicity of parties as in Zimbabwe, in which case the co-ordinated whole of the activity of all these parties - fractions of the petty-bourgeoisie representing different sections and building different alliances with the peasants and workers but on the same basis of a petty-bourgeois character of the total context of nationalist politics. To proceed with an interpretation of the motion or process of the nationalist movement and liberation struggle in Zimbabwe it appears more opportune and clearer to review some salient aspects of the treatment of the question rather than providing an unnecessary historical sketch of the familiar question. The first point has perhaps been mentioned, in that rather than separate the politics of the total petty-bourgeoisie in Zimbabwe into two or several parties and analyse the process from this perspective, this very division must be explained from the total politics - that is, total material interests of the class and its relation with other classes; and proceed to identify the factions and their relation to the motion of the whole politics of the class. This issue is significant because it has become fashionable to present the internal settlement group as puppets and bootlickers, while the Patriotic Front, the Frontline States and the OAU are described almost from what they say of themselves, with no real criticism or conception of their contradictory relation with the whole.

Even a broadly single movement cannot be understood simply as a form of unity but only through a concrete grasp of the attunement of forces in tension whose total context reproduced itself as a single movement of the total class, whose class content manifests all these contradictions, for example, the nationalist movement in Tanzania. It is not possible to comprehend the forms of petty-bourgeois sectional relations after 1961, their context within imperialist domination and the forms that sectional accumulation and imperialist control assumes without such a concept of the total politics of this class within the total class context.

Applied to Zimbabwe, this conception requires first the dialectical connection of the total politics of the petty-bourgeoisie as a whole movement. The minimum demands enabling national independence, the articulation of these demands and the fractional composition of the various stages and phases of this struggle must be seen in a total context. It is here that the petty-bourgeois character and the progressive, moderate and radical or revolutionary factions and their momentary and specific roles are identified, by their relation to this unified total movement.

It is here that one needs to make a distinction between national liberation struggle in its revolutionary context, with the ideology of "war" as the petty-bourgeoisie within the nationalist movement and that external allies, the frontline states, have been using it. This issue is connected with the debate that arose from Fanon's characterisation of revolutionary violence, where violence per se was given precedence perhaps with inadequate articulation of the need for the political consciousness of the masses, reproduced not through practising violence but practising struggle. In Zimbabwe, while there has been to an extent a political mobilisation of the people, the petty-bourgeois domination of the liberation forces has kept the main form of its articulation less in the sense of protracted people's war that is necessary for the achievement of the minimum demands of national liberation - which as we have seen is not the case - but the violence that must be used if the settlers do not budge. Utterances to the effect that "we shall sho



...way to Salisbury, "we shall be through in four months," etc. etc. seen the usual form at all stages of the struggle since 1974, and this tends not to the mobilisation for but mystification of the war to the masses. This outlook is directly related to the eclectic way in which liberation war is itself conceptualised, as the violent form for the armed struggle which is revolutionary perhaps because it is violent. It is not difficult to see that this is the common big and petty-bourgeois outlook on armed struggle. While it is true that through armed struggle revolution is effected, it does not follow that the armed action of any class constitutes a revolutionary process, without recourse to a definite concept of its historical and class context.

And the ideological articulation of the struggle by the frontline states has been the other form of the petty-bourgeois outlook. Populism, "apocalypse and moralism has been the main form of ideological articulation of the struggle, based on the real material relations and their ideological reflection, between the petty-bourgeoisie and imperialism, since the independence struggle and their relation to it is part of the general process of the reproduction of the relations between the petty-bourgeoisie and imperialism."

The mode of reproduction of the independence struggle can hence not be fully comprehended without this dialectical totality of imperialist domination of the whole zone the petty-bourgeoisie as the leading class and its politics basically comprador in this zone and broadly also in the nationalist movement. This relates then to the contradiction of the development of national liberation struggle in the same context, the anti-imperialist demands of the masses and the contradictory position and movement of the relations of the petty-bourgeoisie to imperialism, on the part of the frontline states, which is reflected in the way in which composition of the various parties and leaderships of the broad fractions of the national independence movement.

The various stages of the development of the struggle shows the way in which all these aspects are connected. This brings us to two issues first the distinction at an analytical level between the "options" of internal settlement and negotiated or international settlement and the question of "vaccination" in this process. From the characterisation of the broad and total politics of the leading class, which also includes and can only proceed from a definite alliance with other classes under its leadership, and the factional composition and class alliances can be comprehended as a single movement. The main feature is this motion of nationalist politics and not the difference between the external internal politics and this again related to imperialism in the same way that it is dichotomised, but precisely its opposite - the synthesis of the whole of this situation. The internal politics is part and parcel of the external politics, the internal settlement part and parcel of the negotiation process, and the leaders inside and outside part and parcel of the total class leadership at the every stage. The difference between the internal and external settlements and politics is one of sectional difference and alliances which has not assumed the form of qualitative departure from its unified context. This cannot occur with the politics of the same class, but it would constitute the negation of the leading role of the petty-bourgeoisie, and perhaps then the characterisation of basic difference between the two sides would be correct, in the sense for example of the Kuomintang as representative of the comprador and landlord classes while the Chinese Communist Party represented the united front of other classes, led by the proletariat.

It is obvious therefore that the question of vaccination is solved by the actual conceptualisation of its context. Basic to the concept of vaccination is the methodological dichotomisation, similar to the internal and external settlement approach, the two lines of the politics of nationalist struggle, first the ZANU-ZAPU difference, and then the Patriotic Front - internal settlement party difference. The main plank of this characterisation of the politics is the lack of their total context, and



Hence the particular factional composition is considered rational, and from its context the theoretical distinctions are drawn, because the particular forms and compositions are taken up axiomatically, themselves requiring no explanation but from the self-explanation of these forms. This form of explanation cannot but reproduce the ideology of the sectional struggle rather than its explanation, class superseding of that ideology itself.

From the resolution of the question of the consistent Nkomo and the vacillating Kissinger, which is the inversion of the total movement in the petty-bourgeois reflection of its own position within it, we could proceed to characterise the various phases and stages of the motion towards settlement in which case gain a view of the total politics of petty-bourgeoisie at the eve of the negotiated settlement.

The main stages that can be characterised could start from 1963 to UDI in 1966, the height of the earlier phase of nationalist politics which brought independence to other areas including the federation partners Zambia and Malawi to the breakaway of the internally self-governing settler regime from Britain. The intensification of settler domination and crisis of nationalistic politics through jailing of its leaders and factional differences, while also the requirement for armed struggle was clearly being seen, is characteristic of the ensuing period between 1966 to 1974. A burst of armed action, based on a mistaken confrontation strategy occurred in 1967, by a combined action of forces of Zimbabwean and South African nationalist fighters quickly brought home the need for correct strategy and tactics, and for some time this was held up as the situation required more dynamic movement.

The period between 1969 to 1974, after the collapse of the Tiger and Fearless Talks, and the Pearce Commission, is one of attempted settler solutions based primarily on their own demands, to be accepted and made the basis for a negotiated settlement with African nationalists. The tone of the talks was permanent settler domination, if cushioned in a one or one and half decade "transition" period. The communication between President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and South African Premier J.B. Vorster in this period shows to what extent the accommodation spirit has been consistent, with its minimum demands for accommodation rising in pace with the level of the struggle, and always seeking to reduce the development of the struggle into merely the progression of the struggle for the minimum nationalist demands. There has not been much change of the nature of the demands themselves and also their articulation in ideological and diplomatic terms.

This reductionism of the demands of the nationalist struggle into national independence was the main ideological feature of the internal movements themselves, while their immediate allies, the frontline state also represented the question in the same context. The development generally of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, in particular the success of the struggle in Mozambique, which raised the nationalist struggle in Africa to a new level since Algeria's war of independence, affected the situation but did not change it fundamentally. It encouraged the radical and militant forces in particular in ZANU popular was for national liberation. This occurred after the Chitepo killing and persecution of ZANU cadres in Zambia, a period in which ZANU was almost decimated. The reorganisation along different ideological lines was initially supported by Tanzania and the newly-independent Mozambique but it failed to take root within the whole context of the Zimbabwe struggle itself. These same countries then enabled the regaining of the leadership from this militant section of ZANU, which had sought to ally with similar sections in ZAPU to form ZIPA, by the old ZANU leadership, led by Secretary General Robert Mugabe. While this section remained progressive relative to the other externally based party, ZAPU, and in this period carried the struggle to a new and dynamic height, could not proceed along lines of transforming itself into a full national liberation struggle.



the ideology of the party, the education of the cadres and the movement was not of a protracted, systematic character. The issue, as we saw earlier, did not lie with the ideology propounded by the party; this in the main would not be distinguishable from common revolutionary platform, but the crucial question lay in the systematic organisation, training and education at all levels and fields of the struggle. It was a class composition and leadership question effecting an ideological and organisational question. And this is the crucial question in the realisation of the minimum nationalist programme, or there is the danger of being accommodated by the people and among the fighters, to persevere with the struggle for higher than those ends. The present conclusion, for all intents and purposes, of the Lancaster talks, the imminent steps being taken for the general ceasefire and possible demobilisation goes a long way to show the actual situation, of the completed reductionism from liberation to independence. The former context had not really been reached and it constituted only a realisation of the latter. In sum, the motion of the struggle in Zimbabwe has been one of the realisation of the minimum demands of national independence in the given settler setting inside Zimbabwe and the context of imperialist domination in the zone as a whole, and the development of the liberation struggle and anti-imperialist demands within the whole context. The development of this struggle was not able to cross this historical context into its superseding stage, national liberation or national democratic revolution because the total class context did not change, that is, the national demands did not reach a qualitatively higher stage and therefore also their political articulation, form of struggle or mode of their realisation in terms of its class composition and class leadership, also did not reach or move into a qualitatively new content.

The various stages of the development of the struggle, the process of negotiations, must be seen in this whole context. The point of departure here must be imperialist domination which characterises the general situation in Southern Africa, how this was related to the form and political position of the settler regime and its South African context, in terms of relation to nationalist demands and its treatment of its leadership. The antithesis of this situation is the general development of the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle in this zone, and how this was related to the context of imperialist domination - the necessity to contain national liberation struggle as the main question. In this context, the anti-colonial role of the frontline zone, in direct relation to their internal class character and domination by imperialism gives the basis for comprehension of the relations between the states and imperialism, the settler regimes and the nationalist forces as a total context. This leads to the consideration of the nationalist forces themselves within all these contradictions and their motion as a whole.

The total interconnection of this process gives a synthetic conception of the various levels of class relations between all these contending forces, the degree of accommodation and composition envisaged at each stage. The Tiger, Fearless, Pearce, Kissinger, Anglo-American, internal settlement and Lancaster proposals can only be understood from the total context. Their analysis, in minute terms, must proceed from the balance of class forces and the extent of movement to reach a broad settlement and factional composition to effect it. It therefore requires minute analysis of the broad class implications of the point of departure of each of these packages, the process of negotiations and the point of arrival of these negotiations. Most analyses of the issues have moved only to show why a conference or a package failed, while leaving the standing, balance, as the same after each conference, in terms of its context rather than the extent to which various forces battled at each phase of the struggle in and out of conference rooms. This brings us to the question of the internal crisis of each party involved, at every stage of the struggle, and the relation of each separate crisis to the general crisis of the whole process. This would show us the quantitative and qualitative forms this crisis assumes, and in which case the reflection of



the actual levels and positions in the sequences of compromises and settlements. The changing proposals and standpoints of each party are seen in the light of the total crisis at its momentary level, sectional and thereby from the total crisis at its momentary level, sectional. This is of each of the various parties in the same moment of action. This is the dialectical unity of internal settlements, negotiated settlements and the armed struggle as a total process.

Consequently, on the eye of a negotiated settlement, what we have is also a broadening and deepening of the internal settlement, not its conservative but in its progressive sense. It broadens the factional composition of the nationalist forces and deepens its class effectiveness in terms of holding back the stage of a national democratic revolution. Therefore it is a contradictory settlement in the sense of meeting certain basic national demands including the partial change of the power and structure of the settler regime, but not its dismantling. The class accommodation is related to the minimum demands possible at this stage, but the factional composition is now the main question whose resolution determines the way that each of these interests shall articulate its class demands in the new context.

The struggle in Zimbabwe can therefore not be understood by the analysis of documents by the various parties; it cannot be comprehended from the self-consciousness of the class interests involved. On the contrary, the actual historical situation must be examined to grasp the real relations that give rise to the forms of political articulation.

#### FOOTNOTES:

1. G.T. Mshambi and E.J. Kisanga, "Imperialism and the Politics of Internal Settlement in Zimbabwe," paper presented to the political Science Departmental Seminar, 23rd November 1979; pp. 1-16
2. Omwony Ojwok, "Who is to Lead the Popular Anti-Imperialist Revolution in Africa?" in Utafiti, Vol. III No. 1 1978, p. 132
3. M.L. Baregu, "Notes on the General Features of the National Liberation Movement," presented at the International Seminar on National Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, organised by the International Relations Association, University of Dar es Salaam, 25th Aug 1979.
4. Ibbo Mandaza, "Imperialism, the 'Frontline' States and the Zimbabwe 'Problem'," paper presented at the Pol. Sc. Department seminar 16th November 1979, p. 13 footnote 22
5. Karen Eriksen, "Zambia: Class Formation and Detente," in Review of African Political Economy, No. 9 details the development of Zambia's relations with the liberation movements, the settler regimes and imperialism, and its political and ideological articulation.



## THE LESSON OF KAMPUCHEA

By SAMIR AMIN

Introduction: This article was first published in French in 1976: "L'imperialisme et le développement inégal", Minuit. The extract is from Chapter 8, "The Problem of Transition and the Building of Socialism". Samir Amin, the author, was born in Egypt and is now director of the U.N. sponsored African Institute of Economic Development and Planning in Dakar, Senegal. He wrote Accumulation on a World Scale (NY 1975). The article deals from a serious Marxist point of view with how the Kampuchean communist party went about dealing with the question of transforming their society along socialist lines, and certainly by direct implication gives the lie to the distortions and horror stories of massacres that the imperialist and revisionist mass media have been pouring out in order to discredit the great example of socialist construction in Kampuchea.

There is one very recent socialist revolution that we hear nothing about. This is no doubt partly because the Cambodian revolutionaries themselves do not feel themselves accountable, to all the "heralds" of socialism. But it is also because this revolution, like certain others, has departed from the established formulas. It took place in a country which is among the most "backward" in the world capitalist system: it took the form of a peasant war led by a tiny group of "intellectuals" in a country with almost no working class; it seized decaying towns without firing a shot; it immediately closed the country almost entirely to all external influence; and it carried out a rapid disurbanisation. Out of some resentment, some people already regard it as an insignificant peasant rising (jacquerie), while others will claim, against all evidence, that the revolution was imported. In our view, the lesson of Cambodia is quite essential, because it occurred in a country whose structures and situation are highly reminiscent of those of the average African country and of some regions of Asia. Thus the victorious strategy of our Cambodian brothers must be systematically compared with those advocated elsewhere by the various people concerned.

Cambodia is a small country, both as to population and as to its place in the world capitalist system. Being relatively under-urbanised and under-industrialised, it was ranked at the tail-end of the under-developed countries. A few years ago, its rural masses did not seem any more ripe for a revolution than those of the African Sahel, the Congo, Zaire, Dahomey, Madagascar and most of the other "backward" regions. Its urban masses did not seem much more ready; a tiny so-called "privileged" working class, a petty bourgeoisie of nationalist intellectuals and civil servants, a foreign comprador bourgeoisie, a few large-scale imperialist interests concentrated in the small areas of plantations. After direct colonisation, there was a neo-colonial regime characterised, as elsewhere, by the rapid enrichment of a political class which use the State apparatus to get its percentage out of foreign capital, investing the proceeds of its misappropriations in the construction of villas rented to foreigners, in the running of lorries and taxis, etc. in a way, an average African republic.

NATURE OF CLASS SOCIETY IN KAMPUCHEA

But we need to push the comparison further. The abundance of land had also delayed the development of a precapitalist class exploitation of the peasant masses. Not that Cambodian society was classless. The Khmer State belonged to the type of State that extracted from the villagers a tribute in kind, in labour and in men. For this it could rely not only on its army of civil servants, but also its allies within the peasant society. The latter was thus composed of families of unequal personal status "slaves", free men etc.) and unequal social and political status (chiefs, dependents, etc.) and even unequal economic status (unequal access to the good land and in varying quantities, etc.) But the economic exploitation of some by others was, if not non-existent



least marginal. There was nothing comparable to the so-called "feudal" structures of China, Vietnam, Northern India or Egypt, for example. In the whole it was a society very like most African societies.

As a reaction against the hollow assertion of the national or colonial leaders that their societies had been classless - which ignored the state exploitation of these peasants societies. This approach frequently induced them to confuse the relations of social domination with relations of exploitation (extortion of a surplus). This inaccurate view entails a strategy which the Cambodian experience has now shown to be mistaken.

When imperialism found ready to hand some advanced pro-capitalist forms of exploitation within the peasant society itself, it had no difficulty in finding allies in the exploiting rural classes and in integrating the conquered society into the capitalist system. Gradually transformed in this way, the old class differentiations changed their form and content, and were reduced to the opposition between land-owners (estate-owners and/or kulaks) and working peasants (medium peasants who were thus unable to expand, poor peasants, tenant farmers, sharecroppers, landless peasants, farm labourers). The large estate-owners and the kulaks - a minority - formed an alliance with imperialism and developed the cash crops which the imperialists were interested in. They took advantage of the integration into the world system, often accompanied by the land hunger of those who were more exploited, to impose continually increasing farm rents and tougher terms for sharecroppers, and to reduce the wages of the farm labourers. The working peasants, and particularly the majority, and often the overwhelming majority, which the poor and landless peasants tended to become, were able to become the army of a revolution that was first national and democratic and then socialist. In history of the way the Egyptian "feudal lords", the Indian zamindars and the Chinese gentry turned into latifundary estate-owners follows this model.

#### IMPERIALISM AND THE PEASANTRY

But, when faced with societies such as those of Cambodia and many regions of Africa, imperialism was somewhat at a loss. It could of course form an alliance with the reigning monarchies and the local chieftains in order to establish its political and military domination. But how could it exploit the peasant masses and force them to produce for it?

One possible procedure: to expropriate the indigenous inhabitants and establish settlers on the land or to give the land to capitalist settlers on the land or to give the land to capitalist firms, granting them the necessary resources to develop export crops by modern methods, and providing them with cheap labour by various means ranging from pure and simple coercion (forced labour) to "economic" constraint (compelling the indigenous people to obtain money in this way to pay their taxes, confining them to inadequate "reserves" etc.). The imperialists did do this, but the areas developed in this way were usually limited, and above all the majority of the peasant population remained outside this system, except in South Africa, Rhodesia, Kenya and Algeria.

In Cambodia - where it is Vietnam - and in Madagascar and Africa as a whole, the wage labour of the colonial plantations never represented more than a small fraction of the rural labour force. Occupied towns, attacked all the symbols of their oppression, mercilessly fired on all the "men wearing ties", burned the airconditioned villas, and did not spare either the missionaries in charge of their souls, or the medical personell in charge of their bodies, or the teachers in charge of their brains. There are similar examples everywhere, from Cameroun to Kenya and Madagascar. All these revolts were crushed. Was this because of their internal divisions? Or the treachery of the "privileged" among them? Not at all. The revolts were crushed from outside, by a more powerful and better organised enemy,



What they had to do, then in order to win in their turn, was to weaken their common external adversary by dividing him instead of all uniting him to accentuate their own internal divisions. But for this they had to rise above their rural horizons, find allies in the towns, and acquire a leadership that could coordinate their attacks against the towns and weaken the enemy from within. In short, they alone can make their revolution against capital a stage in the world socialist revolution.

So there are two opposing strategies here. The first, suggested by those who dwell on the internal divisions of the rural world, advocates categorically the all-out and immediate development of the class struggle in the countryside. This strategy may seem "revolutionary"; by compelling comparison with China or Viet-nam, it may attract left-wing sympathy. But it leads to failure and makes itself the objective ally of imperialism by speeding up, after the defeat, the disintegration and subjection of the countryside. The second strategy is the one which led our Cambodian brothers to victory. Being better Marxists, they realized that their country was neither China nor Viet-nam. They formed a peasant army, united those who had been divided first by the old Khmer kingdoms and then by imperialism, and weakened the enemy by depriving him of the support of the workers and the dispossessed of the towns as well as the patriotic sections of the petty bourgeoisie, undermined its army of repression, and finally won. The lesson in revolutionary strategy they have given us is doubtless the most relevant one for most of the countries of Africa.



KAMPUCHEA - THE DECIMATION OF A NATION  
THREE OUT OF EIGHT

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Figures can very often mislead one. When you sit at a table with books and magazines loaded with charts and statistics, you probably do not see behind the figures on malnutrition, unemployment, crime or prostitution the actual shocking suffering of real people. This was very often true in my own case. But now, looking into the dark, quiet eyes of my Kampuchean friends-Keong Nem and Vong Sarin-I would not stop being shocked or rather stunned, -as I thought about the pain, agony and death of the three million Kampucheans who have been murdered in that country which formerly had a population of eight million-people just like me, or my family, or my friends...

The two young men's voices were quiet and monotonous, but they made me shudder...

Keong Nem: Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, with the help of their Chinese friends, modelled "Democratic Kampuchea" along the lines of the Chinese "Great Cultural Revolution". All these people were driven out of the cities. Families were separated, people known to be internationalists, genuine Communists and intellectuals were immediately killed, and schools, hospitals and factories were closed or turned into prisons. My wife, my child, my parents, my parents-in-law, my brothers and sisters-all were murdered by the "Angkar" killers.

Vong Sarin: My father fought against the French and later against the Americans. He was a militant, open-minded, outspoken person. He was a real Communist who never tried to conceal his love of the land of Lenin or the land of Ho Chi Minh. In 1975, my father was killed as one of the first victims of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime, having been accused of "counter-revolutionary activities".

In 1970, my elder sister was sent to China to study medicine. In 1975 she returned to Kampuchea, but bore the black stigma of being her father's daughter; she was also "far too learned", and so in 1977 they brutally murdered her.

How Could All This Have Happen?

This is the question I continue asking myself. Perhaps future historians will give well-elaborated, detailed explanations of the complex tragic history of Kampuchea. But now it is not so much a question of academic research-it is a question one addresses to one's consciousness and integrity. It is a question of immediate political action and solidarity. Still, there is also a necessary place for reason and analysis-otherwise action would be aimless. So here are some facts:

Ultra-Leftist Infiltration

The Khmer Revolutionary Party, which had continued since 1951 the work of the Indochinese Communist Party, considerably expanded its activities and membership in the 1950s, while at the same time losing many of its old-time cadres.

The vacuum was rapidly filled by new recruits, among them young intellectuals who had studied in the West and particularly in France, where they had become acquainted with "leftist", Trotskyite and other ultra-radical theories. Back home, they quickly distinguished themselves within the Party ranks by their theoretical knowledge and their attempt to "creatively develop" Marxism, as well as by their "revolutionary spirit". Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and many other leaders of Democratic Kampuchea were among them...



### Lack of unity

In 1970, Lon Nol's coup d'etat took place. Its success was due to some extent to splits within the country's anti-imperialist forces. During the 1960's the Sihanouk government had enjoyed considerable independence and neutrality. However, Ieng Sary and Pol Pot even then were pushing through the adventurist Maoist line of "armed struggle" in order to gain power at all costs. Although the Communist Party refused to accept the Maoist line of Ieng Sary and Pol Pot, their efforts nevertheless weakened the people's anti-imperialist struggle in the face of the designs of the USA and in fact helped to open the way to the imposition of a pro-imperialist, reactionary dictatorship.

Even after the coup, the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary group, drawing no lessons from the recent past, opposed the promotion of anti-imperialist unity in Kampuchea. At that time, the genuine Marxist forces still prevailed in the country and the Communist Party came out in support of the liberal-minded ruler, Prince Sihanouk.

### Hegemonism at Work

At this crucial stage in the history of the Kampuchean people, the reactionary Maoist leadership of China was doing its best to establish its control over Kampuchea. Peking secretly entertained good relations with Lon Nol; at the same time it was giving its patronage to the government-in-exile of Prince Sihanouk who was being held as a semi-prisoner in Peking. It even maintained relations with such pro-French elements as Son Sann, a former minister in Sihanouk's government. But, of course, it simultaneously kept in touch with and increased its help to the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary group within the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

The Chinese Maoists resorted to direct interference into the internal matters of the Party, including eliminating the true Marxists and all of Pol Pot's and Ieng Sary's rivals within it. Thus by 1975, the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique had gotten hold of the key positions in the Armed Forces and the Party. Their fraction established the so-called "Angkar", which they used as an instrument of domination over both the Party and the Armed Forces. In fact, it was the Party-the CPK-that they were most afraid of and so the genuine Communists, the true Marxists, were the first victims of the "Angkar's" Chinese counterpart during the "Great Cultural Revolution" in China.

All these facts clearly show that what had been established in Kampuchea was the domination of the anti-popular Maoist sect which was inclined to dogmatically apply the "model" of the so-called "Great Cultural Revolution".

### What Followed?

Keong Nem: After our victory in 1975, the people of Kampuchea, like the peoples of Vietnam and Laos, should have been allowed to live in peace and independence and to build a happy future. But a terrible disaster fell upon us: A bloody, fascist, genocidal regime was set up in our country. Why? - We can find the answer only in the Chinese policy of expansion and hegemony. The Chinese leaders wanted their country to be a "super-power". Their starting point was Kampuchea. They wanted to turn Kampuchea into a Chinese province, a military base, a springboard for attacking Vietnam, Laos and other countries in South-East Asia. And so they brought massive amounts of weapons and war material and tens of thousands of military advisers to Kampuchea and kept the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime in power.

Vong Sarin: The first measure taken after the liberation of Phnom Penh was the ordering of the total evacuation of this capital city and of all other urban centres as well. Two reasons were given: first, in the cities counter-revolutionary bases might hide, which were not easy to



detect; and second, the dispersal of all urban populations would insure the automatic liquidation of all exploiting classes--both feudal and bourgeois.

This decision, which had a clear petty-bourgeois character, was directed not so much against the exploiting classes as against the working class. The majority of the workers were replaced by soldiers and were driven to the countryside. Many workers were killed there right on the spot. The major priority was given by the regime to the peasantry and agricultural production. "Turn all people into peasants" and "Having rice means having everything" were the basic slogans in Kampuchea at that time.

A system of oppression and discrimination was thenceforth established all over the country. At the apex was the ruling Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique, embellished with meaningless titles as office-holders in top-level state and Party structures. It exercised its real power through the mysterious "organization"--the so-called "Angkar".

The inhabitants of the newly liberated areas were classified as "new citizens". Driven to the countryside, they were incorporated into agricultural production brigades in "people's communes" and placed under the authority of "old citizens"--the inhabitants of the areas that had been liberated before April 17, 1975.

But even the "old citizens" were suspected of being "contaminated". Consequently among them only those who had been under 23 years of age in 1975--that is, under 18 in 1970, the year of the group d'etat--were allowed to apply for membership in the Communist Party. In any case, young people under 18 were forbidden to live with their parents for fear of their ideological contamination.

Thus the structure of this new "classless" society was a simple one: the "new citizens" were dominated by the "old citizens" and they, in their turn, in accordance with the ideas of the "Great Cultural Revolution" were dominated by the youth who were inexperienced and easy to manipulate and all of them together were dominated by the fearsome "Angkar". This Maoist structure of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique left no place for either the working class or the Communist Party, since these forces were natural enemies of Mao's disciples.

**Keong Nem:** All social institutions considered to be of feudal or bourgeois origin were suppressed: no markets, no money, no postal service, no schools above the primary level were permitted; the authorities wanted no "complications". Religious institutions, pagodas, Buddhist statues--all were destroyed.

All family life disappeared. Husbands and wives were allowed to meet only at night, and in some areas not every night. Private households were not permitted and all meals were taken collective in the production brigades.

**Vong Sarin:** Everyone was forced to toil arduously in the rice-fields or to do hard physical work. Workdays lasted from early morning till late at night. Rice rations were seriously insufficient, even for the "old citizens"--they consisted of two bowlfuls of cooked rice per meal in most areas. "New citizens" received only one-half or one-third of these rations. All this was taking place while the high-ranking officials and Chinese "Wadvisers" were living in villas and enjoying all the possible pleasures of life.

#### Kampuchea Chauvinism-- An Imitation of Chinese Foreign Policy

In its foreign relations, "Democratic Kampuchea" followed an isolationist policy like that practised by China during and after the "Great Cultural Revolution". The country was practically closed to foreign



... and it refused all international or regional co-operation (for  
ance, co-operation in the exploitation of the Mekong River).  
sadors were sent to only two countries: Laos and China (the  
ssador to Vietnam had been recalled on December 31, 1977) and any  
unication existed only with China--an umbilical cord which ensured the  
ne's survival.

Imitating their Chinese bosses, the former Kampuchean leaders raised  
vinistic and immoderately nationalistic territorial claims; evoking  
ancient Kingdom of Angkor which many centuries ago had extended from  
ng Prabang in Laos to the Malay-Asian Peninsula and from the Irrawaddy  
ley in Burma to the present southern seacoast of Vietnam.

Immediately after Kampuchea's liberation, as early as May 1, 1975,  
Kampuchean Armed Forces violated Vietnam's territory at several points  
ng the border from Ha Tien to Tay Ninh. On May 4, they landed on My  
c Island and on May 10 occupied the Chu Island, massacring many people  
carrying off 515 inhabitants. Notwithstanding the Vietnamese proposal  
talks, military actions continued and increased. Whole divisions of  
er Rouge forces were sent into Vietnamese territory, as admitted by  
om Penh itself. The following is a "balance-sheet of a year of fight  
from April 1977 to April 1978", drawn up by Radio Phnom Penh on May  
1978:

"By January 6, 1978 we had completely swept all Vietnamese forces out  
our national territory... We continued to fight them until the end of  
January 1978. In February 1978, we went on attacking and our attacks were  
en more powerful, since all our attacking columns were of division size  
ter crushing the enemy, we immediately sent our units to fight him on  
s own territory..."

The bellicose fury of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique reached the level  
delirium. Thus on May 10, 1978, Radio Phnom Penh stated: "So far we  
ve attained our target: 30 Vietnamese killed for every fallen Kampu-  
ean... Thus we could sacrifice two million Kampucheans in order to  
exterminate the 50 million Vietnamese--and we would still be six million."

This was the arithmetical logic of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary--it was  
ince they are now the pawns of yesterday--which actually led to the deve  
taing deduction, and destruction, in terms of Kampuchean lives: "three  
ut of eight..." But this type of arithmetical leogical which was first  
reclaimed by Mao--who himself was ready to sacrifice half of mankind for  
is own brand of "Communism"--still exists, and it is still dangerous.

#### The Population Rebels

I asked my Kampuchean friends about their personal experiences during  
the years of terror..

Keong Nem: From 1970 on, I worked in the propaganda team among  
the people; from 1975-78 I worked as a low-level functionary in Cong-Pong-  
Cham province. I was first perplexed by the brutalities but then became  
infuriated by the terror of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime. When I learned  
about the uprisings taking place, I fled to the forest and joined the  
liberation Army there and took part in the struggle for our country's  
liberation.

Vong Sarin: In 1970 I was sent to Vietnam to study. After 1975-  
that is, after the liberation--all the students studying in Vietnam were  
recalled home. Almost all of them--about 200 students--were put into a  
canoe and were drowned in the Mekong River. I was to go with the next  
group but on hearing this news I refused to return. Later I went to the  
forest and remained there until the liberation.

The Ieng Sary-Pot Pot rule could not last long. Very soon, the fir  
signs of resistance appeared. Then in September 1976 the first serious  
uprising took place in the area near Battambang in western Kampuchea.



As opposition had been mounting even within the Army, state and Party apparatuses since February 1977, consequent waves of arrests were carried out. Uprisings, led mainly by the dissenters in the Party and Army, were continually breaking out in the northern, eastern and to some extent central parts of Kampuchea. Particularly serious were the uprisings in Oudomxay, Kompong Thom and Siem Reap. Feroocious measures of repression were taken against the rebels-many thousands of people were killed and local leaders accused of treason were condemned to be burnt alive in the Kompong Thom Stadium.

The centre of insurrection gradually shifted to the eastern military zone bordering on Vietnam. There, in Phnom Penh, the reactionary authorities had to attack their own Armed Forces. First they disarmed the 7th Battalion of the 21st Infantry Regiment; then two weeks later they arrested 100 of its officers and men, most of whom were members of the Communist Party and the Communist Youth Organization. Then the 35th, 55th and 59th Battalions of the same regiment suffered the same fate. In June 1977, none of the regiment's commanding officers were left-they had all been taken to some unknown destination, including Chief of Military Operations Chan Hol and Political Commissar Sok Sat. The purge even reached the levels of division and zone headquarters and the High Command. In most cases, the "purged" persons were tied up, tortured and disposed of without trial. But more terror only gave rise to more rebellions and uprisings.

In May 1978, Heng Samrin, who was then Deputy Chief of Staff of the Eastern military zone and a member of its Party Committee, assumed command of the insurgent forces fighting against the tyrannical Pol Pot-Sary clique and co-operated with other patriotic forces in the struggle to overthrow the bloody regime. In November, by which time the insurgent forces had considerably increased and had established themselves well, called upon the population of the Eastern Zone and the whole country to rise up against the treacherous militarist Phnom Penh regime.

On December 2, 1978, the Kampuchea United Front for National Salvation (KUFNS) was established in one of the liberated areas. The patriots elected a KUFNS Central Committee headed by Heng Samrin and Chea Sim. The Front published a declaration setting out the basic aims of the struggle. The overthrow of the Pol-Pot Ieng Sary clique, abolition of the military and fascist order, immediate ending of the provocations on the borders of neighbouring countries and the building of a peaceful, independent, democratic, neutral and nonaligned Kampuchea which would advance towards socialism.

The establishment of the Front precipitated the downfall of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime. The offensive launched by the Armed Revolutionary Forces at the end of December was backed by the population and patriotically-minded officers and soldiers. The patriots liberated one town after another. Finally, on January 7, the KUFNS flag was raised over Phnom Penh and the newly-formed People's Revolutionary Council assumed full power in the country.

### Victory

Keong Nem: Perhaps only those who participated in and rejoiced in the victory over German fascism in Europe in 1945 can fully grasp our rejoicing when Phnom Penh was liberated. How can I express my impressions and feelings when our capital was liberated from that genocidal fascist regime! I was then in the land army unit and had joined in liberating Prei Veng province. We all felt as if time had stopped. We were overwhelmingly happy, I mean happy to fight on until the country's final liberation had been achieved.

Vong Sarin: I was in the office of the SPK in the forest, because our news agency was located there at that time. We were tremendously excited over the liberation of Phnom Penh-we felt that a new page in our history had been turned. In fact, I myself felt that I had just awakened from a terrible nightmare.



The victory of the Kampuchean people is an event of immense importance. It has shown beyond any doubt that it is impossible to impose Maoist dogmas upon a people. In fact, the failure of the "Kampuchean experiment" not only discredited the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique, but it was a blow to Maoism as such, demonstrating, as it did, its bankruptcy and revealing the utter falsity and sheer adventurism of the Chinese model of socialism.

**Keong Nem:** Under the leadership of the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation we won complete victory, overthrew the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime and proclaimed the People's Republic of Kampuchea. The People's Revolutionary Council is managing all of the country's affairs. A system of People's Revolutionary Committees has been established from top to bottom. The Kampuchean people have won their right to be masters of their own destiny. And this situation is irreversible.

**Vong Sarin:** Our victory made many things clear. One of them is that our real friends are. We know who is really progressive and who is not. The US administration. What also became obvious was the discredited character of the US regime. Not long ago, President Carter said that the US was in the UN Security Council the USA said that the US was in the UN Security Council and thereby demonstrated to the whole world the true nature of the hypocritical campaign for "human rights". It is clear that the US campaign is simply an instrument for interference into the internal affairs of the socialist countries and other states having policies that are in line with US imperialism.

#### Our tasks

**Keong Nem:** The tasks facing us, however, are tremendous. We are reconstructing our country and our society from ruins. Everything considered "civilized" has been destroyed; a whole way of life everything considered normal by other societies has been swept away. In general terms, our people and youth now have the following tasks:

1. To consolidate and strengthen Kampuchea's national autonomy by up the remnants of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary forces and to eliminate the fruits of our revolution;
2. To restore production, ensure and gradually improve the people's living conditions and bring life back to normal in every aspect;
3. To establish and develop relations of friendship and cooperation with fraternal countries, neighbouring countries and peaceful countries of the world;
4. As far as our youth organization is concerned, to consolidate and strengthen the Union from top to bottom.

**Vong Sarin:** Great efforts are being made to revive production and restore life to normal in the immediate future. Work is to be put back to cultivation again. Factories are to be reopened, as are schools and hospitals.

But the difficulties are many. We lack almost everything. What is more, the Chinese leaders are still reluctant to let's us alone. On the one hand they are continuing to help the remnants of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary gangs with money, weapons and food supplies. On the other hand they are trying, by hook or by crook, to prevent international recognition of the People's Republic of Kampuchea. In this connection, let me make it clear that the People's Revolutionary Council of the PRK is the sole genuine and legal representative of the Kampuchean people and that it alone has the right to represent Kampuchea and the Kampuchean people. All attempts by the Chinese leaders to revive the political corpse of the overthrown fascist, genocidal regime of Pol Pot-Ieng Sary will be met with a later doomed.



The great extent of the problems confronting our Kampuchean friends can clearly be seen in the example of medical care. In actual fact for several years there was practically no medical service at all in Kampuchea. Hospital equipment had been either destroyed or shipped off to China. All the medical personnel had been sent to work in the fields.

The hospital in Phnom Penh and many local hospitals and first-aid stations are now already open again. Our medical personnel are carrying a maximum load of work but there are still long queues outside every infirmary. Nearly every survivor of the Pol Pot nightmare suffers from some ailment or other, many from intestinal diseases caused by prolonged undernourishment and others-both adults and children-from nervous breakdowns. The torture and humiliation they were subjected to have left their mark.

#### The Value of Solidarity

Our Kampuchean friends are doing their utmost to overcome the grave problems left behind by the Maoists. There is an important way in which all of us can help them; this way is solidarity.

Keong Nem: We would like to warmly thank the IUS and its member organizations for their precious support given to our struggle against the US aggression in the past and against the fascist, genocidal Pol Pot-long Sary regime just recently. We thank them for the various documents on Kampuchea adopted by the IUS Secretariat and particularly for the message of congratulations we received from the IUS Secretariat upon our victory of January, 1979, and the statement it issued on the occasion of our National Day-April 17, 1979.

Vong Sarin: We would also like to request the IUS Secretariat-and through it the progressive student movement in general-to intensify the actions in solidarity with the Kampuchean people and youth, politically morally and materially. It would be of concrete help to us if the progressive students all over the world would increase their efforts to denounce the manoeuvres being perpetrated by the Chinese leadership against our country.

We would also be very grateful if the IUS and its member unions could send us material assistance, in whatever form, because we need virtually everything from school items and sports and office equipment to utensils of daily use. A piece of clothing, a copy-book for a child, a medicine tablet for an ill person-everything is needed, badly and urgently. Timely assistance-how-ever little it may be-is very valuable.