

# A NO-METHOD FOR LEARNING

*Yes. I accept the invitation, let's play. What I'm going to think from here will be beyond the control of the person I'm learning from and writing this text with. In fact, it will be beyond my control, that is, ours. I'm going to try to free myself from formal school, from academic rules, from standardised formats of thought and results. Which, I can tell you, we're tired of. I say freeing us from the rules, not circumventing the rules, because today's school, which is yesterday's school, is not a place for play. It's far from giving us pleasure, motivation, chance, novelty and, above all, it's far from giving us the other, co-operation, being together. Today's school is necessarily boring, based on the idea of what must be.*

After reading the invitation from the person I'm writing this essay with, and before I started writing it (I'd say playing), by chance I opened the book by an artist I admire so much and from whom I continue to learn (even though she's dead). Lygia Clark proposes *The I and the You*.

A few years ago, I wrote a theory that, among other things, questioned methods. I argued that the best method for learning was to have no method, or rather, to build the method along the way. Using the words of Friedrich Nietzsche and Edgar Morin, methods come to an end and, therefore, it is the method that learns how to learn. Today, I continue to defend this same idea of rejecting simplification, or rather, we continue. From now on, I'm going to think with the other.

Although, contrary to its true principle, the school politically defends educational methods as a solution for 'integrated learning' and a 'motivated student', we believe that it is a space that should be free from the imposition of methods. Methods built by people other than those who are supposedly learning. Rather, the school should be a place where methods are designed solely by those who are learning.

Henry Giroux recently stated that the great problem with education (meaning the education system) is that its debates are focused on methods: the search for the best method. Stereotyped methods that, founded on the idea that people are not alive, educate for the result, diminishing their possibility of being critical thinkers and aware of their place and that of others in the world, and cancelling out their sense of control over their actions and their consequences. This lack of imagination and sense of agency fuels factory schools to produce more and more 'neutral' citizens, absent of ideol-

*The I and you are two blue jumpsuits with a sensory hood, their pockets filled with different materials, connected by a cord. Clark's work is supposedly designed 'in the act of making, in the present', where 'the artist is dissolved in the world', through the interaction of two people, who can explore the materials contained in each other's pockets and in their own. These people thus*

ogy, culture, power, authority and creativity. A 'pedagogical stupidity' that ignores the central point of education: what is school for?

We think that school is for learning. But what is learning? The answer to this question is neither closed nor definitive, just like the learning process itself. We are unique beings, that's a fact. But the meaning of that phrase is equally as complex as the answer to what learning is. We all have different ways of seeing the world, values and social experiences. So, the only certainty we have is that nobody follows the same path or learns in the same way. Lev Vygotsky spoke of the act of learning as a construction of the self from the other, through a dialectical interaction with the environment that surrounds us, throughout our lives, long before we enter school. This action takes place in thought and in experience with nature and with others, in other words, as Anthony Wilden said, it takes place in play. Learning therefore means, in a nutshell, playing with others and imagining the future, regardless of how we play.

We argue that the educational methods we use in schools are based on the theories of notable pedagogues – Fröebel, Piaget, Vygotsky, Dewey, Montessori, Malaguzzi, among others – who observed people as unique, social beings who are constantly building. But the educational methods we use in schools don't focus on the particularities of each indi-

vidual, and even less on collective work. Educational methods are generalised and formalised, based on the idea of how someone (or a statistic) thinks another person learns. The only way to create an educational method centred on difference, on the uniqueness of each grain of the community, is to use a *non-method*. The method of letting the other build their own method, of discovering the world according to their vision and actions.

become their own sensory experience. Of course, I didn't visualise all this information when I looked at the photograph. Not least because I couldn't touch or feel the other person or the material in their pockets, although I wanted to. I visualised my own information. I imagined that these people were in the act of surrendering to the other, in other words, learning about the other, discovering something new with them. Are they? Or is it my imagination? My self-projected onto one of them? Or some kind of myself project onto me? In any case, Clark's 'act of making' didn't limit me in its own intention of what I could feel when I saw the overalls or put them on. The jumpsuits only served to activate my thinking and stimulate it to enter the game, regardless of how I might play it. Play is exactly that, as Bernard De Koven would say, an invitation to the imagination.



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*A non-method is not a disorder process, but a highly entropic one. Isn't that learning?*

At the beginning of the 1940s in Copenhagen, Danish architect Carl Theodor Sørensen observed that children's excitement when they played freely in the street was far greater than when they were confined to the swings and slides of ordinary playgrounds. The children sought out construction sites and vacant buildings to build and play imaginary worlds with the materials they found there. Sørensen thus designed a raw building yard with sand, wood, gravel, shovels, nails and other materials and tools. In 1943, *Skrammellegepladsen Emdrup (Emdrup Junk Playground)* opened, free to the children. Every day the park was full of children and endless absorbing possibilities. It wasn't long before problems began to arise. The

children entered a sphere of fierce competition to build the biggest and best hut the fastest. They hid and stole tools and materials, with intense fights. The adults watching them considered taking over and running the park so that everything could function normally again. But the wait brought unexpected results. It wasn't long before the children themselves planned and implemented a system for sharing and organising tools and materials, which solved the practical problem that had arisen. The screams and fights heard in the other playgrounds (which we know well!) were softened here by the silences of discovery, concentration and organisation among peers. Autonomously, the children created an organised community where everyone was free to imagine and do whatever they wanted. The configuration of the playground changed daily, with intense construction and demolition, always in a process of reconfiguration, fulfilling the children's wishes and learning. The park satisfied their desires, but in no way did it meet the standards of visual order that the 'scouts' expected. To use James Scott's words, 'the working order prevailed over the visual order':

*is a kind of parable of anarchy, a free society in miniature, with the same ever-changing tensions and harmonies, the same diversity and spontaneity, the same unforced growth of co-operation and the release of individual qualities and a sense of community that remain dormant.*

(Colin Ward)



John Berselsen, hired as the park's operations manager, revealed that his position remained at the same experimental level as the children, without any serious intrusion into their fantasy world. His task was limited, or rather expanded, to observing and creating opportunities (through materials and tools) for the children to realise their own plans and initiatives. This park was such a success that many followed in all parts of the world, earning them the title of adventure parks.

Today's playgrounds are just like schools. Totally boring. Formalised, repetitive, with no room for discovery. There's no work order or visual order, but rather an extremely rigid, watchful structure that doesn't give us freedom, autonomy or truly meaningful experiences. They are pastimes in the truest sense of the word. What we need to learn are spaces of adventure. Spaces that are truly playful. As Stuart Brown would say, spaces where we can imagine and experience unknown situations, learn from them and create possibilities that have never existed, but could exist in the future.

Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman describe play as free movement within a more rigid structure. And weren't Aldo Van Eyck's playgrounds like that? A game, of any kind, is a complex system of representation designed by the rules and the players' constant interaction with this system. When we play a game, we take on Brian Sutton-Smith's luscious attitude of using worse means to achieve the end (imagining). Playing involves anticipation, surprise, pleasure, understanding, strength (mastery), balance and, above all, the freedom to choose whether to play the game. And this is learning. Learning only happens when we are predisposed, open to situations, objects and especially to others. As with the game, learning doesn't involve teaching. It involves sharing and understanding.

Maria Montessori demonstrated that educating doesn't involve the action of teaching (and what that action can involve), but rather the action of observing. That was John Berselsen's task in the adventure park. An educator-scientist in a laboratory school: one who observes the other learner in interaction with their environment and their own interests and enriches that environment so that learning becomes as rich as possible. And a school-laboratory can only be born out of or give birth to a community, because nobody learns alone. This is the same school as Ivan Illich.

If we learn in interaction with others, through what the other has to give us, in other words, in the unknown and in chance, we can't learn based on a pre-made method. We must allow us to be free and discover for ourselves. The other can be the path, the guidance, the help, or even the source of any knowledge we don't know, including ourselves. But the other person will always be the reason for our construction, for whom we construct ourselves. The method of learning can only be an individual process designed within the collective of a community that



Aldo van Eyck, Dijkstraat Playground



Carl Theodor Sørensen, Skrammellegepladsen Emdrup

Aguirre, P., & Pethick, E. (2007). *The Great Method: Casco Issues X*; Belo, M. G. (2017). *O Designer como Jogador - Jogo, Método e Design Gráfico*; Brown, S. (2010). *Play - How It Shapes the Brain, Opens the Imagination, and Invigorates de Soul*; Butler, C., Pérez-Oramas, L., Bessa, S., Fer, B., & Macel, C. (Eds.). (2014). *Lygia Clark: The Abandonment of Art*; Eberle, S. (2014). *Elements of Play*; Giroux, H. (2019). *Henry Giroux: All education is a struggle over what kind of future you want for young people*; Han, B.-C. (2016). *Por favor, cierra los ojos*; Han, B.-C. (2022). *Não-Coisas*; Huizinga, J. (1949). *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture*; Illich, I. (1970). *Deschooling Society*; Koven, B. De. (2020). *The Infinite Playground - A Player's Guide to Imagination*; Montessori, M. (2004). *The Montessori Method*; Morin, E. (1977). *O Método. In A Natureza da Natureza*; Oudenampsen, M. (2011). *Aldo van Eyck and the City as Play*; Salen, K., & Zimmerman, E. (2003). *Rules of Play - Game Design Fundamentals*; Scott, J. C. (2012). *Two Cheers for Anarchism - Six Easy Pieces on Autonomy, Dignity, and Meaningful Work and Play*; Sutton-Smith, B. (1997). *The Ambiguity of Play*; Vygotsky, L. (1979). *Mind in Society - The Development of Higher Psychological Processes*; Ward, C. (1996). *Anarchy in Action*.

helps each other and feeds each other to survive. Like the process of play that allows society to function and the creation of relationships that nourish each other.

We believe that the learning process is exactly the moment when I come across Lygia Clark's proposal. It's a process designed by the chance of experiences, by the combination of states of being and thinking, of those we interact with, of the invitations we receive.

The invitation is never just one, and to receive it we have to be open to the other. At a different time, this essay wouldn't be written in the same way, perhaps it wouldn't outline the same attempt at discovery. It would be something else, but it would still be written by our self through others. What we've done is expand the learning experience, and this experience can never be the same.

After all, why are we so afraid of freeing ourselves from what we know must be? Nothing could be worse than what we live in today, a fictitious freedom in fictitious playgrounds. We are losing control of our thoughts and actions, not through imagination (for the future), but through technology, bureaucracy, facilities and, always above all, capital. If we only exist in contact with others, then perhaps we are ceasing to exist. We must hold our schools accountable.

by Marta Guerra Belo

# MIMESIS AS THE TRAVELLING OF ORIGINALITY - DIATRIBES IN TEACHING AND RELATIONSHIPS

By way of introduction, this is a text based on the realisation that deception, fraud and lies are foundational elements of human experience and beyond. In this sense, almost every theme, reference and story that can be told and analysed is certainly a kind of lie. But, like Orsini Williams in F for fake, in this brief essay I too make the following promise: over the next few pages everything you read is actually true and based on solid facts.

I intend to discuss certain approaches that perplex us when we accept the hypothesis that society can be deschooled; to look for criteria that help us distinguish those institutions that deserve to progress because they promote learning in a deschooled environment; and to clarify those personal goals that could foster the advent of an Age of Leisure (schola) as opposed to an economy dominated by service industries. IV ICH, 1970.

I set out to write this article with a view to fusing knowledge, as free from hierarchies as it is full of juxtapositions, as well as looking for an interdisciplinary reflection or interaction between holders of areas of knowledge.

The writings of various reference authors are the raw material for a movement of thought that refers to "other" lines of reflection aimed at developing relationships that are as dynamic as they are complex, even from an anodyne or simplified perspective.

AI rely on a lazily honed game of intertextuality that appropriates elements of reference as an escape from a certain kind of anxiety about originality. If there is an offence or delirium in this "play", perhaps it's only because I'm stepping off the path that the cultural structure tries to impose on

us as a destination for control and certification of rules and standards of conduct.

The vast majority of adults, in which I emphasise the presence of teachers/educators, boast of their vast experience, but this argument makes little sense because it is limited to the singular individual experience and an endless series of them, in a mummified everyday life that insists on the hoax of the secret of hidden knowledge; or the pedantic vanity of endless readings, clumsy and poorly articulated, but sufficiently cautious in the discipline of the rules of citation, so as not to make anyone suspicious of their proto-veracity and originality. This is a cunning way of a possible demand for accounts for alleged plagiarising activity (as if plagiarising were significantly different from paraphrasing without attributing authorship).

It is a self-limiting activity that only serves to replicate history and perpetuate the existing order, particularly emptying experience. Giorgio Agamben says that the founding purpose of contemporary science, which created "homogeneous and empty time", already contained an implicit expropriation of experience.

However, what interests me in this "game of ours" is intimately related to the notions of "Difference and Repetition", and in this sense I am justified in opting for the following

definitions for the term "difference": absence of equality or similarity.

While repetition is linked to the actions we perform over and over again, difference is related to what separates or makes unequal the things or individuals placed in contrast. The main argument of Difference and Repetition is that if something is repeated, it cannot be the same thing, because repetition introduces difference in itself.

This is how the law of myth, which is repetition, is fulfilled, and it resembles child's play in that it seeks fulfilment in constant repetition. Habit is the result of this repetition. However, unlike what happens in the world of children, in the world of adults repetition is uncontrollable, which results in an appetite for the everyday and its mythification. The critical stance of youth is actually a warning against the exhaustion of experience and the void that those who consider themselves more experienced form in their daily lives. It's also a kind of retroactive memory activity that aims to revive the possibilities of the past through remembrance.

For Aristotle, it is the literary and artistic impulses that enhance mimetic thinking; knowledge is acquired through a playful process in which the faculty of recognising similarities and producing them in language is developed. On this path traced by Aristotle, the theory of mimicry leads to a theory of metaphor; knowledge and similarity, knowledge and metaphor involve unstable connections that are often ignored and even denied.

Just as for Aristotle, for Walter Benjamin mimetic pro-

duction is linked to play and learning, to knowledge and the joy of knowing. From this perspective, Benjamin challenges the notion that the predetermined imaginative content of a toy governs the child's play. The relationship between the child and the toy goes the other way round, as the child seeks to include their toy or object of play in their play. There are countless examples: the child takes a broom and turns it into a horse, wants to play with sand and becomes a baker... In reality, the child's social experience, as expressed through play and games, is permeated by mimetic behaviour, which allows them to transcend their ability to produce similarities and launch into transmutation between the various possible social roles through which they freely move.

According to Benjamin, toys block the possibility of children establishing connections with the outside world and even transforming many of the perceptions and capacities for which the toys were designed, and in this sense he says that it is absurd to enter into pedantic fantasies about producing toys, books or teaching materials that would be appropriate for children. This is, in his view, one of the most obsolete theories of educators since the

Enlightenment, in the sense that they are unable to see that the world is full of the most extraordinary things for children to pay attention to and play with, due to their deep-rooted psychological beliefs. They put elements of a totally different kind into them, through what they learn from them in play, in a new and sudden interaction with each other, rather than imitating the works of adults. Children thus create their own



world of things, a small part of a larger whole.

Ontogenesis, or the journey of being in an infinite process, is how education, as formation, should be viewed and not as the exclusive domain of pedagogy. For this reason, children are seen as agents who modify the environments in which they are involved, giving purpose to the objects they manipulate and the many roles they play.

There is an inherent logic of similarity rather than identity in the mimetic strategy, which instead of conceiving of the subject and their consciousness as having only one identity, emphasises the importance of the emergence of the “other”.

Most schools today, including academies, are designed to teach several students at the same time, placing them in a passive position without considering them as an essential component of the teacher-student interaction or the teaching and learning process. Often, the teacher acts only as a repository of knowledge and a communicator of information, without supporting the development of the student’s critical thinking.

Many students, especially those from less favoured or lower social groups, intuitively understand that what the school does for them is to initiate a creeping technique of shuffling and confusing processes with substances, as **Illich** observed forty years ago, the longer the educational institution manages to maintain its relationship with the students, the greater the promises of success (systematically pointed to the result of an individual assessment) and the greater the chances that each of these better educated individuals will succeed in obtaining a certification that manifests itself in a document guaranteeing academic graduation. As if completing school inevitably resulted in success.

Above all, these are the terms that contribute to and define “schooling” – a kind of fusion between teaching and

learning – with the aim of obtaining degrees, diplomas of competence and the consequent guarantee of qualification, because only in this way is someone capable of producing something original and enlightening. Thus, for several generations, we have been led to believe that the level of education we receive determines our degree of creativity. In other words, we are orientated towards judging that a service is superior or that it can take the place of value.

The critique we propose here aims to show how the institutionalisation of values inevitably results in physical deterioration or intoxication, sharp social divisions and a certain lack of self-determination, because our psychosocial lives are predetermined and don’t leave much room for improvisation, intuition or chance, let alone for the leisure that promotes the generation of knowledge in a healthy (mental) state.

The school is a company with high added value and a rapidly expanding labour market worldwide. As the main objective is to produce economic growth at any cost, the key to the neoliberal system and capitalism in general is to understand who consumes.

The growing concentration of labour and capital in the institution that trains and rehabilitates people for disciplined consumption – the school – accompanies the decline in production costs.

According to **Illich’s** accounts, a designated superstructure has taken over as the main employment in society, if we add the individuals who devote their full time to teaching to those who attend classes full-time. Schools can thus be seen as industries (even cultural ones), and most human labour is centred on creating a demand that can be satisfied by these industries, which, of course, always requires more capital. You don’t have to be very educated to realise that it is at school that most of this effort is created, developed and realised.

The availability of employment, which led to a conversion into a wage, defined or represented the traditional concept of labour. A salaried worker was a person who had the ability to create and be created. While the students declare themselves to be creators and consumers of their own information, the school in fact provokes a pre-alienation that manifests itself in the isolation of the students. The division between the education of reality and the work of creativity turns the schoolchild into a commodity that the school commercialises and which is fuelled by distancing.

It is precisely because it institutionalises the need to be taught that the school becomes isolating. That’s why most of today’s teachers, who have also learnt this lesson, criticise their students, accusing them of lacking initiative, motivation to progress, independence or critical thinking. If students are closed off from life’s surprises that aren’t pre determined by institutional definition, it becomes difficult to devise other forms and alternatives.

We are convinced that learning can and must only take place within ourselves and that we are the only ones capable of producing it in others through the totalising commitment of schooling, both on the production and consumption side.

If we accept **Ivillia’s** idea that the New World Church is the industry of knowledge, serving both as a source of income and as a place where you can spend a substantial part of your life working, then “de-schooling” is the cornerstone of any human liberation movement.

What is perhaps also worth mentioning is that education must always be a group endeavour where at least two singularities must be in contact to educate and be educated.

Although this is not a great novelty, what perhaps stands out is that education as a meeting of these singularities constitutes and contributes to one

of the great challenges that education must face – the relationship of alterity. The question is whether, when we talk about alterity in education, we’re really talking about the other and the potential for encounter, or whether we’re once again talking about the same and always being reduced to the same, with no potential for encounter.

Let’s consider the present, where two generations – the so-called “digital natives” and the “digital migrants”, victims of info-exclusion – coexist, sometimes amicably, sometimes not. There are people who love technology and people who absolutely hate it. Today, the vast majority of children and teenagers suffer from so-called “digital pre-obesity”, caused by spending too much time online and using digital devices such as video games and social networks. This deprives children and teenagers of valuable downtime for sleep, leisure and “face-to-face” communication (spoken live rather than written).

In the midst of all this, the teacher begins to doubt himself and tries to reinvent himself, resorting to the apparently positive and useful use of technology, but only as a means to an end and not as his own goal. We refer to technology as an alternative or a fatality that we have to deal with in this century.

Despite the irony, the truth is that individualised persuasion of formalised knowledge and arrogance have no place in today’s world. The educator’s profile must include pedagogical humility, the awareness that learning is continuous and the understanding that you can only be a good “teacher” if you are also a good “learner”, because teaching and learning are integral parts of everyone’s human, historical and social condition. For this strategy to have the main objective of serving collective life, in a continuous process of re-creation and reflection, it is necessary to have three virtues: generosity in sharing what you know; ethical coherence, so that practice doesn’t

contradict discourse; and intellectual humility, continuing to systematically question and investigate what you don’t know.

These attributes are essential to ensure that the school serves as a place for a variety of activities and not as a breeding ground for injustice and alienation.

The modern school, however, is characterised by the Cartesian idea of “I think, I am”, which derives from “I am a thing that thinks”. The other in the Cartesian system is who or what.

The other is just a result of my thought process, just like all the other things I can be confident about on the basis of reason. This is code for saying that I always think from the perspective of my own interiority, or the interiority of my thinking. For the other, there is only a concept and a result of thought. The other I’m referring to is a representation; not what I experience as an absolute otherness, but as a result of my own cognition.

This struggle essentially reflects the underlying issue, which includes the challenge of “accepting” that the other implies the erasure of my subjectivity. The foundation of consciousness, its identity, will only be projected in recognition by the other if consciousness is not discovered in its interiority – absolute subjectivity, in the Cartesian regime.

If it is possible to ignore the other and act indifferently towards them, we have found the solution to the issue of conflict with the other: it is hidden and disguised, but because the other is still present, the conflict also persists and cannot be resolved.

On the other hand, one of the great concerns of our time is precisely when we discuss controversial issues such as multiculturalism and the consequent responsibility to tolerate. According to the defenders of democracy, understanding the other and tolerating their differences is essential for peaceful cohabitation.

However, having a tolerant mentality is the exact opposite of respecting the other person’s right to freedom, insofar as I decide to do something for myself and for them.

Education must always include the other, since it is always a group endeavour and that is precisely why it cannot exist without the other. Whether or not we agree with **Paire’s** thesis that “no one educates anyone, no one educates himself, men educate each other, mediated by the world”, it is inevitable that the other is always present in educational acts. The social nature of educational processes is therefore indisputable and takes place whether people educate others, whether people educate each other, or even the experience of autodidacticism, in which someone educates themselves, but only through the cultural production generated by others.

That’s why education is always aimed at the other, and the central concern must be to try to understand how the other fits into these processes. It is possible to teach everything to everyone, or, to put it another way, to teach anything to anyone, according to the great myth of educational modernism.

In fact, the issue is that of methodology as a teaching and learning strategy, where the current school of thought argues that if it is feasible to have a teaching method, it is also feasible to have a way of guiding the thinking of others. Furthermore, the way something is taught has a direct impact on what each student learns.

As if learning can only take place when something or someone teaches.

This misunderstanding results from attributing the “other” to a purely intellectual other, or from confusing the notion of “other” with that other. This type of reasoning

has therefore resulted in both the “erasure of difference by its exposure” and the “erasure of the other by its exposure”. In other words, the more we deny the other or the difference, the more we talk about the other or the difference.

The question is therefore one of difference in itself, the other in itself, as opposed to difference as notions or representations. This is called “thinking from the outside”.

There is a deceptively simple but original argument: that repetition is an essential part of being human, that the ability to repeat is worth celebrating and that, without recognising how repetition is an integral part of being human, we cannot understand ourselves or the world we live in.

This idea is illustrated extremely well in **Ridley Scott’s** film **Blade Runner**, which is based on an intriguing book by **Philip K. Dick**. In the story, we meet an “android hunter” whose mission is to locate and destroy wandering machines. The reason why androids are called “replicants” is because they imitate human forms and functions to perform dangerous or demanding tasks. The androids in the Nexus 5 series are so convincingly human that they experience emotions and have their own uniqueness and personality. However, the technology is so advanced that by repeatedly reproducing the human form, differentiation is created.

The implantation of memories of a childhood and a family that they don’t have provides the “certainty of the self”. However, they are programmed to expire in five years, in order to prevent them from getting out of control and perhaps evolving into supermen more human than humans themselves. To ensure their continued existence, it turns out that a group of them learn this and set off in search of their creator. Nothing is more human. The replicants are the other, even though they appear to be the same; they are not representations. In other

words, the replicants, i.e. the repetitions of the human body, are the difference itself; they are that other that terrifies us and that could be anyone out there. Perhaps this is the reason why we want to get off the “ant trail”, which resembles everything, where there seems to be no room for difference.

How to coexist with this absolute other, apparently identical, who cannot be reduced to the same, is the obvious question that arises.

It would be conceivable to discuss a “politics of difference” or a “politics of the other”. This would be absurd in the context of common thought, the thought of thought, since politics obviously deals with difference and the other; in fact, it is the art of managing differences – otherness – in a common project. Democracy, the symbol of contemporary politics, is therefore based on respect for the other and the creation of consensus through conversation rather than conflict.

The issue of equality is an integral part of the contemporary political agenda and rhetoric, although its real intent in defending it from a humanist or naturalist point of view is highly doubtful. The point is: equality is a power game and a balance of forces. Although equality is part of political discourse, it is far from being the centre of its action.

According to this interpretation, reaching a consensus implies doing away with politics and suppressing it. Consensus is established when society is completely governed and controlled, when difference is not even tolerated. When difference is rejected or eliminated in the name of equality, consensus is established. We have totalitarianism, policing and governance in consensus. In fact, we don’t have equality, because it is restricted to the right to equality, which reduces equality to a mere idea or image. On the other hand, a de facto politics, crushed in disagreement, in a dynamic equilibrium that



arises from the correlations of force, transcending any humanism, is what can create, in the midst of differences, a society that favours equality.

What we mean is that the concept of representation, which sees the other as a concept and sees education as the repetition of the same, has been used to think about and develop modern education, facts that raise questions about education for differences, as well as whether the very act of teaching difference is not already a biased form of domestication, where domestication could mean a reductive activity or an unedifying sameness.

Since it is impossible to know and control how someone learns, it is possible to imagine another type of education that, through difference, could be a catalyst for the creation of singularities in a more libertarian and anarchist sense. However, doing so carries significant risks.

We can create a large number of teaching techniques, but only a philosophy of representation can explain the relationship that links the learning system to instruction in a predictable and controllable way.

We can create a wide variety of teaching techniques, but only certain learning systems make it possible to predict and control how teaching interacts with learning.

The inescapable fact is that learning cannot be taught, and it is impossible to predict in advance what forces will be at play in a singularity when the power of that singularity is driven by learning itself.

It would be essential to discuss education by the other rather than education of the other, and the sequence of events is fundamental to this discussion.

Education takes place through the mediation of the other, whether this other is a singularity (a teacher or a friend, for example) or some-

thing else (a book, a film or an idea gathered from who knows where), since education is a change of state and learning is the transition from ignorance to knowledge.

The transition from ignorance to knowledge is a moment that occurs, an oxymoron that manifests itself in a small instant that lasts forever, a period of time of the intensive kind that cannot be counted or measured.

Dismantling the logic of contemporary representational education implies thinking about and creating the educational process in the order of the event or occurrence. Giving up the aim of moulding the subject, the conscience or the individual means giving up in order to bet on the creation of singularities, which are impersonal and not yet individuals. They are impersonal precisely because they are many despite being singular.

The “folding” of the self into the other and the other into the self is the definition of a singularity. The educational process is like a pleated fabric; each pleat only has meaning and can only be immanent if it occurs within the folds, the creases associated with the group and dependent on that group, and is therefore unrepeatable in its repetition.

Alternatively, a similarly planned educational experience can be repeated, but the results will never be the same.

The consistency of the facts you've just read, if it exists, comes from a “game” that strategically muddles, hides and confuses the contents of the quotes and those quoted. This purpose, which is hardly “academic”, isn't just to hide the sources so that the text appears to be the result of the luminous spark of an author. No, what is at stake here is not an effort to simply remember a certain text from the past (more or less distant) or to condescend to the act of rescuing new or old authors from oblivion, but the “remembrance” of the intertextual encounter, in other words, the possibility of all texts coming together in terms of coordination or juxtaposition. In this way, quotation can be imagined, muddled, invented, plagiarised, but above all stripped of the aura of idolatrous authorship that leads us to dogmatic belief. Quotation is nothing more than the first step towards montage, towards pure coordination, which abandons the intermediary text and authoritative explanations in order to align a quotation with the flow of the text.

So it quickly becomes clear that we are moving a long way away from the current concept of a model. Models of education cannot be produced, and cannot be duplicated.

Is it possible to develop our own teaching strategies? Yes, but we need to abandon the pedagogical myth of teaching and learning, because there are no procedures for learning.

To educate is to extend invitations to others, but the educator has no influence over what others will or will not do with these invitations. Therefore, in order to educate, one must have the detachment characteristic of someone who doesn't want followers, of someone who points out paths, but doesn't anticipate or even control the paths that others may take. Furthermore, only those who are sufficiently humble will be able to modify their own behaviour in the light of what they have learned from others, which is not easy in a society that is committed to the heroic singularity of the “super individual”.

According to António Gueiró, Freud named three “impossible” professions: teaching, curing (the psychoanalytic cure) and directing. The first of these seems to be the most stubborn in its impossibility. And when a “pedagogical society” full of knowledge spreads through the education system, denying the possibility of the impossible, everything becomes more miserable.

Such a teaching process requires collective production, which is uncontrollable.

A pedagogy for the alterity of the paradoxical anarchic order implies nomadic intermittence in the restless search for what is repeated until it is different and therefore “new” or “novelty”.

In an ironic way, mimesis denotes a critical aspect of thought that is returned to us in the form of enjoyment through metaphors. It directs attention to a crude approximation of the other that expresses it without deforming it.

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