Girard and Levinas, Cain and Abel, Mimesis and the Face

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Genesis 4: [1] Adam lay with his wife Eve, and she became pregnant and gave birth to Cain. She said, "With the help of the Lord I have brought forth a man." [2] Later she gave birth to his brother Abel. Now Abel kept flocks, and Cain worked the soil. [3] In the course of time Cain brought some of the fruits of the soil as an offering to the Lord. [4] But Abel brought fat portions from some of the firstborn of his flock. The Lord looked with favor on Abel and his offering, [5] but on Cain and his offering he did not look with favor. So Cain was very angry, and his face was downcast. [6] Then the Lord said to Cain, "Why are you angry? Why is your face downcast? [7] If you do what is right, will you not be accepted? But if you do not do what is right, sin is crouching at your door; it desires to have you, but you must master it." [8] Now Cain said to his brother Abel, "Let's go out to the field." And while they were in the field, Cain attacked his brother Abel and killed him. [9] Then the Lord said to Cain, "Where is your brother Abel?" "I don't know," he replied. "Am I my brother's keeper?" [10] The Lord said, "What have you done? Listen! Your brother's blood cries out to me from the ground. [11] Now you are under a curse and driven from the ground, which opened its mouth to receive your brother's blood from your hand. [12] When you work

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> the ground, it will no longer yield its crops for you. You will be a restless wanderer on the earth."

INTRODUCTION

In his reading of the biblical story of Cain and Abel, Girard exercises his specialism as he does in most of his work: hermeneutical reading of classical texts, to unveil the mechanisms of mimetic desire and scapegoating.[1] Girard sees this universally known story from the beginning of the Bible as very important. Within his mimetic theory he ascribes special meaning to Bible stories, from both the Old Testament and the New Testament. The story I just began with belongs to the genre of founding narratives: stories telling of the beginning of the world, that is, the beginning of culture. A murder takes place in many of these stories as the culture commences. This is true for the story of Cain and Abel too. But Girard points out an important difference between the biblical stories of origin and what he calls mythical founding stories. Whereas there is, for instance, neither judgment nor punishment for Romulus's murdering Remus in the founding myth of Rome and the Roman Empire—in a way, this murder is even justified by Remus's infraction in jumping over the boundary wall—God does judge and punish Cain for murdering Abel. Unlike Remus, Abel is innocent. This means that the mimetic motive, which Girard thinks is present in both murders, albeit hidden, is exposed and denounced only in the Bible story.[2]

In the myths, mimetic conflicts lead to the sacrifice of a scapegoat, after which the scapegoat is often deified, because with the sacrifice the mimetic violence ends, albeit temporarily. In the Bible, however, the victim is not deified but rehabilitated. According to Girard, this difference exists not only in tales of origin but also between numerous other myths and Bible stories. Girard beautifully and convincingly interprets the difference between the Oedipus myth and the story of Joseph from the Book of Genesis.[3] At first glance, the similarities between these two stories strike us from a mimetic perspective. Both central figures are ostracized twice by their own community; both narrowly avoid death the first time. Oedipus's parents first banish him when he is a newborn, and later the citizens of Thebes do the same, after his unmasking. Joseph's brothers first sell him as a slave, and later on he is banned from Potiphar's house in Egypt when Potiphar's wife causes him to be jailed. Both Oedipus and Joseph are violently ostracized as scapegoats to solve a crisis. The crisis in the narrative of Joseph and his envious brothers is most clearly mimetic. The fact that both protagonists are geniuses in solving puzzles is another similarity between

these two stories. Oedipus solves the puzzle of the sphinx and Joseph interprets dreams. Both use their talents to save their communities. Finally, both central figures demonstrate hubris: self-superiority or overestimation of oneself. Oedipus, as a typical classical tragic hero, falls because overconfidence tells him he can escape his fate; Joseph exacerbates his brothers's mimetic jealousy with his predictive dreams of his own dominion.

According to Girard, however, the important difference between the two stories, in spite of their similarities, is that Oedipus's persecutors turn out to be right and Joseph's do not. Oedipus is guilty of patricide and of incest with his mother, even though he was unaware of it and did not want it himself. Joseph is an innocent victim, but he is rehabilitated. Or, more correctly, he rehabilitates himself, by conquering his persecutors with gentleness. By means of his trick, placing his silver cup in the sack belonging to Benjamin, his father's other favorite, he returns his brothers to the same situation as the one in which they ostracized him: he threatens to enslave Benjamin. Only when Juda then takes Benjamin's place, substitutes himself for Benjamin, does Joseph reveal himself to his brothers and forgive his persecutors. The Bible story reverses the roles of the myth: the victim is right and not the mimetically driven persecutors.

CENTRAL QUESTION

This is also true for Cain and Abel. Abel is innocent, and God punishes Cain for his crime.[4] Let us look more closely at this story. It contains important clues to what I am advocating in this article: a connection between Girard and Levinas. At first sight, these two French thinkers seem to have very little in common. But in precisely the issue of deploying a moral counterweight against supposedly amoral human nature, they share a common motive and they supplement each other in important ways. It is the relationship between Girard and Levinas, their common motive and their complementarity, that I want to investigate further here.

MORAL PERSPECTIVE

One could argue that the story of Cain and Abel introduces a moral perspective into the Bible. When God asks Cain, "Where is your brother Abel?"[5] he makes Cain responsible for his brother, that is, responsible for *another.* That had not happened earlier. In Eden, God asks Adam, "Where are you?"[6] and not "Where

is [Eve] your wife?" When God asks Cain where he brother is, Cain answers rhetorically, "Am I my brother's keeper?"[7] The answer is yes! Cain is being called to account: "What have you done?"[8] Responsibility for the other is for people outside paradise.

Girard emphasizes that the unique character of the Bible in contrast to myths lies in the fact that and the way in which events are placed within a moral perspective.[9] Relations between Cain and Abel very clearly bear the characteristics of a mimetic conflict: Cain envies and fights Abel because of something he is excluded from: God's acceptance of his offering. But from a mimetic perspective, even more is going on. Cain is the first who "brought some of the produce of the soil as a gift to the Lord," followed by Abel, who "*also* brought some of the first-born of his flock, the fat portions of them." One could say Abel is copying Cain, and therefore acting mimetically, but there is not yet any question of mimetic *desire* here. Probably Cain is the first because he is the elder. But then something astounding happens: God reacts first to Abel's offer, which He accepts, and only then to the offer that was brought first, that of Cain, which He rejects. God reverses both the logical and the natural sequence: first comes the younger; only then the older. Immediately after that, when "Cain was furious and his face fell," God warns Cain against the desire foreshadowing the sin: he must maintain control over this desire. This warning comes prior to the murder.

To what extent are this reversal, the moral perspective, and the warning to constantly control desire interconnected? I'd like to use precisely this question to articulate the relationship between Girard and Levinas. Further along in the Bible, we frequently come across the reversal of the natural, logical, and traditional sequence with regard to children, where the younger brother is chosen instead of the older: when God calls Isaac Abraham's *only* son;[10] when God tells the pregnant Rebecca her oldest son will serve her youngest;[11] and when Jacob is blessed *before* Esau.[12] Something similar happens when Jacob blesses Joseph's sons later, in Egypt. Jacob does this with crossed arms, first with his right hand blessing Ephraim, who has been placed on his left by Joseph, and then with his left hand blessing Manasse, placed on his right.[13] Reversals like this continue through the New Testament. Think, for example, of the parable of the prodigal son.[14]

I want to use the notion of election or being chosen to find and clarify the connection between this reversal, the moral perspective, and the control of desire. Here there may be a connection to Levinas, because being chosen is a central notion of his. The above-mentioned biblical examples of reversal seem to suggest election. Abel, with his offering, is chosen in preference to Cain with

his offering; Isaac is chosen over Ishmael, Jacob instead of Esau, Joseph above his brothers, Ephraim instead of Manasse. And the prodigal youngest son wins favor in preference to the conscientious oldest, who has worked hard all his life. However, there seems a certain arbitrariness to all these examples. The stories do not make clear why one is chosen at the cost of the other. No positive reason, such as obvious merit leading to election, is given; no negative reason is given either, such as something bad or wrong done by the one passed over. It seems to be happenstance, or arbitrary, or lost in God's unfathomable ways. In addition, the examples given above illustrate a fracture in an obvious, traditional, and established order. This only confirms the unexpected strangeness of happenstance, of arbitrariness, of God's unfathomable ways.

The "content" of the election is not always identical in the examples cited. Whereas in Abel's case it is his offering that is recognized or esteemed, in other cases, we see that it is Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph's sons that are blessed. Blessing in this sense would mean literally sanctifying and protecting by making a *sign*. For that matter, Cain is also blessed once he admits his guilt.[15] The sign of a blessing implies a task. It is not a one-off gift; it points to a future. Once blessed, Jacob cannot spend his days reclining; the complete burden of his people rests on his shoulders and, despite the accompanying protection, he is right to fear Esau. And Joseph, as we have seen, not only saves the Egyptians, who are entrusted to him, but also his own people, for whom he has a duty to care in his role as the chosen.

Being chosen to care, and being accountable for the fulfilment of this task: the concept of responsibility cannot be better defined. Being chosen for responsibility means being invited or asked to take it on. The word says it all: responsibility—giving a response; that is, answering a question that has been asked. Levinas too speaks of being chosen to be responsible. Now, bearing in mind our question of how Girard is related to Levinas, I will first briefly deal with Levinas's idea of election for responsibility. Then I will reveal the link between the two thinkers.

RESPONSIBILITY

In Levinas, one is being chosen for responsibility in relationship to the Other. We can clarify this best using Levinas's well-known notion of the face.[16] His thinking begins with how I experience the other's face. For Levinas, that is a moral experience. It is my experience of a demand coming from the Other. The appeal the other makes by this moral experience makes me responsible. The

Other invites or elects me to take on what Levinas calls *infinite* responsibility.[17] This is responsibility in the first person, my responsibility for the Other, the essence or quintessence of Levinas's philosophy.[18] The core, therefore, lies in experiencing the face.

Why the face? In the first place, because the appeal to responsibility can be inferred only in direct relationship with the Other. It is no ordinary demand, arising from an ethical theory and aimed at everyone. Levinas is not formulating a general order or universal call to responsibility. It's all about me. *I* have been chosen for responsibility; this task of caring for the Other has been imposed on *me*. How do I know? I see it in the Other's face. I become aware of it when the Other looks at me. This is why Levinas's thinking begins with the Other's face.

The fact that the Other makes me responsible, as Levinas says, is, however, not something the Other *does*. The demand from the Other is not a deed carried out by an active subject. Rather, it is an effect emanating from the Other, even before he or she has said or done anything as a subject.[19] In philosophical terms, it is an effect of the Other as an other: the consequence of the Other's otherness. This constitutes a second meaning for face, and a second reason for Levinas to start with the face of the Other. The Other's face immediately expresses his or her alterity, and this instantaneous alterity precedes the mediated relationships we maintain with one another as subjects in a variety of cultural contexts. The Other as Other precedes the Other as teacher, student, patient, client, friend, neighbor, consultant, or whatever. The alterity of the Other also precedes the rivalry I can have with the Other. I will return to this point later.

In a certain sense, the face of the Other breaks through the cultural contexts in which things around us gain meaning and through which we give meaning to our own lives. The face of the Other is extracultural or transcultural. This is a third meaning for the face. The fact that we can be interested in another culture, that we are prepared to learn another language, that we can see our own culture as a culture surrounded by others—these things indicate to Levinas an underlying or transcultural meaning that is not itself culturally determined but, prior to this, is implicit in the alterity of the face of the Other.[20]

To give an example: as I was teaching my master's courses in philosophy, I noticed how the participation of an Iranian refugee influenced the rest of the group, consisting only of Dutch students. His mere presence, quite apart from his contribution to discussions, kept us attentive, confronted us with our habits, our normal ways of teaching and learning, and our prejudices. His presence made us responsible for him. He did not do this himself, actively; he did not ask for it but "did" it in spite of himself. It was an effect of his face, of

his presence in our midst. It was pure coincidence that this course featured Levinas's philosophy, but during the course, Levinas's teachings were put into practice in a very thought-provoking way.

Although the effect of the Other's face is therefore a moral effect, Levinas's philosophy is not ethics. Levinas says nothing about the content of the responsibility to which the Other invites me, about what I would have to do to actually exercise this responsibility adequately. He derives no rules, values, or virtues from this responsibility. All he says, in his later work, is that the answer to the responsibility consists of substituting for the Other.[21] He does not even say that I *should* substitute. And he does not seek a foundation for ethics, as is usually done in ethical theory, a foundation that could be found in responsibility for the Other. In fact, he seems to do the reverse. He shows that the ethical or morality *itself* is the foundation. The moral principle lies at the base of the world, that is, at the origin of culture. Not that everyone sees this, or that everyone would agree on it. On the contrary, it is seldom recognized. Metaphors like "base" and "foundation" should not tempt us to think we are dealing here with something sturdy and strong. It is, instead, something fragile, something usually unnoticed. It is an awareness that sometimes penetrates with difficulty, while at other moments it suddenly kindles intensely.

Once, the novelist Astrid Roemer gave me a precious example of this sudden kindling.[22] Walking down a platform in the Utrecht railway station, she saw an old woman who had difficulty walking. At precisely the moment Astrid passed her, the woman almost fell. In a reflex action, Astrid caught the woman and led her to a bench. Then she started asking herself what else she could do for the woman. In principle, a great deal. She could have taken her home, helped her wash, given her food, helped her to bed, and so on. But what are the limits of her task of caring? Should she stay at the woman's side for the rest of her life in order to care for her? No, that would be absurd. But why, exactly? We feel, on the one hand, that responsibility has limits, but, on the other, we feel that to define those limits for ourselves would be somehow unfair. Would one not have to limit that responsibility, however, because Astrid, and all of us, meet many people in the world? If Astrid were to care exclusively for that one woman, she would short-change all the others for whom she also bears responsibility. And ultimately, she would short-change herself. If this is true, then it is "the others of the Other," or "the third" in Levinas's words, who restrict my infinite responsibility for that one Other. And it is through the third that I have the duty to care for myself as well.[23]

Levinas sees the third, the other's others, the other others, as the beginning of regulated society with mutual rights and obligations and the law before

which all of us, including me, are equals. The comparative perspective begins with the third party. That is why rivalry too begins with the third party. But my primary responsibility for the Other precedes all of us being equal. The fact that Levinas calls this responsibility infinite means that it overcomes me; it comes from the Other's presence; I cannot impose restrictions on it myself. My responsibility is restricted only because more others exist.

BEING CHOSEN, RESPONSIBILITY, UNIQUENESS

With regard to the question of how Girard and Levinas are related, the following aspects of Levinas's idea of being chosen for responsibility are important:

1. Being chosen is something between the Other and me. It appears and is experienced *within* this relationship. This means that election happens in a relational perspective. Responsibility is not granted from an abstract perspective, and thus not from a general morality or a theory of ethics.
2. Because election for responsibility appears *within* the relationship between the Other and me, it makes me unique.[24] It has to do with my unique responsibility, which no one can take over from me. In other words, my uniqueness depends on this responsibility for which I am being chosen.
3. Uniqueness is not established from outside the relationship, as if it involved comparing characteristics and someone with unique characteristics would emerge from among the contestants. Uniqueness is a specific form of recognition (election) *within* a relationship. Quite different from a quality like authenticity, uniqueness is a relational concept. You are not unique on your own, as you can be authentic on your own; you are unique and irreplaceable *for someone.* For your friends, for your parents, for your children, or for God.
4. And in Levinas, I am unique for the Other, because she or he elects me for responsibility. As I have said, not through the Other's action as a subject, but prior to this: through the effect of the Other as Other. From this relational, first-person perspective, I cannot say how responsibility would look for another or for others in general. I would know this only if I were to leave the relational perspective and survey myself and others comparatively from an overarching perspective.
5. The difference between the relational first-person perspective and the abstract overarching perspective is crucial if we are speaking of being chosen. Being chosen is beyond compare and has meaning only from a

relational perspective. To say that someone, or that a group, has been chosen from a general point of view means one is comparing people or groups and placing this person or this group first. This also applies if one speaks of oneself as chosen. That too happens from outside the first-person perspective, usually through narcissistic mirroring. From a general perspective, only *one* can be the only one: the best, the largest, the most beautiful, and so forth. But from an equal number of relational perspectives, everyone can be "the only one": unique and irreplaceable.

MIMESIS AND MORALITY

How does being chosen in this sense relate to the biblical examples of election previously discussed? Is Jacob not being elected in preference to Esau, Joseph in preference to his brothers, and Abel in preference to Cain? In other words, can we speak here of an abstract, comparative perspective? Yes, and that is exactly the problem! The problem is that Cain compares his offering to Abel's. Esau compares himself to Jacob and feels degraded. Joseph's brothers envy him because they compare themselves to him. And worst of all, they're all right—Cain, Esau, Joseph's brothers, and the oldest son in the parable of the prodigal son. Isn't it pretty hard to take the fact that a squanderer and a swindler (Jacob) is elected in preference to a hard-working and obedient person? That is an upside-down world. It thwarts the natural, obvious, logical, traditional, established order, in short, the fair order of things.

It is indeed hard to take from a mimetic, comparative perspective. But comparing is precisely what the oldest brother of the prodigal son, what Joseph's brothers, Esau, and Cain should *not* be doing. For it is precisely this comparative, general perspective that arouses and intensifies their mimetic desire. Does God not tell Cain, when his offering is rejected, but prior to the murder, to rule over his desire? God warns Cain to control his desire, and when desire nevertheless prevails mimetically through the murder, God makes Cain responsible for his neighbor ("Where is your brother Abel?") and blesses him with a sign. Here we already have responsibility and election. The moral perspective goes hand in hand with a warning against the comparative, mimetic, general perspective.

To introduce the moral perspective together with a warning against the comparative, mimetic perspective is to speak not only to Cain but also to us, the readers. The election of Abel, Jacob, Joseph, and the prodigal son is a relative election, an election of one and not another, not only for their contenders but also for the reader, for us. Doubtlessly, the reader will identify to a certain extent

with one character while also remaining distant, and will, no matter what, encounter more personages. Therefore the reader will, of necessity, compare. It even seems to be the express intention. The reader is not God, but a human person, cursed with mimetic desire. The reader will easily identify with the mimetic perspective of Cain, the older son, and with the others.

The reversal of the natural, the obvious, and the established order forces the reader to face this mimetic reality. And these reversals place the moral perspective of responsibility in opposition to and prior to this natural mimesis. If this is successful, the reader experiences a catharsis, a reconciliation with the unexpected truth. In the suspense story of Joseph, that moment comes when Juda takes Benjamin's place—a substitution in Levinas's sense—and Joseph reveals himself. This touches not only Joseph, but also the reader.

CONCLUSION

In this article, I hope I have been able to clarify the connection I have been seeking between the reversals, the moral perspective of responsibility, and the control of desire. This connection lies in the relational perspective of being chosen for responsibility. And it is on this point, the deployment of the moral perspective against amoral human nature, against the natural, logical, established order, that Levinas and Girard share a motive and supplement each other's work.

In conclusion, I want to illustrate the complementary relation between Girard and Levinas using Girard's brilliant interpretation of a passage from the Gospel according to St. John about an adulterous woman.[25] Girard points out that, in Jesus's formulation, "let him who is without sin throw the first stone," all the emphasis rests on the *first* stone. This echoes on, in the deafening silence reverberating after these words are spoken. Because the *first* stone to be thrown lacks precedent, it has no model, it forms the last obstacle to the stoning, says Girard. Once the *first* stone has been thrown, subsequent stones will follow easily because they will follow mimetically. Girard says that the fact that Jesus's words have become proverbial and symbolic proves that the mechanism is just as alive and virulent as it was 2,000 years ago.[26]

By placing the emphasis on the *first* stone, Jesus makes each of the accusers responsible. Each accuser holding a stone in his or her hand is holding the first stone. This makes each "the only one," unique. There is, after all, but the *one* first stone, even though all of the accusers might have that stone in their hand. What we see happening here is the making singular, the individualizing process of responsibility. Being chosen for responsibility—it sounds huge and

heavy, but it can happen in the twinkling of an eye. All of a sudden you are called to account for your responsibility. And you are suddenly the only one. When you are singled out, this breaks up the *Mitsein* of the hordes, to which we belong first and foremost according to Heidegger.[27] The hordes fall apart through the uniqueness of the responsibility. Jesus too withdrew himself from the *Mitsein*, of which the Pharisees wanted to make him part. By bending down and writing in the sand, before and after his words about the first stone, he avoids looking at his challengers. In this way, even though he is acting as a substitute for the adulterous woman, he avoids being sacrificed as a scapegoat in her place. After all, the intention of the whole scene was to trap him.

Resisting the temptation of mimetic desire and the scapegoat mechanism from a moral perspective: this is the common motive Levinas and Girard share and the point where they complement each other.

NOTES

Unless otherwise noted, scriptural quotations are from the New International Version of the Bible, with some emphasis added.

1. Now Adam knew Eve his wife, and she conceived and bore Cain, saying, "I have gotten a man with the help of the LORD." 2 And again, she bore his brother Abel. Now Abel was a keeper of sheep, and Cain a tiller of the ground. 3 In the course of time Cain brought to the LORD an offering of the fruit of the ground, 4 and Abel brought of the firstlings of his flock and of their fat portions. And the LORD had regard for Abel and his offering, 5 but for Cain and his offering he had no regard. So Cain was very angry, and his countenance fell. 6 The LORD said to Cain, "Why are you angry, and why has your countenance fallen? 7 If you do well, will you not be accepted? And if you do not do well, sin is couching at the door; its desire is for you, but you must master it." 8 Cain said to Abel his brother, "Let us go out to the field." And when they were in the field, Cain rose up against his brother Abel, and killed him. 9 Then the LORD said to Cain, "Where is Abel your brother?" He said, "I do not know; am I my brother's keeper?" 10 And the LORD said, "What have you done? The voice of your brother's blood is crying to me from the ground. 11 And now you are cursed from the ground, which has opened its mouth to receive your brother's blood from your hand.
2. René Girard, *Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World*, trans. Stephen Bann and Michael Metteer (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 144–48.
3. René Girard, *I See Satan Fall like Lightning*, trans. James G. Williams (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2001), 106–20; Girard, *Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World*, 149–54.
4. "You shall be a wanderer, a fugitive on the earth" (Gen. 4:11–12).
5. Gen. 4:9.
6. Gen. 3:9.
7. Gen. 4:9.

8. Gen. 4:10.
9. Girard, *Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World*, 147; Girard, *I See Satan Fall like Lightning*, passim.
10. Gen. 22:2. What about Ishmael? Abraham sent his first son into the desert (Gen. 21:14), but Ishmael has not completely disappeared, because later he will join Isaac to bury their father (Gen. 25:9). Yet, after Abraham's death, it is Isaac whom God blesses (Gen. 25:11).
11. Gen. 25:23.
12. Gen. 27.
13. Gen. 48:8–20.
14. Luke 15:11–32.
15. Gen. 4:15.
16. Levinas discusses his notion of the face in numerous articles, published in a variety of journals. For an overview, see the Levinas Online Bibliography (www.levinas.nl). In Levinas's first major work, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 2000), the experience of the face is discussed on pages 187–204. Levinas's second major work, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 2000), in which his previous work is radicalized, still rests on the notion of the face, albeit less predominantly.
17. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 244–45; and *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, 12, 113, 124.
18. For Levinas's notion of being chosen or elected to responsibility, see *Totality and Infinity*, 245, 246, 279; and *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, 15, 50, 52, 56, 57, 106, 122, 124, 127, 144, 145, 153, 194.
19. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 84, 231; and *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, 5, 37, 48, 109.
20. Emmanuel Levinas, "Meaning and Sense," in Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Phaenomenologica 100 (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 75–107.
21. Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, chapter 4.
22. Not in one of her novels, but orally when she was attending my lectures.
23. Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, 150, 157–61, 168.
24. Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, 48–59, 83, 86, 111–12.
25. John 8:3–11.
26. Girard, *I See Satan Fall like Lightning*, 49–61.
27. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), 149-68 (§25–§27).