First Section 5: 203
Analytic
of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment
First Book
Analytic of the Beautiful[1]

First Moment
of the judgment of taste,* concerning its quality.

§ 1.
The judgment of taste is aesthetic.

In order to decide whether or not something is beautiful, we do not relate the representation by means of understanding to the object for cognition, but rather relate it by means of the imagination (perhaps combined with the understanding) to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The judgment of taste is therefore not a cognitive judgment, hence not a logical one, but is rather aesthetic, by which is understood one whose determining ground **cannot** be **other than subjective**. Any relation of representations, however, even that of sensations, can be objective (in which case it signifies what is real in an empirical representation); but not the relation to the feeling of 5: 204
pleasure and displeasure, by means of which nothing at all in the object is designated, but in which the subject feels itself as it is affected by the representation.[2]

To grasp a regular, purposive structure with one's faculty of cognition (whether the manner of representation be distinct or confused) is something entirely different from being conscious of this repre-

* The definition of taste that is the basis here is that it is the faculty for the 5: 203
judging[a] of the beautiful. But what is required for calling an object beautiful must be discovered by the analysis of judgments of taste. In seeking the moments to which this power of judgment attends in its reflection, I have been guided by the logical functions for judging (for a relation to the understanding is always contained even in the judgment of taste). I have considered the moment of quality first, since the aesthetic judgment on the beautiful takes notice of this first.

[a] *Beurtheilung*

sentation with the sensation of satisfaction. Here the representation is related entirely to the subject, indeed to its feeling of life,[3] under the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, which grounds an entirely special faculty for discriminating and judging[a] that contributes nothing to cognition but only holds the given representation in the subject up to the entire faculty of representation, of which the mind becomes conscious in the feeling of its state. Given representations in a judgment can be empirical (hence aesthetic); however, the judgment that is made by means of them is logical if in the judgment they are related to the object. Conversely, however, even if the given representations were to be rational but related in a judgment solely to the subject (its feeling), then they are to that extent always aesthetic.

§ 2.
The satisfaction that determines the judgment of taste is without any interest.

The satisfaction that we combine with the representation of the existence of an object is called interest. Hence such a satisfaction always has at the same time a relation to the faculty of desire, either as its determining ground or else as necessarily interconnected with its determining ground. But if the question is whether something is beautiful, one does not want to know whether there is anything that is or that could be at stake, for us or for someone else, in the existence of the thing, but rather how we judge[b] it in mere contemplation (intuition or reflection).[4] If someone asks[c] me whether I find the palace that I see before me beautiful, I may well say that I don't like that sort of thing, which is made merely to be gaped at, or, like the Iroquois sachem, that nothing in Paris pleased him better than the cook-shops;[5] in true **Rousseauesque** style I might even vilify the vanity of the great who waste the sweat of the people on such superfluous things;[6] finally
5: 205 I could even easily convince myself that if I were to find myself on an uninhabited island, without any hope of ever coming upon human beings again, and could conjure up such a magnificent structure through my mere wish, I would not even take the trouble of doing so if I already had a hut that was[d] comfortable enough for me. All of this might be conceded to me and approved; but that is not what is at issue here. One only wants to know whether the mere representation of the

[a] *Unterscheidungs- und Beurtheilungsvermögen*
[b] *beurtheilen*
[c] In the first edition, "were to ask . . ."
[d] In the first edition, "is."

object is accompanied with satisfaction in me, however indifferent I might be with regard to the existence of the object of this representation. It is readily seen that to say that it is **beautiful** and to prove that I have taste what matters is what I make of this representation in myself, not how I depend on the existence of the object. Everyone must admit that a judgment about beauty in which there is mixed the least interest is very partial and not a pure judgment of taste. One must not be in the least biased in favor of the existence of the thing, but must be entirely indifferent in this respect in order to play the judge in matters of taste.

We can find no better way of elucidating this proposition, however, which is of the utmost importance, than by contrasting to the pure disinterested* satisfaction in the judgment of taste that which is combined with interest, especially if we can be certain that there are not more kinds of interest than those that are to be mentioned now.

§ 3.
The satisfaction *in the agreeable* is combined with interest.

The agreeable is that which pleases the senses in sensation.[7] Now here there is an immediate opportunity to reprove and draw attention to a quite common confusion of the double meaning that the word "sensation" can have. All satisfaction (it is said or thought) is itself sensation (of a pleasure). Hence everything that pleases, just because it 5: 206
pleases, is agreeable (and, according to its different degrees or relations to other agreeable sensations, **graceful, lovely, enchanting, enjoyable,** etc.). But if this is conceded, then impressions of the senses, which determine inclination, or principles of reason, which determine the will, or merely reflected forms of intuition, which determine the power of judgment, are all entirely the same as far as the effect on the feeling of pleasure is concerned. For this would be the agreeableness in the sensation of one's state, and, since in the end all the effort of our faculties is directed to what is practical and must be united in it as their goal, one could not expect of them any other assessment of things and their value than that which consists in the gratification that they promise. In the end, how they achieve this does not matter at all, and

* A judgment on an object of satisfaction can be entirely **disinterested** yet still 5: 205
very **interesting**, i.e., it is not grounded on any interest but it produces an interest; all pure moral judgments are like this. But the pure judgment of taste does not in itself even ground any interest. Only in society does it become **interesting** to have taste, the reason for which will be indicated in the sequel.

since[a] the choice of means alone can make a difference here, people could certainly blame one another for foolishness and incomprehension, but never for baseness and malice: for all of them, each seeing things his own way, would be after one goal, which for everyone is gratification.

If a determination of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure is called sensation, then this expression means something entirely different than if I call the representation of a thing (through sense, as a receptivity belonging to the faculty of[b] cognition) sensation. For in the latter case the representation is related to the object, but in the first case it is related solely to the subject, and does not serve for any cognition at all, not even that by which the subject **cognizes** itself.

In the above explanation, however, we understand by the word "sensation" an objective representation of the senses; and in order not always to run the risk of being misinterpreted, we will call that which must always remain merely subjective and absolutely cannot constitute a representation of an object by the otherwise customary name of "feeling." The green color of the meadows belongs to **objective** sensation, as perception of an object of sense; but its agreeableness belongs to **subjective** sensation, through which no object is represented, i.e., to feeling, through which the object is considered as an object of satisfaction (which is not a cognition of it).

5: 207 Now that my judgment about an object by which I declare it agreeable expresses an interest in it is already clear from the fact that through sensation it excites a desire for objects of the same sort, hence the satisfaction presupposes not the mere judgment about it but the relation of its existence to my state insofar as it is affected by such an object. Hence one says of the agreeable not merely that it **pleases** but that it **gratifies**. It is not mere approval that I give it, rather inclination is thereby aroused; and any judgment about the constitution of the object belongs so little to that which is agreeable in the liveliest way that those who are always intent only on enjoyment (for this is the word that signifies intensity of gratification) gladly put themselves above all judging.

§ 4.
The satisfaction *in the good* is combined with interest.

That is **good** which pleases by means of reason alone, through the mere concept. We call something **good for something** (the useful)

[a] The first edition inserts the word "only" here.
[b] The word *Vermögen* (faculty of) was added in the second edition.

that pleases only as a means; however, another thing is called **good in itself** that pleases for itself. Both always involve the concept of an end, hence the relation of reason to (at least possible) willing, and consequently a satisfaction in the **existence** of an object or of an action, i.e., some sort of interest.[8]

In order to find something good, I must always know what sort of thing the object is supposed to be, i.e., I must have a concept of it. I do not need that in order to find beauty in something. Flowers, free designs, lines aimlessly[a] intertwined in each other under the name of foliage, signify nothing, do not depend on any determinate concept, and yet please. The satisfaction in the beautiful must depend upon reflection on an object that leads to some sort of concept (it is indeterminate which), and is thereby also distinguished from the agreeable, which rests entirely on sensation.

In many cases, to be sure, the agreeable seems to be identical to the good. Thus it is commonly said that all gratification (especially if it is durable) is good in itself, which means roughly that to be durably agreeable is the same as to be good. But one can quickly see that this is merely an erroneous verbal confusion, since the concepts that are properly attached to these expressions can in no way be exchanged for 5: 208
each other. The agreeable, which as such represents the object solely in relation to sense, must first be brought under principles of reason through the concept of an end before it can be called good as an object of the will. But that there is an entirely different relation to satisfaction when I call something that gratifies at the same time **good** can be seen from the fact that in the case of the good there is always the question whether it is merely mediately good or immediately good (whether it is useful or good in itself), while in contrast this cannot be a question at all in the case of the agreeable, since the word always signifies something that pleases immediately. (This is exactly the same in the case of that which I call beautiful.)

Even in the most common speech the agreeable is distinguished from the good. Of a dish that stimulates the taste through spices and other flavorings one may say without hesitation that it is agreeable and yet at the same time concede that it is not good; because while it immediately **appeals to**[b] the senses, considered mediately, i.e., by reason, which looks beyond to the consequences, it displeases. Even in judging[c] health this difference can be noticed. It is immediately agreeable to anyone who possesses it (at least negatively, i.e., as the absence of all bodily pains). But in order to say that it is good it must still be

[a] *ohne Absicht*
[b] ***behagt***
[c] *der Beurtheilung*

referred by reason to ends, as a state, namely, that makes us fit for all our tasks. In respect to[a] happiness, finally, everyone believes that the greatest sum (in terms of number as well as duration) of the agreeableness of life can be called a true good, indeed even the highest good. But reason also balks at this. Agreeableness is enjoyment. But if this were all that is at stake, then it would be foolish to be scrupulous with regard to the means for providing ourselves with it, that is, whether it is obtained passively, from the generosity of nature, or through self-activity and our own effort. But that the existence of a human being who lives merely **for enjoyment** (however busy he might be in this respect) should have a value in itself,[b] even if as a means to this he was as helpful as possible to others who were likewise concerned only with enjoyment, because he participated in all gratification through sympathy: of this reason could never be persuaded. Only through that which he does without regard to enjoyment, in full freedom and independently of that which nature could passively provide for him, does he
5: 209 give his being as the existence of a person an absolute value; and happiness, in all the fullness of its agreeableness, is far from being an unconditional good.*

But despite all this difference between the agreeable and the good, the two still agree in this: that they are always combined with an interest in their object, not only the agreeable (§ 3) and the mediately good (the useful), which pleases as a means to some agreeableness or other, but also that which is good absolutely and in all respects, namely the morally good, which carries the highest interest with it. For the good is the object of the will (i.e., of a faculty of desire that is determined by reason). But to will something and to have satisfaction in its existence, i.e., to take an interest in it, are identical.

§ 5.
Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of satisfaction.[9]

The agreeable and the good both have a relation to the faculty of desire, and to this extent bring satisfaction with them, the former a pathologically conditioned satisfaction (through stimuli, *stimulos*), the

5: 209 * An obligation to enjoyment is a patent absurdity. The same thing must also be true of an alleged obligation in all actions that have mere enjoyment as their goal, however spiritually refined (or embellished) this may be, even if it were a mystical, so-called heavenly enjoyment.

[a] In the first edition, "But of . . ."
[b] The words "in itself" were added in the second edition.

latter a pure practical satisfaction, which is determined not merely through the representation of the object but at the same time through the represented connection of the subject with the existence of the object. Not merely the object but also its existence please.[a] Hence the judgment of taste is merely **contemplative**, i.e., a judgment that, indifferent with regard to the existence of an object, merely connects its constitution together with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. But this contemplation itself is also not directed to concepts; for the judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment (neither a theoretical nor a practical one),[b] and hence it is neither **grounded** on concepts nor **aimed** at them.

The agreeable, the beautiful, and the good therefore designate three different relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, in relation to which we distinguish objects or kinds of 5: 210
representations from each other.[10] The expressions appropriate to each of these, by means of which one designates the pleasure[c] in each of them, are also not the same. **Agreeable** is that which everyone calls what **gratifies** him; **beautiful**, what merely **pleases** him; **good,** what is **esteemed**, **approved**,[d] i.e., that on which he sets an objective value.[11] Agreeableness is also valid for nonrational animals; beauty is valid only for human beings, i.e., animal but also rational beings,[e] but not merely as the latter (e.g., spirits), rather as beings who are at the same time animal; the good, however, is valid for every rational being in general;[12] a proposition, which can receive its complete justification and explanation only in the sequel. One can say that among all these three kinds of satisfaction only that of the taste for the beautiful is a disinterested and **free** satisfaction; for no[f] interest, neither that of the senses nor that of reason, extorts approval. Hence it could be said of satisfaction that it is related in the three cases mentioned to **inclination**, to **favor**, or to **respect**. For **favor** is the only free satisfaction. An object of inclination and one that is imposed upon us by a law of reason for the sake of desire leave us no freedom to make anything into an object of pleasure ourselves. All interest presupposes a need or produces one; and as a determining ground of approval it no longer leaves the judgment on the object free.

Concerning the interest of inclination in the case of the agreeable, everyone says that hunger is the best cook, and people with a healthy

[a] This sentence was added in the second edition.

[b] The words in parentheses were added in the second edition.

[c] *Complacenz*, i.e., Latin *complacentia*, which Kant often gives as an equivalent of *Lust*.

[d] This word (*gebilligt*) added in the second edition.

[e] The words from here to the next semicolon were added in the second edition.

[f] In the second edition, "no" (*kein*) replaces "an" (*ein*).

appetite relish everything that is edible at all; thus such a satisfaction demonstrates no choice in accordance with taste. Only when the need is satisfied can one distinguish who among the many has taste or does not. Likewise, there are mores[a] (conduct)[b] without virtue, politeness without benevolence, propriety without honorableness, etc. For where the moral[c] law speaks there is, objectively,[d] no longer any free choice with regard to what is to be done; and to show taste in one's conduct (or in judging[e] that of others) is something very different from expressing one's moral[f] mode of thinking; for the latter contains a command and produces a need, while modish[g] taste by contrast only plays with the objects of satisfaction without attaching itself to any of them.

5: 211 Definition of the beautiful derived from the first moment.

Taste is the faculty for judging[h] an object or a kind of representation through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction **without any interest**. The object of such a satisfaction is called **beautiful.**[13]

Second Moment
of the judgment of taste, concerning its quality.

§ 6.
The beautiful is that which, without concepts, is represented as the object of a *universal* satisfaction.[14]

This definition of the beautiful can be deduced from the previous explanation of it as an object of satisfaction without any interest. For one cannot judge[i] that about which he is aware that the satisfaction in it is without any interest in his own case in any way except that it must contain a ground of satisfaction for everyone. For since it is not grounded in any inclination of the subject (nor in any other underlying interest), but rather the person making the judgment feels himself completely **free** with regard to the satisfaction that he devotes to the

[a] *Sitten*. In this paragraph, Kant contrasts mere mores or manners (*Sitten*) with genuine morality (*moralische Denkungsart*), but uses the adjective *sittlich* ambiguously, meaning both genuinely moral but also merely modish.
[b] *Conduite*
[c] *sittliche*
[d] The word "objectively" is added in the second edition.
[e] *in Beurtheilung*; "in" added in the second edition.
[f] *moralische*
[g] *sittliche*
[h] *Beurtheilungsvermögen*
[i] *beurtheilen*

object, he cannot discover as grounds of the satisfaction any private conditions, pertaining to his subject alone, and must therefore regard it as grounded in those that he can also presuppose in everyone else; consequently he must believe himself to have grounds for expecting a similar pleasure of everyone. Hence he will speak of the beautiful as if beauty were a property[a] of the object and the judgment logical (constituting a cognition of the object through concepts of it), although it is only aesthetic and contains merely a relation of the representation of the object to the subject, because it still has the similarity with logical judgment that its validity for everyone can be presupposed. But this universality cannot originate from concepts. For there is no transition from concepts to the feeling of pleasure or[b] displeasure (except in pure practical laws, which however bring with them an interest of the sort that is not combined with the pure judgment of taste). Consequently 5: 212
there must be attached to the judgment of taste, with the consciousness of an abstraction in it from all interest, a claim to validity for everyone without the universality that pertains to objects, i.e., it must be combined with a claim to subjective universality.

§ 7.
Comparison of the beautiful with the agreeable and the good through the above characteristic.

With regard to the **agreeable**, everyone is content that his judgment, which he grounds on a private feeling, and in which he says of an object that it pleases him, be restricted merely to his own person.[15] Hence he is perfectly happy if, when he says that sparkling wine from the Canaries is agreeable, someone else should improve his expression and remind him that he should say "It is agreeable **to me**"; and this is so not only in the case of the taste of the tongue, palate, and throat, but also in the case of that which may be agreeable to someone's eyes and ears. For one person, the color violet is gentle and lovely, for another dead and lifeless. One person loves the tone of wind instruments, another that of stringed instruments. It would be folly to dispute the judgment of another that is different from our own in such a matter, with the aim of condemning it as incorrect, as if it were logically opposed to our own; thus[c] with regard to the agreeable, the principle **Everyone has his own**[d] taste (of the senses) is valid.

[a] *Beschaffenheit*

[b] In the first edition, "and."

[c] The word "thus" in the second edition replaces "and" in the first.

[d] The word "own" (*eigenen*) in the second edition replaces the word "special" or "particular" (*besondern*) in the first.

With the beautiful it is entirely different. It would be ridiculous if (the precise converse) someone who prided himself on his taste thought to justify himself thus: "This object (the building we are looking at, the clothing someone is wearing, the poem that is presented for judging)[a] is beautiful **for me**." For he must not call it **beautiful** if it pleases merely him. Many things may have charm and agreeableness for him, no one will be bothered about that; but if he pronounces that something is beautiful, then he expects the very same satisfaction of others: he judges not merely for himself, but for everyone, and speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things. Hence he says that the **thing**[b] is beautiful, and does not count on the agreement of others with his
5: 213 judgment of satisfaction because he has frequently found them to be agreeable with his own, but rather **demands** it from them. He rebukes them if they judge otherwise, and denies that they have taste, though he nevertheless requires that they ought to have it; and to this extent one cannot say, "Everyone has his special taste." This would be as much as to say that there is no taste at all, i.e., no aesthetic judgment that could make a rightful claim to the assent of everyone.

Nevertheless, one also finds with regard to the agreeable that unanimity in their judging[c] of it may be encountered among people, in view of which taste is denied of some of them but conceded to others, and not indeed with the meaning of an organic sense, but as a faculty for judging[d] with regard to the agreeable in general. Thus one says of someone who knows how to entertain his guests with agreeable things (of enjoyment through all the senses), so that they are all pleased, that he has taste. But here the universality is understood only comparatively, and in this case there are only **general**[e] rules (like all empirical rules are),[f] not **universal**[g] ones, the latter of which the judgment of taste about the beautiful ventures or claims. It is a judgment in relation to sociability insofar as it rests on empirical rules. With regard to the good, to be sure, judgments also rightly lay claim to validity for everyone; but the good is represented as an object of a universal satisfaction only **through a concept**, which is not the case either with the agreeable or with the beautiful.

[a] *Beurtheilung*
[b] *Sache*
[c] *Beurtheilung*
[d] *Beurtheilungsvermögen*
[e] *generale*
[f] The words in parentheses were added in the second edition.
[g] *universale*

§ 8.
The universality of the satisfaction is represented in a judgment of taste only as subjective.

This particular determination of the universality of an aesthetic judgment that can be found in a judgment of taste is something remarkable, not indeed for the logician, but certainly for the transcendental philosopher, the discovery of the origin of which calls for no little effort on his part, but which also reveals a property of our faculty of cognition that without this analysis would have remained unknown.

First, one must be fully convinced that through the judgment of taste (on the beautiful) one ascribes the satisfaction in an object **to everyone**, yet without grounding it on a concept (for then it would be the good), and that this claim to universal validity so essentially belongs to a judgment by which we declare something to be **beautiful** that without thinking this it would never occur to anyone to use this expression, rather everything that pleases without a concept would be counted as agreeable, regarding which everyone can be of his own mind, and no one expects assent to his judgment of taste of anyone else, although this is always the case in judgments of taste about beauty. I can call the first the taste of the senses, the second the taste of reflection,[16] insofar as the first makes merely private judgments about an object, while the second makes supposedly generally valid (public) judgments, but both make aesthetic (not merely practical judgments) about an object, regarding merely[a] the relation of its representation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Now it is nevertheless strange that in the case of the taste of the senses experience not only shows that its judgment (of pleasure or displeasure in something) is not universally valid, but also that everyone is intrinsically so modest as not even to ascribe this assent to others (even though a quite extensive unanimity is often found in these judgments as well), whereas the taste of reflection, which, as experience teaches, is often enough rejected in its claim to the universal validity of its judgment (about the beautiful), can nevertheless find it possible (as it also actually does) to represent judgments that could demand such assent universally, and does in fact expect it of everyone for each of its judgments, while those who make those judgments do not find themselves in conflict over the possibility of such a claim, but only find it impossible to agree on the correct application of this faculty in particular cases. 5: 214

Here it should first of all be noted that a universality that does not

[a] Added in the second edition.

rest on concepts of objects (even if only empirical ones) is not logical at all, but aesthetic, i.e., it does not contain an objective quantity of judgment, but only a subjective one, for which I also use the expression **common validity**,[a] which does not designate[b] the validity for every subject of the relation of a representation to the faculty of cognition but rather to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. (The same expression can, however, also be used for the logical quantity of the
5: 215 judgment provided only that one adds to it **objective** universal validity to distinguish it from the merely subjective, which is always aesthetic.)[17]

Now an **objectively universally valid** judgment is also always subjectively so, i.e., if the judgment is valid for everything that is contained under a given concept then it is also valid for everyone who represents an object through this concept. But from a **subjectively universal validity**, i.e., from aesthetic universal validity, which does not rest on any concept, there cannot be any inference at all to logical universal validity; because the first kind of judgment does not pertain to the object at all. For that very reason, however, the aesthetic universality that is ascribed to a judgment must also be of a special kind, since the predicate of beauty is not connected with the concept of the **object** considered in its entire logical[c] sphere, and yet it extends it over the whole sphere of **those who judge.**

In regard to logical quantity all judgments of taste are **singular** judgments. For since I must immediately hold the object up to my feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and yet not through concepts, it cannot have the quantity of an objectively generally valid judgment, although if the singular representation of the object of the judgment of taste in accordance with the conditions that determine the latter is transformed into a concept through comparison, then a logically universal judgment can arise from it: e.g., by means of a judgment of taste I declare the rose that I am gazing at to be beautiful. By contrast, the judgment that arises from the comparison of many singular ones, that roses in general are beautiful, is no longer pronounced merely as an aesthetic judgment, but as an aesthetically grounded logical judgment. Now the judgment that the rose is (in its use)[d] agreeable is also, to be sure, an aesthetic and singular judgment, but not a judgment of taste, rather a judgment of the senses. That is to say, it differs from the former in that the judgment of taste carries with it

[a] ***Gemeingültigkeit***

[b] The verb "designate" (*bezeichnet*) was added in the second edition.

[c] The word "logical" was added in the second edition.

[d] *im Gebrauche*; in the Academy edition, Windelband suggests *im Geruche* (in its smell).

an **aesthetic quantity** of universality, i.e., validity for everyone, which cannot be found in the judgment about the agreeable. Only judgments about the good alone, although they also determine the satisfaction in an object, have logical and not merely aesthetic validity, for they are valid of the object, as cognitions of it, and are therefore valid for everyone.

If one judges[a] objects merely in accordance with concepts, then all representation of beauty is lost. Thus there can also be no rule in accordance with which someone could be compelled to acknowledge something as beautiful. Whether a garment, a house, a flower is beau- 5: 216
tiful: no one allows himself to be talked into[b] his judgment about that by means of any grounds or fundamental principles. One wants to submit the object to his own eyes, just as if his satisfaction depended on sensation; and yet, if one then calls the object beautiful, one believes oneself to have a universal voice, and lays claim to the consent of everyone, whereas any private sensation would be decisive only for him alone and his satisfaction.[18]

Now here it can be seen that in the judgment of taste nothing is postulated except such a **universal voice** with regard to satisfaction without the mediation of concepts, hence the **possibility** of an aesthetic judgment that could at the same time be considered valid for everyone. The judgment of taste does not itself **postulate** the accord of everyone (only a logically universal judgment can do that, since it can adduce grounds); it only **ascribes** this agreement to everyone, as a case of the rule with regard to which it expects confirmation not from concepts but only from the consent of others.[19] The universal voice is thus only an idea (what it rests on will not yet be investigated here). Whether someone who believes himself to be making a judgment of taste is in fact judging in accordance with this idea can be uncertain; but that he relates it to that idea, thus that it is supposed to be a judgment of taste, he announces through the expression of beauty. Of that he can be certain for himself through the mere consciousness of separation of everything that belongs to the agreeable and the good from the satisfaction that remains to him; and this is all for which he promises himself the assent of everyone: a claim which he would also be justified in making under these conditions, if only he were not often to offend against them and thereby make an erroneous judgment of taste.[c]

[a] *beurtheilt*

[b] *beschwatzen*; the first edition has *abschwatzen* (talked out of).

[c] In the first edition, this clause was in the past indicative and not in the subjunctive mood.

§ 9.
Investigation of the question: whether in the judgment of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes the judging[a] of the object or the latter precedes the former.

The solution of this problem is the key to the critique of taste, and hence worthy of full attention.

5: 217 If the pleasure in the given object came first, and only its universal communicability[b] were to be attributed in the judgment of taste to the representation of the object, then such a procedure would be self-contradictory. For such a pleasure would be none other than mere agreeableness in sensation,[c] and hence by its very nature could have only private validity, since it would immediately depend on the representation through which the object **is given.**

Thus it is the universal capacity for the communication[d] of the state of mind in the given representation which, as the subjective condition of the judgment of taste, must serve as its ground and have the pleasure in the object as a consequence.[20] Nothing, however, can be universally communicated except cognition and representation so far as it belongs to cognition. For only so far is the latter objective, and only thereby does it have a universal point of relation with which everyone's faculty of representation is compelled to agree. Now if the determining ground of the judgment on this universal communicability of the representation is to be conceived of merely subjectively, namely without a concept of the object, it can be nothing other than the state of mind that is encountered in the relation of the powers of representation to each other insofar as they relate a given representation to **cognition in general.**

The powers of cognition that are set into play by this representation are hereby in a free play, since no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition.[21] Thus the state of mind in this representation must be that of a feeling of the free play of the powers of representation in a given representation for a cognition in general. Now there belongs to a representation by which an object is given, in order for there to be cognition of it in general, **imagination** for the composition of the manifold of intuition and **understanding** for the unity of the concept that unifies the representations.[e] This state of a

[a] *Beurtheilung*
[b] *Mittheilbarkeit*
[c] *Sinnenempfindung*
[d] *Mittheilungsfähigkeit*
[e] In the first edition, this clause ends with a comma, and the next sentence is a further clause of the present one, introduced with an "and."

free play of the faculties of cognition with a representation through which an object is given must be able to be universally communicated, because cognition, as a determination of the object with which given representations (in whatever subject it may be) should agree, is the only kind of representation that is valid for everyone.[22]

The subjective universal communicability of the kind of representation in a judgment of taste, since it is supposed to occur without presupposing a determinate concept, can be nothing other than the state of mind in the free play of the imagination and the understanding 5: 218
(so far as they agree with each other as is requisite for a **cognition in general**): for we are conscious that this subjective relation suited to cognition in general must be valid for everyone and consequently universally communicable, just as any determinate cognition is, which still always rests on that relation as its subjective condition.

Now this merely subjective (aesthetic) judging[a] of the object, or of the representation through which the object is given, precedes the pleasure in it, and is the ground of this pleasure in the harmony of the faculties of cognition; but on that universality of the subjective conditions of the judging[b] of objects alone is this universal subjective validity of satisfaction, which we combine with the representation of the object that we call beautiful, grounded.

That being able to communicate one's state of mind, even if only with regard to the faculties of cognition, carries a pleasure with it, could easily be established (empirically and psychologically) from the natural tendency of human beings to sociability. But that is not enough for our purposes. When we call something beautiful, the pleasure that we feel is expected of everyone else in the judgment of taste as necessary, just as if it were to be regarded as a property of the object that is determined in it in accordance with concepts; but beauty is nothing by itself, without relation to the feeling of the subject. However, we must reserve the discussion of this question until we have answered another: how and whether aesthetic judgments *a priori* are possible.

For now we shall still concern ourselves with the lesser question: in what way do we become conscious of a mutual subjective correspondence of the powers of cognition with each other[c] in the judgment of taste – aesthetically, through mere inner sense and sensation, or intellectually, through the consciousness of our intentional activity through which we set them in play?[d]

If the given representation, which occasions the judgment of taste,

[a] *Beurtheilung*
[b] *Beurtheilung*
[c] The words "with each other" (*untereinander*) were added in the second edition.
[d] Question mark added.

were a concept, which united understanding and imagination in the judging[a] of the object into a cognition of the object, then the consciousness of this relationship would be intellectual (as in the objective schematism of the power of judgment, which was dealt with in the critique).[23] But in that case the judgment would not be made in relation
5: 219 to pleasure and displeasure, hence it would not be a judgment of taste. Now the judgment of taste, however, determines the object, independently of concepts, with regard to satisfaction and the predicate of beauty. Thus that subjective unity of the relation can make itself known only through sensation. The animation[b,24] of both faculties (the imagination and the understanding)[c] to an activity that is indeterminate but yet, through the stimulus of the given representation, in unison,[d] namely that which belongs to a cognition in general, is the sensation whose universal communicability is postulated by the judgment of taste. Of course, an objective relation can only be thought, but insofar[e] as it is subjective as far as its conditions are concerned it can still be sensed in its effect on the mind; and further, in the case of a relation that is not grounded in any concept (like that of the powers of representation to a faculty of cognition in general), no other consciousness of it is possible except through sensation of the effect that consists in the facilitated play of both powers of the mind (imagination and understanding), enlivened[f] through mutual agreement. A representation which, though singular and without comparison to others, nevertheless is in agreement with the conditions of universality, an agreement that constitutes the business of the understanding in general, brings the faculties of cognition into the well-proportioned disposition that we require for all cognition and hence also regard as valid for everyone (for[g] every human being) who is determined to judge by means of understanding and sense in combination.

The definition of the beautiful drawn from the second moment.

That is **beautiful** which pleases universally without a concept.

[a] *Beurtheilung*
[b] *Belebung*
[c] The words in parentheses were added in the second edition.
[d] *einhelliger*
[e] In the first edition, "if."
[f] *belebten*
[g] The word "for" added in the second edition.

Third Moment
of judgments of taste, concerning the *relation* of the ends that are taken into consideration in them.

§ 10.
On purposiveness in general.

If one would define what an end is in accordance with its transcendental determinations (without presupposing anything empirical, such as the feeling of pleasure), then an end is the object of a concept insofar 5: 220
as the latter is regarded as the cause of the former (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a **concept** with regard to its **object** is purposiveness (*forma finalis*).[a] Thus where not merely the cognition of an object but the object itself (its form or its existence) as an effect is thought of as possible only through a concept of the latter, there one thinks of an end. The representation of the effect is here the determining ground of its cause, and precedes the latter. The consciousness of the causality of a representation with respect to the state of the subject, **for maintaining** it in that state, can here designate in general what is called pleasure; in contrast to which displeasure is that representation that contains the ground for determining the state of the representations to their own opposite (hindering or getting rid of them).[b,25]

The faculty of desire, insofar as it is determinable only through concepts, i.e., to act in accordance with the representation of an end, would be the will.[26] An object or a state of mind or even an action, however, even if its possibility does not necessarily presuppose the representation of an end, is called purposive merely because its possibility can only be explained and conceived by us insofar as we assume as its ground a causality in accordance with ends, i.e., a will that has arranged it so in accordance with the representation of a certain rule. Purposiveness can thus exist without an end, insofar as we do not place the causes[c] of this form in a will, but can still make the explanation of its possibility conceivable to ourselves only by deriving it from a will. Now we do not always necessarily need to have insight through reason (concerning its possibility) into what we observe. Thus we can at least observe a purposiveness concerning form, even without basing it in an end (as the matter of the *nexus finalis*),[d] and notice it in objects, although in no other way than by reflection.

[a] purposive form
[b] The words in parentheses were added in the second edition.
[c] This word was singular in the first edition.
[d] purposive connection

5: 221

§ 11.
The judgment of taste has nothing but the *form of the purposiveness* of an object (or of the way of representing it) as its ground.

Every end, if it is regarded as a ground of satisfaction, always brings an interest with it, as the determining ground of the judgment about the object of the pleasure. Thus no subjective end can ground the judgment of taste. But further no representation of an objective end, i.e., of the possibility of the object itself in accordance with principles of purposive connection, hence no concept of the good, can determine the judgment of taste, because it is an aesthetic judgment and not a cognitive judgment, which thus does not concern any **concept** of the constitution and internal or external possibility of the object, through this or that cause, but concerns only the relation of the powers of representation to each other insofar as they are determined by a representation.

Now this relation in the determination of an object as a beautiful one is combined with the feeling of pleasure that is at the same time declared to be valid for everyone through the judgment of taste; consequently an agreeableness accompanying the representation can contain the determining ground just as little as the representation of[a] the perfection of the object and the concept of the good can. Thus nothing other than the subjective purposiveness in the representation of an object without any end (objective or subjective), consequently the mere form of purposiveness in the representation through which an object is **given** to us, insofar as we are conscious of it, can constitute the satisfaction that we judge,[b] without a concept, to be universally communicable, and hence the determining ground of the judgment of taste.

§ 12.
The judgment of taste rests on *a priori* grounds.

To establish *a priori* the connection of the feeling of a pleasure or displeasure as an effect with some representation (sensation or concept) as its cause is absolutely impossible, for that would be a [c]causal relation,
5: 222 which (among objects of experience) can only ever be cognized *a posteriori* and by means of experience itself. To be sure, in the critique of

[a] The words "the representation of" were added in the second edition.
[b] *beurtheilen*
[c] The second edition omits the word "particular" (*besonderes*) that precedes "causal" in the first edition.

practical reason we actually derived the feeling of respect (as a special and peculiar modification of this feeling, which will not coincide exactly either with the pleasure or with the displeasure that we obtain from empirical objects) from universal moral concepts *a priori*.[27] But there we could also step beyond the bounds of experience and appeal to a causality that rests on a supersensible property of the subject, namely that of freedom. But even there we did not actually derive this **feeling** from the idea of the moral as a cause, rather it was merely the determination of the will that was derived from the latter. The state of mind of a will determined by something, however, is in itself already a feeling of pleasure and is identical with it, thus it does not follow from it as an effect: the latter would only have to be assumed if the concept of the moral as a good preceded the determination of the will by the law, for in that case it would be pointless for the pleasure that would be connected with the concept to be derived from it as a mere cognition.

Now it is similar with the pleasure in the aesthetic judgment, except that here it is merely contemplative and does not produce an interest in the object, while in the moral judgment it is practical.[a] The consciousness of the merely formal purposiveness in the play of the cognitive powers of the subject in the case of a representation through which an object is given is the pleasure itself, because it contains a determining ground of the activity of the subject with regard to the animation of its cognitive powers, thus an internal causality (which is purposive) with regard to cognition in general, but without being restricted to a particular cognition, hence it contains a mere form of the subjective purposiveness of a representation in an aesthetic judgment. This pleasure is also in no way practical, neither like that from the pathological ground of agreeableness nor like that from the intellectual ground of the represented good. But yet it has a causality in itself, namely that of **maintaining** the state of the representation of the mind and the occupation of the cognitive powers without a further aim. We **linger** over the consideration of the beautiful because this consideration strengthens and reproduces itself, which is analogous to (yet not identical with) the way in which we linger when a charm in the representation of the object repeatedly attracts attention, where the mind is passive.

§ 13. 5: 223

The pure judgment of taste is independent from charm and emotion.[28]

Any interest spoils the judgment of taste and deprives it of its impartiality, especially if the purposiveness does not precede the feeling of

[a] In the first edition, "moral but practical."

pleasure, as in the interest of reason, but is instead grounded on it, which always happens in the aesthetic judgment about something insofar as it is gratifying or painful. Hence judgments that are so affected can make no claim at all to universal satisfaction or as little claim as can be made when those sorts of sensations are found among the determining grounds of taste. Taste is always still barbaric when it needs the addition of **charms** and **emotions** for satisfaction, let alone if it makes these into the standard for its approval.

And yet charms are not only often included with beauty (which should properly concern merely form) as a contribution to the aesthetic universal satisfaction, but are even passed off as beauties in themselves, hence the matter of satisfaction is passed off for the form: a misunderstanding which, like many others that yet always have something true as their ground, can be eliminated by careful determination of these concepts.

A judgment of taste on which charm and emotion have no influence (even though these may be combined with the satisfaction in the beautiful), which thus has for its determining ground merely the purposiveness of the form, is a **pure judgment of taste.**[29]

§ 14.
Elucidation by means of examples.

Aesthetic judgments can be divided, just like theoretical (logical) ones, into empirical and pure. The first are those which assert agreeableness or disagreeableness, the second those which assert beauty of an object or the way of representing it; the former are judgments of sense (material aesthetic judgments), the latter (as formal)[a] are alone proper judgments of taste.

5: 224 A judgment of taste is thus pure only insofar as no merely empirical satisfaction is mixed into its determining ground. This always happens, however, if charm or emotion has any share in the judgment by which something is to be declared to be beautiful.

Now here there may arise many objections, pretending that charm is not merely a necessary ingredient of beauty, but even entirely sufficient by itself to be called beautiful. A mere color, e.g., the green of a lawn, a mere tone (in distinction from sound and noise), say that of a violin, is declared by most people to be beautiful in itself, although both seem to have as their ground merely the matter of the representations, namely mere sensation, and on that account deserve to be called only agreeable. Yet at the same time one will surely note that

[a] The parenthesis "(as formal)" was added in the second edition.

the sensations of color as well as of tone justifiably count as beautiful only insofar as both are **pure**, which is a determination that already concerns form, and is also the only thing that can be universally communicated about these representations with certainty: because the quality of the sensations themselves cannot be assumed to be in accord in all subjects, and it cannot easily be assumed that the agreeableness of one color in preference to another or of the tone of one musical instrument in preference to another will be judged[a] in the same way by everyone.

If one assumes, with Euler, that the colors are vibrations (*pulsus*) of the air immediately following one another, just as tones are vibrations of the air disturbed by sound, and, what is most important, that the mind does not merely perceive, by sense, their effect on the animation of the organ, but also, through reflection, perceives the regular play of the impressions (hence the form in the combination of different representations) (about which I have very little doubt),[b,30] then colors and tones would not be mere sensations, but would already be a formal determination of the unity of a manifold of them, and in that case could also be counted as beauties in themselves.

The purity of a simple kind of sensation, however, means that its uniformity is not disturbed and interrupted by any foreign sensation, and belongs merely to the form; for in that case one can abstract from the quality of that kind of sensation (from whether and what color or whether and what tone it represents). Hence all simple colors, insofar as they are pure, are held to be beautiful; those that are mixed do not have this advantage since, precisely because they are not simple, one 5: 225
has no standard for judging[c] whether they should be called pure or impure.[31]

As for the opinion that the beauty that is attributed to the object on account of its form may well be heightened by charm, this is a common error and one that is very detrimental to genuine, uncorrupted, well-grounded taste, although charms may certainly be added beside beauty in order to interest the mind through the representation of the object beyond dry satisfaction, and thus to serve to recommend taste and its cultivation,[d] especially when it is still crude and unpracticed. But they actually do damage to the judgment of taste if they attract attention to

[a] *beurtheilt*

[b] Here we follow the third edition, which prints "*woran ich doch gar nicht zweifle*," rather than the first and second editions, which read "*woran ich doch gar sehr zweifle*," i.e., "which I very much doubt." For explanation of this departure from the second edition, see the endnote.

[c] *der Beurtheilung*

[d] *Kultur*

themselves as grounds for the judging[a] of beauty. For it is so far from being true that they contribute to taste that, if taste is still weak and unpracticed, they must rather be accepted cautiously, as foreigners, only to the extent that they do not disturb that beautiful form.[32]

In painting and sculpture, indeed in all the pictorial arts,[b] in architecture[33] and horticulture insofar as they are fine arts, the **drawing** is what is essential, in which what constitutes the ground of all arrangements for taste is not what gratifies in sensation but merely what pleases through its form. The colors that illuminate the outline belong to charm; they can of course enliven[c] the object in itself for sensation, but they cannot make it worthy of being intuited and beautiful, rather, they are often even considerably restricted by what is required by beautiful form, and even where charm is permitted it is ennobled only through the former.[d]

All form of the objects of the senses (of the outer as well as, mediately, the inner) is either **shape**[e] or **play**: in the latter case, either play of shapes (in space, mime, and dance), or mere[f] play of sensations (in time). The **charm** of colors or of the agreeable tones of instruments can be added, but **drawing** in the former and composition in the latter constitute the proper object of the pure judgment of taste; and that the purity of colors as well as of tones as well as their multiplicity and their contrast seem to contribute to beauty does not mean that they as it were supply a supplement of the same rank to the satisfaction in the form because they are agreeable by themselves, but rather they do so because they merely make the latter more precisely, more determi-
5: 226 nately, and more completely intuitable, and also enliven the representation[g] through their charm, thereby awakening and sustaining[h] attention to the object itself.

Even what one calls **ornaments** (*parerga*),[i] i.e., that which is not internal to the entire representation of the object as a constituent, but

[a] *Beurtheilungsgründe*

[b] *bildenden Künste*

[c] Following the second edition, reading *belebt . . . machen* rather than *beliebt* (make it beloved).

[d] In the first edition, Kant explicitly refers to "beautiful form" rather than merely "the former" here.

[e] *Gestalt*

[f] The word "mere" added in the second edition.

[g] The phrase "enliven the representation" added in the second edition; the first edition would read "and through their charm awaken and elevate . . ."

[h] In the first edition, "elevating" (*erheben* rather than *erhalten*).

[i] The parenthetical term *parerga*, a word in both Latin and Greek meaning something subordinate or incidental, is added in the second edition.

only belongs to it externally as an addendum and augments the satisfaction of taste, still does this only through its form: like the borders of paintings,[a] draperies on statues, or colonnades around magnificent buildings. But if the ornament itself does not consist in beautiful form, if it is, like a gilt frame, attached merely in order to recommend approval for the painting through its charm – then it is called **decoration**, and detracts from genuine beauty.

Emotion, a sensation in which agreeableness is produced only by means of a momentary inhibition followed by a stronger outpouring of the vital force, does not belong to beauty at all. Sublimity (with which the feeling of emotion is combined), however, requires another standard for judging[b] than that on which taste is grounded; and thus a pure judgment of taste has neither charm nor emotion, in a word no sensation, as matter of the aesthetic judgment, for its determining ground.

§ 15.
The judgment of taste is entirely independent from the concept of perfection.

Objective purposiveness can be cognized only by means of the relation of the manifold to a determinate end, thus only through a concept. From this alone it is already clear that the beautiful, the judging[c] of which has as its ground a merely formal purposiveness, i.e., a purposiveness without an end, is entirely independent of the representation of the good, since the latter presupposes an objective purposiveness, i.e., the relation of the object to a determinate end.

Objective purposiveness is either external, i.e., the **utility** of the object, or internal, i.e., its **perfection**. That the satisfaction in an object on account of which we call it beautiful could not rest on the representation of its utility is sufficiently obvious from the two preceding main sections,[d] since in that case it would not be an immediate satisfaction 5: 227
in the object, which latter is the essential condition of the judgment about beauty. But an objective inner purposiveness, i.e., perfection, already comes closer to the predicate of beauty, and has therefore been held to be identical with beauty even by philosophers of repute, though with the proviso **if it is thought confusedly**.[34] It is of the greatest

[a] This example was added in the second edition.
[b] *Beurtheilung*
[c] *Beurtheilung*
[d] That is, the first and second moments of the "Analytic of the Beautiful."

importance in a critique of taste to decide whether beauty is really reducible to the concept of perfection.

To judge[a] objective purposiveness we always require the concept of an end, and [if that purposiveness is not to be an external one (utility), but an internal one],[b] we require the concept of an internal end, which contains the ground of the internal possibility of the object. Now as an end in general is that the **concept** of which can be regarded as the ground of the possibility of the object itself, thus in order to represent an objective purposiveness in a thing the concept of **what sort of thing it is supposed to be** must come first; and the agreement of the manifold in the thing with this concept (which supplies the rule for the combination of the manifold in it) is the **qualitative perfection** of a thing.[c] **Quantitative** perfection, as the completeness of any thing in its own kind, is entirely distinct from this, and is a mere concept of magnitude (of totality), in which **what the thing is supposed to be** is thought of as already determined and it is only asked whether **everything** that is requisite for it exists.[35] What is formal in the representation of a thing, i.e., the agreement of the manifold with a unity (leaving undetermined what it is supposed to be) does not by itself allow any cognition of objective purposiveness at all, because since abstraction is made from this unity, **as an end** (what the thing is supposed to be), nothing remains but the subjective purposiveness of representations in the mind of the beholder,[d] which indicates a certain purposiveness of the representational state of the subject, and in this an ease in apprehending a given form in the imagination, but not the perfection of any object, which is here not conceived through any concept of an end. E.g., if I encounter in the forest a plot of grass around which the trees stand in a circle, and I do not represent a purpose for it, say that it is
5: 228 to serve for country dancing, then not the slightest concept of perfection is given through the mere form. But to represent a formal **objective** purposiveness without an end, i.e., the mere form of a **perfection** (without any material and **concept** of that with which it is to agree, even if it were only the idea of a lawfulness in general),[e] is a veritable contradiction.

Now the judgment of taste is an aesthetic judgment, i.e., one that rests on subjective grounds, and its determining ground cannot be a concept, and thus not a concept of a determinate end. Thus by beauty,

[a] *beurtheilen*

[b] The square brackets are Kant's.

[c] In the first edition, there is a comma here, and the next sentence continues as a dependent clause.

[d] *des Anschauenden*, i.e., the one who intuits

[e] This clause was added in the second edition.

as a formal subjective purposiveness, there is not conceived any perfection of the object as a supposedly formal but yet also objective purposiveness, and the distinction between the concepts of the beautiful and good, as if both differed only in logical form, the former being merely a confused but the latter a distinct concept of perfection while they were otherwise identical in content and origin, is null, because in that case there would be no **specific** difference between them, rather a judgment of taste would be just as much a cognitive judgment as the judgment whereby something is declared to be good – just as when the ordinary man, when he says that deception is unjust, grounds his judgment on confused principles, while the philosopher grounds his on distinct ones, but at bottom these are identical principles of reason. But I have already pointed out that an aesthetic judgment is of a unique[a] kind, and affords absolutely no cognition (not even a confused one) of the object, which happens only in a logical judgment; while the former, by contrast, relates the representation by which an object is given solely to the subject, and does not bring to our attention any property of the object, but only the purposive form in the determination[b] of the powers of representation that are occupied with it. The judgment is also called aesthetic precisely because its determining ground is not a concept but the feeling (of inner sense) of that unison in the play of the powers of the mind, insofar as they can only be sensed.[c] By contrast, if one were to call confused concepts and the objective judgment that is grounded in them aesthetic, one would have an understanding that judged by sense or a sense that represented its object through concepts, both of which are self-contradictory. The faculty of concepts, be they confused or distinct, is the understanding; and although understanding also belongs to the judgment of taste, as an aesthetic judgment (as in all judgments), it does not belong to it as a faculty for the cognition 5: 229
of an object, but as the faculty for the determination of the judgment and its representation (without a concept) in accordance with the relation of the representation to the subject and its internal feeling, and indeed insofar as this judgment is possible in accordance with a universal rule.

[a] Here reading *einzig* with the third edition rather than *einig* ("unitary") as in the first two.

[b] The words "in the determination" were added in the second edition.

[c] *empfunden*

§ 16.
The judgment of taste through which an object is declared to be beautiful under the condition of a determinate concept is not pure.

There are two kinds of beauty: free beauty (*pulchritudo vaga*) or merely adherent[a] beauty (*pulchritudo adhaerens*). The first presupposes no concept of what the object ought to be; the second does presuppose such a concept and the perfection of the object in accordance with it. The first are called (self-subsisting) beauties of this or that thing; the latter, as adhering to a concept (conditioned beauty), are ascribed to objects that stand under the concept of a particular end.[36]

Flowers are free natural beauties. Hardly anyone other than the botanist knows what sort of thing a flower is supposed to be; and even the botanist, who recognizes in it the reproductive organ of the plant, pays no attention to this natural end if he judges the flower by means of taste. Thus this judgment is not grounded on any kind of perfection, any internal purposiveness to which the composition of the manifold is related. Many birds (the parrot, the hummingbird, the bird of paradise) and a host of marine crustaceans are beauties in themselves, which are not attached to a determinate object in accordance with concepts regarding its end, but are free and please for themselves. Thus designs *à la grecque*,[37] foliage for borders or on wallpaper, etc., signify nothing by themselves: they do not represent anything, no object under a determinate concept, and are free beauties. One can also count as belonging to the same kind what are called in music fantasias (without a theme), indeed all music without a text.

In the judging[b] of a free beauty (according to mere form) the judgment of taste is pure. No concept of any end for which the manifold should serve the given object and thus which the latter should
5: 230 represent is presupposed, by which the imagination, which is as it were at play in the observation of the shape, would merely be restricted.

But the beauty of a human being (and in this species that of a man, a woman, or a child), the beauty of a horse, of a building (such as a church, a palace, an arsenal, or a garden-house) presuppose a concept of the end that determines what the thing should be, hence a concept of its perfection, and is thus merely adherent[c] beauty. Now just as the combination of the agreeable (of sensation) with beauty, which properly concerns only form, hindered the purity of the judgment of taste,

[a] *anhängende*; the Latin equivalent shows that Kant means the same by this as by the term *adhärirende*, which he uses later in this section.

[b] *Beurtheilung*

[c] *adhärierende*

so the combination of the good (that is, the way in which the manifold is good for the thing itself, in accordance with its end) with beauty does damage to its purity.[38]

One would be able to add much to a building that would be pleasing in the intuition of it if only it were not supposed to be a church; a figure could be beautified with all sorts of curlicues and light but regular lines, as the New Zealanders[a] do with their tattooing, if only it were not a human being; and the latter could have much finer features and a more pleasing, softer outline to its facial structure if only it were not supposed to represent a man, or even a warrior.

Now the satisfaction in the manifold in a thing in relation to the internal purpose that determines its possibility is a satisfaction grounded on a concept; the satisfaction in beauty, however, is one that presupposes no concept, but is immediately combined with the representation through which the object is given (not through which it is thought). Now if the judgment of taste in regard to the latter is made dependent on the purpose in the former, as a judgment of reason, and is thereby restricted, then it is no longer a free and pure judgment of taste.

To be sure, taste gains by this combination of aesthetic satisfaction with the intellectual in that it becomes fixed and, though not universal, can have rules prescribed to it in regard to certain purposively determined objects. But in this case these are also not rules of taste, but merely rules for the unification of taste with reason, i.e., of the beautiful with the good, through which the former becomes usable as an instrument of the intention with regard to the latter, so that the determination of the mind that sustains itself and is of subjective universal 5: 231
validity can underlie that which can only be sustained through strenuous resolve but is objectively universally valid. Strictly speaking, however, perfection does not gain by beauty, nor does beauty gain by perfection; rather, since in comparing the representation by which an object is given to us with the object (with regard to what it ought to be) we cannot avoid at the same time holding it together with the subject, the **entire faculty** of the powers of representation gains if both states of mind are in agreement.

A judgment of taste in regard to an object with a determinate internal end would thus be pure only if the person making the judgment either had no concept of this end or abstracted from it in his judgment. But in that case, although this person would have made a correct judgment of taste, in that he would have judged[b] the object as a free beauty, he would nevertheless be criticized and accused of a false

[a] That is, the Maori aborigines in New Zealand.

[b] *beurtheilete*

taste by someone else, who considered beauty in the object only as an adherent property (who looked to the end of the object), even though both judge correctly in their way: the one on the basis of what he has before his sense, the other on the basis of what he has in his thoughts. By means of this distinction one can settle many disputes about beauty between judges of taste, by showing them that the one is concerned[a] with free beauty, the other with adherent beauty, the first making a pure, the second an applied judgment of taste.

§ 17. On the ideal of beauty.[39]

There can be no objective rule of taste that would determine what is beautiful through concepts. For every judgment from this source is aesthetic, i.e., its determining ground is the feeling of the subject and not a concept of an object. To seek a principle of taste that would provide the universal criterion of the beautiful through determinate concepts is a fruitless undertaking, because what is sought is impossible and intrinsically self-contradictory. The universal communicability of the sensation (of satisfaction or dissatisfaction), and indeed one that occurs without concepts, the unanimity, so far as possible, of all times
5: 232 and peoples about this feeling in the representation of certain objects: although weak and hardly sufficient for conjecture, this is the empirical criterion of the derivation of a taste, confirmed by examples, from the common ground, deeply buried in all human beings, of unanimity in the judging[b] of forms under which objects are given to them.

Hence some products of taste are regarded as **exemplary** – not as if taste could be acquired by imitating others.[40] For taste must be a faculty of one's own; however, whoever imitates a model certainly shows, so far as he gets it right, a skill, but he shows taste only insofar as he can judge[c] this model himself.* From this, however, it follows that the highest model, the archetype of taste, is a mere idea, which everyone must produce in himself, and in accordance with which he must judge[d]

5: 232 * Models of taste with regard to the arts of discourse must be composed in a dead and learned language: the former, in order not to have to suffer the alterations that unavoidably affect living languages, which make noble expressions flat, common ones outmoded, and newly created ones of only brief currency; the latter, so that it should have a grammar that is not subject to any willful change of fashion but has its own unalterable rules.

[a] In the second edition, the verb *halte* replaces *wende* (turning to), used in the first.
[b] *Beurtheilung*
[c] *beurtheilen*
[d] *beurtheilen*

everything that is an object of taste, or that is an example of judging[a] through taste, even the taste of everyone. **Idea** signifies, strictly speaking, a concept of reason, and **ideal** the representation of an individual being as adequate to an idea. Hence that archetype of taste, which indeed rests on reason's indeterminate idea of a maximum, but cannot be represented through concepts, but only in an individual presentation, would better be called the ideal of the beautiful, something that we strive to produce in ourselves even if we are not in possession of it. But it will be merely an ideal of the imagination, precisely because it does not rest on concepts but on presentation, and the faculty of presentation is the imagination. – Now how do we attain such an ideal of beauty? *A priori* or empirically? Likewise, what species of beauty admits of an ideal?

First, it should be noted that the beauty for which an idea is to be sought must not be a **vague**[b] beauty, but must be a beauty **fixed** by a concept of objective purposiveness, consequently it must not belong to the object of an entirely pure judgment of taste, but rather to one of[c] a partly intellectualized judgment of taste. I.e., in whatever kind of 5: 233
grounds for judging[d] an ideal is supposed to occur, at its basis there must lie some idea of reason in accordance with determinate concepts, which determines *a priori* the end on which the internal possibility of the object rests. An ideal of beautiful flowers, of beautiful furnishings, of a beautiful view, cannot be conceived. However, an ideal of a beauty adhering to determinate ends, e.g., of a beautiful residence, a beautiful tree, beautiful gardens, etc., is also incapable of being represented, presumably because the ends are not adequately determined and fixed by their concept, and consequently the purposiveness is almost as free as in the case of **vague** beauty. Only that which has the end of its existence in itself, the **human being**, who determines his ends himself through reason, or, where he must derive them from external perception can nevertheless compare them to essential and universal ends and in that case also aesthetically judge[e] their agreement with them: this **human being** alone is capable of an ideal of **beauty**, just as the humanity in his person, as intelligence, is alone among all the objects in the world capable of the ideal of **perfection.**

But there are two elements involved here: **first**, the aesthetic **normal**

[a] *Beurtheilung*
[b] *vage*; in § 16, Kant used the Latin word *vaga* as a parenthetical synonym of "free" in the expression "free beauty."
[c] Following the first edition rather than the second, which omits the words "one of" (*dem eines*).
[d] *Beurtheilung*
[e] *beurtheilen*

idea, which is an individual intuition (of the imagination) that represents the standard for judging[a] it as a thing belonging to a particular species of animal; **second**, the **idea of reason**, which makes the ends of humanity insofar as they cannot be sensibly represented into the principle for the judging[b] of its figure, through which, as their effect in appearance, the former are revealed. The normal idea must take its elements for the figure of an animal of a particular species from experience; but the greatest purposiveness in the construction of the figure, which would be suitable as a universal standard for the aesthetic judging[c] of every individual of this species, the image which has as it were intentionally grounded the technique of nature, to which only the species as a whole but not any separate individual is adequate, lies merely in the idea of the one who does the judging,[d] which, however, with its proportions, can be represented fully *in concreto* as an aesthetic idea in a model image. In order to make it somewhat comprehensible how this happens (for who can entirely unlock its secret from nature?), we shall attempt a psychological explanation.

5: 234 It should be noted that the imagination does not only know how to recall for us occasionally signs of concepts, even after a long time, in a way that is entirely incomprehensible to us; it also knows how to reproduce the image and shape of an object out of an immense number of objects of different kinds, or even of one and the same kind; indeed, when the mind is set on making comparisons, it even knows how, by all accounts actually if not consciously,[e] as it were to superimpose one image on another and by means of the congruence of several of the same kind to arrive at a mean that can serve them all as a common measure. Someone has seen a thousand grown men. Now if he would judge what should be estimated as their comparatively normal size, then (in my opinion) the imagination allows a great number of images (perhaps all thousand) to be superimposed on one another, and, if I may here apply the analogy of optical presentation, in the space where the greatest number of them coincide and within the outline of the place that is illuminated by the most concentrated colors, there the **average size** becomes recognizable, which is in both height and breadth equidistant from the most extreme boundaries of the largest and smallest statures; and this is the stature for a beautiful man.[41] (One could get the same result mechanically if one measured all thousand men, added up their heights, widths (and girths) and then divided the

[a] *Beurtheilung*
[b] *Beurtheilung*
[c] *Beurtheilung*
[d] *des Beurtheilenden*
[e] The second edition here omits the phrase "to reproduce" from the first.

sum by a thousand. But the imagination does just this by means of a dynamic effect, which arises from the repeated apprehension of such figures on the organ of inner sense.) Now if in a similar way there is sought for this average man the average head, the average nose, etc., then this shape is the basis for the normal idea of the beautiful man in the country where this comparison is made; hence under these empirical conditions[a] a Negro must necessarily have a different normal idea[b] of the beauty of a figure than a white, a Chinese person a different idea from a European. It will be exactly the same with the model of a beautiful horse or dog (of a certain breed). – This **normal idea** is not derived from the proportions taken from experience, **as determinate rules**; rather it is in accordance with it that rules for judging[c] first become possible. It is the image for the whole species, hovering among all the particular and variously diverging intuitions of the individuals, which nature used as the archetype underlying her productions in the same species, but does not seem to have fully achieved in any individ- 5: 235
ual. It is by no means the entire[d] **archetype** of **beauty** in this species, but only the form that constitutes the indispensable condition of all beauty, and so merely the **correctness** in the presentation of the species. It is, as was said of **Polycletus's** famous **Doryphorus**, the **rule** (and **Myron's** cow could be used in the same way in its species).[42] For that very reason it cannot contain anything specifically characteristic, for then it would not be the **normal idea** for the species. Its presentation also does not please because of beauty, but merely because it does not contradict any condition under which alone a thing of this species can be beautiful. The presentation is merely academically correct.*

* One will find that a perfectly regular face, which a painter might ask to sit for him as a model, usually says nothing: because it contains nothing charac- 5: 235
teristic, and thus expresses more the idea of the species than anything specific to a person. What is characteristic in this way, when it is exaggerated, i.e., when it itself breaks with the normal idea (of the purposiveness of the species), is called **caricature.** Experience also shows that such completely regular faces usually betray an inwardly only average human being, presumably for this reason (if it may be assumed that nature expresses in the exterior the proportions of the interior), that if none of the mental characteristics stand out beyond those proportions that are required merely to constitute a faultless human being, then nothing may be expected of that which is called **genius**, in which nature seems to depart from its usual relations among the powers of the mind in favor of a particular one.

[a] The phrase "under these empirical conditions" was added in the second edition.
[b] In the first edition, the word "normal" was omitted.
[c] *Beurtheilung*
[d] This word was added in the second edition.

Yet there is still a distinction between the **normal idea** of the beautiful and its **ideal**, which on the grounds already introduced can be expected only in the **human figure**.[43] In the latter the ideal consists in the expression of the **moral**, without which the object would not please universally and moreover positively (not merely negatively in an academically correct presentation). The visible expression of moral ideas, which inwardly govern human beings, can of course be drawn only from experience; but as it were to make visible in bodily manifestation (as the effect of what is inward) their combination with everything that our understanding connects with the morally good in the idea of the highest purposiveness – goodness of soul, or purity, or strength, or repose, etc. – this requires pure ideas of reason and great force of imagination united in anyone who would merely judge[a] them, let alone anyone who would present them. The correctness of such an
5: 236 ideal of beauty is proved by the fact that no sensory charm is allowed to be mixed into the satisfaction in its object, while it nevertheless allows a great interest to be taken in it, which then proves that judging[b] in accordance with such a standard can never be purely aesthetic, and judging in accordance with an ideal of beauty is no mere judgment of taste.

Definition of the beautiful inferred from this third moment.

Beauty is the form of the **purposiveness** of an object, insofar as it is perceived in it **without representation of an end**.*[44]

5: 236 * It might be adduced as a counterexample to this definition that there are things in which one can see a purposive form without[c] cognizing an end in them, e.g., the stone utensils often excavated from ancient burial mounds, which are equipped with a hole, as if for a handle, which, although they clearly betray by their shape a purposiveness the end of which one does not know, are nevertheless not declared to be beautiful on that account. Yet the fact that they are regarded as a work of art is already enough to require one to admit that one relates their shape to some sort of intention and to a determinate purpose. Hence there is also no immediate satisfaction at all in their intuition. A flower, by contrast,[d] e.g., a tulip, is held to be beautiful because a certain purposiveness is encountered in our perception of it which, as we judge[e] it, is not related to any end at all.

[a] *beurtheilen*

[b] *Beurtheilung* here and in the next clause of this sentence.

[c] The second edition here omits the word "also" from the first.

[d] In the first edition, "however."

[e] *beurtheilen*

Fourth Moment of the judgment of taste, concerning the modality of the satisfaction in the object.

§ 18. What the modality of a judgment of taste is.

Of every representation I can say that it is at least **possible** that it (as a cognition) be combined with a pleasure. Of that which I call **agreeable** I say that it **actually** produces a pleasure in me. Of the **beautiful**, however, one thinks that it has a necessary relation to satisfaction. Now this necessity is[a] of a special kind: not a theoretical objective necessity, where it can be cognized *a priori* that everyone **will feel** this satisfaction 5: 237
in the object called beautiful by me, nor a practical necessity, whereby means of concepts of a pure will, serving as rules for freely acting beings, this satisfaction is a necessary consequence of an objective law and signifies nothing other than that one absolutely (without a further aim) ought to act in a certain way. Rather, as a necessity that is thought in an aesthetic judgment, it can only be called **exemplary**, i.e., a[b] necessity of the assent of **all** to a judgment that is regarded as an example of a universal rule that one cannot produce.[45] Since an aesthetic judgment is not an objective and cognitive judgment, this necessity cannot be derived from determinate concepts, and is therefore not apodictic. Much less can it be inferred from the universality of experience (from a complete unanimity in judgments about the beauty of a certain object). For not only would experience hardly supply sufficient evidence of this, but it is also impossible to ground any concept of the necessity of these judgments on empirical judgments.[46]

§ 19. The subjective necessity that we ascribe to the judgment of taste is conditioned.

The judgment of taste ascribes assent to everyone, and whoever declares something to be beautiful wishes that everyone **should** approve of the object in question and similarly declare it to be beautiful. The **should** in aesthetic judgments of taste is thus pronounced only conditionally even given all the data that are required for the judging.[c] One solicits assent from everyone else because one has a ground for it that

[a] The second edition here omits the word "however" present in the first.
[b] In the first edition, "the."
[c] *Beurtheilung*

is common to all; one could even count on this assent if only one were always sure that the case were correctly subsumed under that ground as the rule of approval.

§ 20.
The condition of the necessity that is alleged by a judgment of taste is the idea of a common sense.

If judgments of taste (like cognitive judgments) had a determinate objective principle, then someone who made them in accordance with
5: 238 the latter would lay claim to the unconditioned necessity of his judgment. If they had no principle at all, like those of mere sensory taste, then one would never even have a thought of their necessity. They must thus have a subjective principle, which determines what pleases or displeases only through feeling and not through concepts, but yet with universal validity. Such a principle, however, could only be regarded as a **common sense**, which is essentially different from the common understanding that is sometimes also called common sense (*sensus communis*),[47] since the latter judges not by feeling but always by concepts, although commonly only in the form of[a] obscurely represented principles.

Thus only under the presupposition that there is a common sense (by which, however, we do not mean any external sense but rather the effect of the free play of our cognitive powers), only under the presupposition of such a common sense, I say, can the judgment of taste be made.

§ 21.
Whether one has good reason to presuppose a common sense.

Cognitions and judgments must, together with the conviction that accompanies them, be able to be universally communicated, for otherwise they would have no correspondence with the object: they would all be a merely subjective play of the powers of representation, just as skepticism insists. But if cognitions are to be able to be communicated, then the mental state, i.e., the disposition of the cognitive powers for a cognition in general, and indeed that proportion which is suitable for making cognition out of a representation (whereby an object is given to us) must also be capable of being universally communicated; for

[a] In the first edition, "although commonly in accordance with the latter [concepts], as only obscurely represented principles."

without this, as the subjective condition of cognizing, the cognition, as an effect, could not arise. And this actually happens every time when, by means of the senses, a given object brings the imagination into activity for the synthesis[a] of the manifold, while the imagination brings the understanding into activity for the unification of the manifold into concepts. But this disposition of the cognitive powers has a different proportion depending on the difference of the objects that are given. Nevertheless, there must be one in which this inner relationship is optimal for the animation of both powers of the mind (the one through the other) with respect to cognition (of given objects) in general; and 5: 239
this disposition cannot be determined except through the feeling (not by concepts). Now since this disposition itself must be capable of being universally communicated, hence also the feeling of it (in the case of a given representation), but since the universal communicability of a feeling presupposes a common sense, the latter must be able to be assumed with good reason, and indeed without appeal to psychological observations, but rather as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our cognition, which is[b] assumed in every logic and every principle of cognitions that is not skeptical.

§ 22.
The necessity of the universal assent that is thought in a judgment of taste is a subjective necessity, which is represented as objective under the presupposition of a common sense.

In all judgments by which we declare something to be beautiful, we allow no one to be of a different opinion, without, however, grounding our judgment on concepts, but only on our feeling, which we therefore make our ground not as a private feeling, but as a common one. Now this common sense cannot be grounded on experience for this purpose, for it is to justify judgments that contain a "should": it does not say that everyone **will** concur with our judgment but that everyone **should** agree with it. Thus the common sense, of whose judgment I here[c] offer my judgment of taste as an example and on account of which I ascribe **exemplary** validity to it, is a merely ideal norm, under the presupposition of which one could rightfully make a judgment that agrees with it and the satisfaction in an object that is expressed in it into a rule for everyone: since the principle, though only subjective, is

[a] *Zusammensetzung*
[b] In the first edition, "must be."
[c] Following the second edition in reading *hier* rather than *mir* (to myself).

nevertheless assumed to be subjectively universal (an idea necessary for everyone), which, as far as the unanimity of different judges is concerned, could demand universal assent just like an objective one – if only one were certain of having correctly subsumed under it.

This indeterminate norm of a common sense is really presupposed
5: 240 by us: our presumption in making judgments of taste proves that.[48] Whether there is in fact such a common sense, as a constitutive principle of the possibility of experience, or whether a yet higher principle of reason only makes it into a regulative principle for us first to produce a common sense in ourselves for higher ends, thus whether taste is an original and natural faculty, or only the idea of one that is yet to be acquired and is artificial, so that a judgment of taste, with its expectation of a universal assent, is in fact only a demand of reason to produce such a unanimity in the manner of sensing, and whether the "should," i.e., the objective necessity of the confluence of the feeling of everyone with that of each, signifies only the possibility of coming to agreement about this, and the judgment of taste only provides an example of the application of this principle – this we would not and cannot yet investigate here; for now we have only to resolve the faculty of taste into its elements and to unite them ultimately in the idea of a common sense.

The definition of the beautiful drawn from the fourth moment.

That is **beautiful** which is cognized without a concept as the object of a **necessary** satisfaction.

* *
*

General remark on the first section of the Analytic.

If one draws the conclusion from the above analyses, it turns out that everything flows from the concept of taste as a faculty for judging[a] an object in relation to the **free lawfulness** of the imagination. But if in the judgment of taste the imagination must be considered in its freedom, then it is in the first instance taken not as reproductive, as subjected to the laws of association, but as productive and self-active (as the authoress of voluntary[b] forms of possible intuitions);[49] and although in the apprehension of a given object of the senses it is of course bound to a determinate form of this object and to this extent has no free play (as in invention),[c] nevertheless it is still quite conceivable that the

[a] *Beurtheilungsvermögen*
[b] *willkührlicher*
[c] *Dichten*

object can provide it with a form that contains precisely such a composition of the manifold as the imagination would design in harmony with the **lawfulness of the understanding** in general if it were left free by itself. Yet for the **imagination** to be **free** and yet **lawful by itself**, i.e., that it carry autonomy with it, is a contradiction.[50] The understanding alone gives the law. But when the imagination is compelled to proceed in accordance with a determinate law, then how its product should be, as far as its form is concerned, is determined through concepts; but then, as was said above, the satisfaction is not that in the beautiful, but in the good (of perfection, in any case merely the formal kind), and the judgment is not a judgment by means of taste. Thus only a lawfulness without law and a subjective correspondence of the imagination to the understanding without an objective one – where the representation is related to a determinate concept of an object – are consistent with the free lawfulness of the understanding (which is also called purposiveness without an end) and with the peculiarity of a judgment of taste. 5: 241

Now geometrically regular shapes – a circle, a square, a cube, etc. – are commonly adduced by critics of taste as the simplest and most indubitable examples of beauty; and yet they are called regular precisely because they cannot be represented except by being regarded as mere presentations of a determinate concept, which prescribes the rule for that shape (in accordance with which it is alone possible). Thus one of the two must be wrong: either the judgment of the critics that attributes beauty to such shapes, or ours, which finds purposiveness without a concept to be necessary for beauty.

No one is likely to think it necessary for a person to have taste in order to find more satisfaction in the shape of a circle than in a scribbled outline, or more in an equilateral and equiangular quadrilateral than in one that is lopsided and irregular, as it were deformed; for this takes only common understanding and no taste at all. Where there is an aim in view, e.g., judging[a] the magnitude of an area or grasping the relation of the parts in a division to each other and to the whole, there regular shapes, and indeed those of the simplest kind, are necessary, and the satisfaction does not rest immediately on the view of the shape, but on its usefulness for all sorts of possible aims. A 5: 242 room whose walls form oblique angles, a garden of a similar sort, even any injury to symmetry in the shape of animals (e.g., having one eye) as well as in buildings or floral arrangements displeases, because it is contrapurposive, not only practically, with regard to a determinate use of these things, but also for judging[b] with respect to all sorts of possible aims; this is not the case in the judgment of taste, which, if it is pure, immediately connects satisfaction or dissatisfaction to the mere **consideration** of the object without respect to use or to an end.

The regularity that leads to the concept of an object is of course the indispensable condition (*conditio sine qua non*) of grasping the object in a single representation and determining the manifold in its form. This determination is an end with regard to cognition; and in relation to this it is also always

[a] *beurtheilen*
[b] *Beurtheilung*

connected with satisfaction (which accompanies the accomplishment of any aim, even a merely problematic one). But then it is merely the approval of the solution that answers a problem, and not a free and indeterminately purposive entertainment of the mental powers with that which we call beautiful, where the understanding is in the service of the imagination and not vice versa.

In a thing that is possible only through an intention, in a building, even in an animal, the regularity that consists in symmetry must express the unity of the intuition, which accompanies the concept of the end and belongs to the cognition. But where only a free play of the powers of representation (although under the condition that the understanding does not thereby suffer any offense) is to be maintained, in pleasure gardens, in the decoration of rooms, in all sorts of tasteful utensils and the like, regularity that comes across as constraint is to be avoided as far as possible; hence the English taste in gardens or the baroque taste in furniture pushes the freedom of the imagination almost to the point of the grotesque, and makes this abstraction from all constraint by rules the very case in which the taste can demonstrate its greatest perfection in projects of the imagination.

All stiff regularity (whatever approaches mathematical regularity) is of itself contrary to taste: the consideration of it affords no lasting entertainment, but
5: 243 rather, insofar as it does not expressly have cognition or a determinate practical end as its aim, it induces boredom. By contrast, that with which the imagination can play in an unstudied and purposive way is always new for us, and we are never tired of looking at it. In his description of Sumatra, **Marsden**[51] remarks that the free beauties of nature everywhere surround the observer there and hence have little attraction for him any more; by contrast, a pepper garden where the stakes on which the plants were trained formed parallel rows had much charm for him when he encountered it in the middle of a forest; and from this he infers that wild, to all appearances irregular beauty is pleasing only as a change for one who has had enough of the regular kind. But he needed only to have made the experiment of spending one day in his pepper garden to realize that once the understanding has been disposed by means of the regularity to the order that it always requires the object would no longer entertain him, but would rather impose upon the imagination a burdensome constraint, whereas nature, which is there extravagant in its varieties to the point of opulence, subject to no coercion from artificial rules, could provide his taste with lasting nourishment. – Even the song of the bird, which we cannot bring under any musical rules, seems to contain more freedom and thus more that is entertaining for taste than even a human song that is performed in accordance with all the rules of the art of music: for one grows tired of the latter far more quickly if it is repeated often and for a long time. But here we may well confuse our sympathy with the merriment of a beloved little creature with the beauty of his song, which, when it is exactly imitated by a human being (as is sometimes done with the notes of the nightingale) strikes our ear as utterly tasteless.

Further, beautiful objects are to be distinguished from beautiful views of objects (which on account of the distance can often no longer be distinctly cognized). In the latter, taste seems to fasten not so much on what the imagination **apprehends** in this field as on what gives it occasion to **invent**,[a] i.e., on what are strictly speaking the fantasies with which the mind entertains itself while it is being continuously aroused by the manifold which strikes the eye, as for instance in looking at the changing shapes of a fire in a hearth or of a rippling brook, neither of which are beauties, but both of which carry with them a charm for the imagination, because they sustain its free play. 5: 244

[a] *zu dichten*