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## IN THIS ISSUE

AMILCAR CABRAL  
SITUATION IN SUDAN  
C.I.A. IN AFRICA  
YOUTH AND LIBERATION  
BOOK REVIEWS...

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EDITORIAL BOARD:

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OPPRESSED OF THE WORLD, UNITE!  
YOU HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE!  
BUT YOUR CHAINS!  
YOU HAVE A WORLD TO WIN!

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EDITORIALTRIBUTE TO CABRAL

It is to the memory of late Comrade Amílcar Cabral, fighter and one of the greatest revolutionaries Africa has ever produced, that we dedicate this issue of MAJI MAJI. Comrade Cabral would be remembered for his ability to combine careful, painstaking theoretical analysis with the practical questions of winning an armed struggle and constructing a new society. The brutal death of Cabral is more heinous crime of the forces of imperialist reaction. His assassination constitutes an attack on the oppressed classes, and the liberation movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. We don't want to go into the enormous contributions Cabral made, - his record speaks for itself. We condemn the cowardly assassination of Cabral by the agents of the fascist Caetano. There is no doubt that this assassination will hasten the day of the total collapse of Portuguese colonialism. We must however be vigilant of external as well as internal enemies. Guinea Bissau is now nearly liberated and Cabral's revolutionary ideas have struck deep roots in Africa. More Cabrals will take his place and the struggle will go on till every inch of the African continent is liberated.

MAJI MAJI joins in paying high tribute to a great man and a great revolutionary! We must create one, two, and more Guinea Bissaus, that is the heritage of Amílcar Cabral. The struggle continues.

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EDITORIAL NOTES

- I. MAJI MAJI editorial board wishes to announce that our next issue No. 10 will be in Kiswahili. In view of its contents we do not think we shall have more copies after first day of its being issued. Our next English issue No. 11 will come out in mid-August.
- II. Finally we welcome all the first year students to the University. As you would have been told by the Chairman, TYL on the hill conducts a lot of activities; public lectures, filmshows, trips to Ujamaa villages, and adult literacy classes. Besides these, T.Y.L. also publishes this magazine to which all of you are invited to contribute.

It is of utmost importance that you fully participate in writing for MAJI MAJI if the journal is to survive. Furthermore, this is part of the ideological struggle waging in our society to which no committed intellectual can be a bystander nor can be neutral.

In all class societies those who control the means of production, also control the means of mental production. In such a society the large majority of the so called "intellectuals" are nothing but the scribes of the ruling class, tied to that class's ideological apron strings.

The question and the challenge before the intellectuals of the exploited countries is whether they are going to continue in this tradition and ultimately be swept away in the wrath of the exploited masses or make a decisive break and take their stand against all forms of exploitation and ideological dominations.

There is no third way, for as a revolutionary Guetamalan poet who was murdered by his country's fascist regime, put it:

.... on that day  
 the simple men will come  
 those who had no place  
 in the books and poems  
 of the a political intellectuals  
 but daily delivered  
 their tortillas and eggs  
 those who mended their clothes  
 those who drove their cars  
 those who cared for their dogs and gardens  
 and worked for them  
 and they'll ask:

"what did you do when the poor  
 suffered, when tenderness and life  
 burned out in them?"

We hope we shall be worthy of this challenge!



AMILCAR CABRAL WILL REMAIN SYMBOL OF ARMED  
STRUGGLE FOR THE LIBERATION  
OF AFRICA

The tragic death of Comrade Amilcar Cabral at the hands of assassins is definitely one of the greatest blows the people of Africa have suffered. In Amilcar Cabral, Africa had produced a great leader of the struggle for the emancipation of the oppressed and dehumanised people of Africa.

Amilcar Cabral had the rare capacity to combine the qualities both of a capable organiser as well as those of a proficient theorist of the struggle we are engaged in. He thus was able not only to unite, mobilise, and organise the people of Guinea Bissau in a revolutionary manner, but also to provide the people of the continent as a whole with a clear and coherent theoretical guidance in their endeavours. Cabral's contribution to the struggle against imperialism in Africa is indeed unparalleled. His death has robbed us not only of a militant leader but also of a genuine spokesman of the African Revolution.

Perhaps those who have killed him believe they have stopped the gallant march of the Guinean People towards liberation. As will soon be clear, they are mistaken. With his assassination the people of Guinea Bissau are only bound to intensify their struggle so as to finally usher in the day when they will be completely free from Portuguese fascist rule. The imperialist and their henchmen will come to learn that people like Cabral never die in the mind of struggling people - to kill them physically is simply to increase the revolutionary fire burning in the heart of every militant.

Thus while we mourn his death, and express our sincere condolences to the people of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde Islands, we are confident that they, as well as the fighting people in the continent, will only rededicate themselves to the revolutionary goal to which Cabral worked so tirelessly and for so long!

C.C. Liundi

CHAIRMAN - TYL UNIVERSITY DISTRICT

22nd January, 1973

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For my part, the deeper I enter into the cultures and political circles of Africa the surer I become that the great danger which threatens Africa is the absence of ideology.

FANON



## AFRICAN COUNCIL ON THE GUINEAN REVOLUTION

[A question and answer session held in the University of London, 27th October, 1976 - published by Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola & Guiné, London.]

Comrades, I salute you all. It is a very great honour and a pleasure to have this opportunity of meeting you, not for a lecture, but for a friendly and, for us, a useful discussion. As I understand it, I am facing an audience of intellectuals - intellectuals in the good sense of the word. My responsibility is therefore great. I will do my best to answer the questions you put to me, and as briefly as possible, so as to have the maximum number of questions.

**Question:** What is the present military situation on the mainland of Guiné-Bissau? What are the military perspectives there and on the Cape Verde Islands?

You will be more or less aware of the military situation in my country. We have now liberated more than two-thirds of our national territory from the colonial yoke, and both our fight against the remaining Portuguese colonial positions, principally in the urban centres of the north, and also our political work in the Cape Verde Islands are intensifying day by day. Despite Portuguese bombings and other crimes, we have developed a new life in the liberated areas, where our people are increasingly the masters of their own destiny: this is fundamental to our armed struggle. However, in order to give you a fuller understanding of the current situation, I should like to go back to some of the essential factors that confronted us at the outset of our struggle.

Our country is unique in the African continent. We are in a flat part of Africa. The country divides basically into two regions: the coastal region and the interior. The coastal region, covered by rivers and swamps, extends as far as Mansoa, which is about 60 kms from Bissau and is characterised, from north to south, by forests and ricefields. The interior, from Mansoa to the eastern border, is lightly-wooded savannah with occasional rivers. There are no mountains at all. Our people call the hills in Boé region, in the south-east, mountains, because in Guiné we don't really know what mountains are.

Another point is that our country is very small, only the size of Switzerland or Belgium. It is important to consider these geographical aspects of Guiné in relation to the liberation struggle because, as you will know, the manuals of guerrilla warfare generally state that a country has to be of a certain size to be able to create what is called a base, and, further, that mountains are the best place to develop guerrilla warfare. Obviously, we don't have those conditions in Guiné, but this did not stop us beginning our armed liberation struggle.

I would like to make it clear that we took up this struggle only in answer to the violent oppression of our people by the Portuguese colonialists. We are not fighting because we are a warlike people, or because we think armed struggle is the only means. In some circumstances, however, it may be the only means, and even the best means. It all depends on the particular conditions of the country involved. That we did was to establish a strategy based on this principle: start from the actual conditions of Guiné, the geographical, social, historical, political and economic conditions.

Basing ourselves on this principle, we studied our social structure as deeply as we could, together with all other factors likely to influence the eventual development of our struggle. As for the mountains, we decided that our people had to take their place, since it would be impossible to develop our struggle otherwise. So our people are our mountains. To achieve this, we adopted another principle - self-evident, it seemed to us - that our struggle is a political one, which takes an armed form because of the Portuguese colonialists, but beginning and ending as a political struggle. We are not fighting to invade Portugal, or to enter Lisbon. We are fighting for the independence of our own country.



On this basis we prepared the political ground necessary for the armed struggle to develop. The first step was to mobilise and organise our people politically; this took about three years. For this we adopted another principle, based on a national proverb which says: rice can only be cooked inside the pot. Even if you have fire, you can't cook rice outside the pot. This means that our struggle has to be carried on inside our own country; from the beginning we had to avoid any diversion of our effort through the use of neighbouring countries. This is very important, because the general tendency is to take advantage of the facilities you have abroad to fight from the outside inwards.

Owing to our small population, we adopted a further principle: to fight as economically as possible, since we can afford only the minimum of losses. So we worked out our strategy and tactics. And I may say that I know no other liberation struggle where losses have been fewer than ours.

We also agreed that our strategy had to be centrifugal. As you know, the Portuguese believed that we would develop our forces outside, in neighbouring countries, and then move in towards the centre of Guiné. They therefore concentrated their troops on the borders. But we began the general armed struggle in 1963 from the interior of Guiné, at a place south of the Geba river. That is to say, we did the exact opposite of what the Portuguese expected - we moved from the centre outwards.

Furthermore, from the start of the struggle we did our utmost to give the maximum autonomy to our guerrilla units. This was risky but necessary, as it was not initially possible for us, even in a small country like ours, to have day to day direction of every guerrilla unit. Yet it was a decision that contained some dangers for our struggle.

Clearly, there are some basic contradictions in a struggle like ours. The main contradiction, our great difficulty, is that we have to fight against a foreign power in our own land. They destroy our people and our resources, but we cannot go to Lisbon, or to the villages of Portugal, to retaliate. This makes our struggle a hard one. If it had been possible, at the beginning, for us to attack the enemy in their own country, less fighting would have been necessary. But the Portuguese have a very powerful advantage. They bring their men and their arms to fight against us, destroying our villages; and they also oblige us to destroy our own property. Yet we can never touch them in their own country. So, as part of our strategy, we have had to develop tactics which enable us, as far as possible, to avoid the destruction of our own country.

On the colonialists' side, too, there is a comparable contradiction: in order to dominate Guiné they have to be there, occupying it. For Guiné is not Portugal; it is an African country only conquered in the first place after 50 years of colonial war. And in order to maintain the conquest they have to be present. At first the presence was military; later, when they had established an administration, they used civil control, with all the apparatus of a colonial state. When we launched our armed struggle, the Portuguese were compelled to reinforce their presence - they brought in troops and distributed them all over the country, in the villages as well as the urban centres, to maintain their domination.

But this dispersion of the enemy forces meant weakness, and our strategy was to concentrate specific forces to attack the Portuguese place by place. They suffered losses immediately, and made the fatal move of concentrating their forces in order to defend themselves. But this meant leaving large parts of the country outside their control. This was, and is, a dilemma that cannot be solved in a colonial war: when they disperse their forces so as to maintain control, we concentrate ours so as to attack them, thus forcing them to concentrate. But when their forces are concentrated, we organise, mobilise, and develop new structures in the countryside, so that they can never come back.



What are the main strategic objectives of the colonial army? Firstly, to maintain their positions in the urban centres. Secondly, to disperse their forces to assure domination.

To supply their troops they must control the main arteries of communication. In Guiné this means principally the roads but also the rivers, because a lot of communication is by river. This the Portuguese did. At first they had more than 80 garrisons, large and small, distributed all over our country; they controlled the main roads and were able to travel freely along all navigable rivers. I recall that boats of 10,000 tons used to go up the Bafing river as far as the internal port of Tumbato, where Guiné groundnuts are loaded for export.

To destroy this system of domination we simply concentrated our forces and attacked two camps simultaneously - Tite and Pulacunda. Most of the Portuguese troops were at the time in the border areas in Bissau. They started to move immediately, heading for the centre of the country. But our guerrillas were all over the roads, cutting them to make road-blocks, laying mines and ambushes. We caused heavy losses. Six months later the Portuguese Minister of Defence, General Araujo, had to make a press statement admitting that we were in control of 1/3 of the territory. It was the best propaganda we could have had, especially as our struggle was up till then unknown outside Guiné. When we concentrated our forces for attack, we dispersed them to ambush the main roads, and we started trying to close off the rivers.

Since that point we have made great progress. Altogether we have expelled the Portuguese from more than 40 camps - from some small camps in both the north and the south, and more recently from important ones such as Madina and Beli. For an example: the Portuguese used to have 14 camps along the border with Guinea. Now they have only one, in the east.

We now control all the main roads except some in the western and central-eastern regions. The Portuguese cannot use them and don't even try. Recently they made efforts to asphalt the roads so they could use them, but it's really too late for them to asphalt roads because we have become very efficient at destroying their transport with bazookas and other weapons. On the roads still occasionally used by Portuguese troops we destroyed 90 trucks and armoured cars between January and August 1971; on the rivers we sank 20 Portuguese boats during the same period, having over the years developed our capacity to attack river craft.

At the moment, the Portuguese have about 35 garrisons, including Bissau, Bafata and the other main towns. But almost all the roads in the hinterland are closed to them. And we are increasing our assaults on the urban centres still under occupation by the colonialists; last June we launched our first attacks on Portuguese positions in Bissau and Bafata. In all the rural areas we are free and sovereign - that is in more than two-thirds of the country.

That summarises the general military situation in Guiné at present. As far as the perspective of the struggle is concerned (the second part of the question) the aim is to fight until victory. We are determined to fight, not only with arms, but also through political work and national reconstruction in the liberated regions. We are determined to develop and intensify our political activity in the Cape Verde Islands.

Question: Why has Portugal been notoriously unable to seek some variety of neo-colonial solution? Have Portuguese tactics changed in any measure in response to the armed struggle?

This is an important point. Many people ask how it is possible for Portugal, the most underdeveloped and backward country in Europe - not the fault of the Portuguese people, but the fault of her ruling classes - to continue to wage three colonial wars in Africa, as they have done for over ten years now, since the start of the war in Angola. How and why? The first answer is that it is precisely because Portugal is underdeveloped, that she is unable to find a solution for her colonies, because she cannot hope for a neocolonialist one.



In analyzing the problems of colonial independence we see that independence was given to colonial countries by the colonial powers as a means of securing the full-scale domination of its subject peoples. The Portugal has not pursued the economic autonomy arrangements that will allow her to free her dependence in this manner. The "new" Portugal remains the same as yesterday.

Clearly, the Portuguese society is not strong enough to support colonialism. But it is very difficult for the ruling class of Portugal to change its attitude because they themselves are trapped within the psychology of authoritarianism. They have never opened all those questions of authoritarianism, authoritarianism, authoritarianism, authoritarianism etc. All Portuguese culture is represented with this type of structure, and it is clear that the economic conditions and the type of class structure that prevail in Portugal. Portugal is not a country where the social order is a reflection of the institutional reality, because Portugal herself is a monarchy. Even the movement in Portugal was not of Portuguese nationalism, nor the democracy, nor the socialism. The aspect of the language and the form are not really Portuguese-ness. The Portuguese in this sense have all this very well, better than I. In these cases is in question of a colonialist attitude.

The Portugal changed her attitude in response to our armed struggle. It was very important when we began. I thought it was possible to persuade Portugal to change, possible to use peaceful means to

make her change. But the Portuguese colonialists even thought at that it wasn't possible to fight them empty-handed, that we had to try and force them to change. It was only when we Africans realized that peaceful means were useless that we launched our armed struggle - first in Angola, later in Guinea and finally in Mozambique. And now the Portuguese colonialists are changed, they are changing.

Their tactics have changed already. Salazar, in fact, was a very limited man, a man with a feudal mentality, and he was independent. He served the ruling classes, but from a position of independence, and by force of his strong personality. Castro is none of these things. Castro was a great fighter only at Coimbra University. But Castro taught at the Higher Faculty of Law, and was also a member of the Council of State during the revolution - a true servant of Portuguese capitalism, completely dependent on the ruling class.

Yet Castro had more a wider experience than Salazar, and he began in the political field a kind of small-scale change. In 1961 he tried a new policy, making concessions to the white people while still controlling them. You know how it's done - build a new school or two, send some people to schools, send them on free trips to London and France, give them the titles 'noble' and 'noble'. Before they were merely things, now they're called names like 'spontaneous nobles'. And the Portuguese believe we will be fooled by these gestures. But they're failing miserably in this.

Of course, the colonialists try to divide our people. On one hand they tell us that Portugal is one multi-racial, multi-cultural nation - we are all one family and so on. And changes were made in the Portuguese constitution in 1971, after the adoption of the IV Chapter, with further changes following in 1976 after the IV revolution on decentralization. Indeed, during the history of Portugal the colonies have changed names many times. During the first Republic they were called colonies, but later they became 'overseas provinces', to avoid any reference of their rights to self-determination by the democratic and progressive forces of the world. After colonies, after overseas provinces, what now come will they find.

On the other hand, after the beginning of our struggle in 1960, other kinds of change were introduced into the constitution for all these colonies. For example, two sorts of people had been identified in Guinea - the 'natives' and the 'assimilated'. The natives form 99.7% of the population. The assimilated - after 500 years - are a mere 0.3.



Portugal claims to encourage mobilization but to start effectively it, people have to have some will that if people become mobilized, they can't be so easily organized. But that we want to be mobilized. In the end, we want to be independent. But it was Portugal who he mobilized them in this, perhaps a soldier can be subjected to domestic labour, and has to pay a wage but at himself, the wife and the children. These are things for women and child. (then but - very much thank.)

There are not further changes in the constitution. The new system is called 'representative democracy' for our country. However, it was really Portugal's interest for its effect, and his speaking on this, they still see that it was nothing, absolutely nothing. The Portuguese are facing the future - they're not so sure that that they're beginning to believe these ideas themselves.

The same political change that has occurred in Spain is also found that General Spínola, this very president of Spain, is now claiming that we must be able to lead our people forward to self-determination under the Portuguese flag, but also that to still create a social revolution in the country. That's very strange, because in Portugal it's illegal to talk about 'social revolution'. You can't even use the word 'socialist', it's considered a dangerous word. And 'revolution' - much more dangerous. But it would be very nice for us if Portugal had a social revolution. That would mean our independence would be granted willingly and on condition that we have to fight for it. Is it suggest General Spínola goes back to his own country and creates a social revolution there. He would also destroy the Portuguese economy while he's about it - it's one of the best economies in Europe.

Question: How will you move from the structure of a guerrilla struggle to structures for mass participation in a new state? How will you reduce the danger of the leadership becoming detached from the people?

In Guinea, guerrilla struggle means mass participation. Without mass participation the guerrilla struggle would be impossible. Perhaps in other conditions it may be possible, but in Guinea the only way is through mass participation.

The question that this question refers to is the practical application of some of the theoretical ideas about guerrilla struggle. Our movement can only be said to have had a guerrilla struggle during the first year of fighting - if that, because it wasn't a guerrilla-struggle structure in the sense of a structure that led the people. It began with our political organization: we are, and have always been, first of all a party - a national liberation movement constituted by a party which leads the people to liberation. Our guerrilla forces, even when they were fewer and more autonomous, were specifically created as the military arm of the party. In Guinea there is no question of the guerrillas directing the party. The guerrilla is at all times under the direction of the party.

This is important. Since our Congress of Conakry in 1964 we have maintained a clear distinction between the functions of the different instruments of the party. We distinguished between the role of the party, whose main task lies in political work,

and the role of the armed forces, guerrilla or regular, whose task is to take action against the Portuguese colonialists. At the same time we created all the organs necessary for national reconstruction work in liberated areas.

We have therefore no really great problems in moving from the structure of a guerrilla struggle to the structures of mass participation. We are organized as a party: by village, by zone and by region. Southern Guinea is led by a National Committee of Liberated Regions. In the south, and the north is led by a National Committee of Liberated Regions in the North. This forms a basic structure of government. On liberated territory, we have already created all the elements of a state.



administrative services, health services, education services, local armed forces for defence against Portuguese attacks, tribunals and prisons. The immediate problem is to move from the liberated to the non-liberated areas, and to enlarge our state till it encloses the whole country. The transition to state structure will not be a problem.

The second part of the question asked how the danger of the leadership becoming detached from the people can be reduced. This is a constant problem, constant struggle. But we have based our struggle in our masses, and their participation in the decisions taken for the movement by the party is continually increasing. In the liberated regions we are now preparing for the election of local assemblies, and the election of our first national assembly. We believe this will reinforce the sovereignty of our people and enlarge the democratic basis of our actions now and in the future. Up till now, all decisions concerning our struggle have been taken by the organs of the party, but after the elections of the assemblies matters affecting each region will be studied and decided by regional assemblies. Naturally, military problems are a separate matter: the council of war decides those. We believe that the fact that the people are represented in the committee of the party, in the popular tribunals, and will be represented, after the elections, in the assemblies, means that it should be possible to prevent the leadership becoming detached from the led.

But we shall have to be vigilant. For this reason: the idea of the struggle against the enemy was launched by elements of the petty bourgeoisie - by the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie if you like - with the peasants and urban workers joining in later to provide the essential basis for the struggle. But the normal tendency of the petty bourgeoisie is towards bourgeois behaviour - to want to be the boss - and the development of the struggle can crystallise in this way. Indeed this happens not only with petty bourgeois elements, but also with the peasant people; there is always a strong tendency for the framework of the movement to acquire a bourgeois caste. We must be very wary of this today, and more especially in the future.

Can the danger be reduced? We can reduce it only by constantly reinforcing the participation and control by the mass over the whole liberation movement. When we began there were just six of us in Bissau - two workers and four petty bourgeois. Later, as the workers in the urban centres joined, the group was partly transformed. And today the majority of the party leadership comes from the peasant element, and the majority of our comrades in the struggle are peasants, and in all our liberated regions the peasants are armed. At the beginning, our man was a very great man when he entered the village with a gun; with a weapon he was a privileged person. Now a weapon means nothing; all the villagers have them. But we have not yet achieved absolute equality in the movement; it remains an important question for the future.

Question: In the building of a new society in Guiné-Bissau what will be the guiding lines of economic organisation?

I'll be brief on this. We consider that the guiding lines in economic affairs are simply that there shall be no more exploitation of our people. We have had enough exploitation. We have been exploited by the traditional chiefs, by other sections of our society, and by the colonial power. That's quite enough.

Nor do we see any difference between one form of exploitation and another, when all that changes is the colour of the exploiters' skin. So, no more exploitation either by foreigners or by our own people. To achieve this, however, we will have to be realistic and pay extremely close attention to our actual situation.



We are an agricultural country - but a backward agricultural country. The Portuguese never developed Guiné agriculturally; tractors and fertilisers are largely unknown. Our first objective at this stage is to ensure that agriculture remains the most important focus of our economic policy, and this means that our principal task will have to be a technical revolution in agriculture.

Naturally, people in Europe expect 'agrarian reform' in my country. But in Guiné (Cape Verde is a different matter) the problem of agrarian reform is not the same as it is in Europe. This is because the land is not privately-owned in Guiné. The Portuguese did not occupy our land as settlers, as, for example, they did in Angola. The Africans kept the land and the Portuguese appropriated the result of his labour. As a result, most of the land has remained the property of the villages. Of course, in tribes like the Fula or Mandjak which have a pyramidal social structure, the chiefs have the best land. But they have it only in terms of getting the best possible production from it; they do not own it, for it cannot be sold or otherwise disposed of.

We do not therefore have the problem of agrarian reform in relation to land ownership that other countries are familiar with. What we need is an agrarian revolution to improve the yield of the soil through technology, and we believe that the best structure for this change will be a cooperative system. There is in fact a tradition of cooperation in our country between members of the same family, between different families and even between different villages. Some Africans have called this a cooperative system, arguing that the African family constitutes a ready-made cooperative. This is not really so; a true cooperative does not exist when some members still exploit others - in Fula society, for instance, where the women work but have no rights - that's in no sense a true cooperative.

We believe that we must develop the cooperative as the fundamental economic structure in our way of life, not only internally as the basis of our whole economy but also in terms of our country's international economic relations. We believe we should try to act as a nation in the same way as a cooperative acts, within a system of international cooperatives. I cannot now go into all the details of our thinking on this matter, but I have explained the basic guidelines of our economic organisation.

Question: How do you see the relationship between the armed struggle in the three Portuguese territories and the conditions of the rest of the African continent?

The three armed struggles in Mozambique, Angola and Guiné are closely linked, for several reasons. Firstly, we are fighting the same enemy - Portuguese colonialism. Secondly, but no less importantly, the leaders of the three movements began by working together: we were people of the Portuguese colonies before we were Guinean, Mozambican or Angolan, and we worked together in Lisbon, sharing in the creation of the three movements.

Political reasons also keep us together. At the outset, our struggle in Guiné, for instance, provoked a feeling of insecurity among the neighbouring states, but as the struggle grew and strengthened in Africa, it became a positive force. Our struggles in Angola, Mozambique and Guiné now aid the security of surrounding countries who are also menaced by the Portuguese colonialists. This is the first effect of our liberation movements as far as the rest of Africa is concerned.

The second effect is that we are showing Africans it is possible to transform one's life; it is possible to fight the great colonial imperialist powers in our continent. Our struggle is part of the making of African history.



We also believe that our struggle helps to influence the attitudes of people in other dominated African countries, especially in Southern Africa, although of course we are also aware that whatever other peoples can do by way of destroying colonialism or racism in their countries helps our struggle enormously. We could talk about this for hours; that's the briefest answer I can give you.

Question: You have been quoted as being willing to reach a negotiated settlement with the Portuguese. Could this allow an outlet with honour for the Portuguese which would not damage their morale and would therefore allow them to intensify their actions in Angola and Mozambique?

Our position on the question of negotiation is very clear: our battle is emphatically a political battle. We are not fighting to conquer Portugal, we are fighting to liberate our country from the colonial yoke. I can perhaps illustrate this by relating the story of the Italian journalist who interviewed a schoolboy in the north of Guiné, asking: "Aren't you tired of this long struggle?" The child replied: "It's for the Portuguese to tire of it; we shan't tire because it's our country." Journalist: "But how will it end?" The child: "Well, in the beginning it was only politics, and in the end it will be only politics too." A fourteen-year old child.

Anyone with revolutionary ideas who doesn't understand that our struggle has to include negotiations doesn't understand anything. We are always ready for negotiations. Our fundamental principle is this: we are fighting to gain the independence of our country, and to redeem all the sacrifices we have agreed upon during these long years of struggle. Independence is the only solution.

It may be true that if independence is won in Guiné and the Cape Verdes through negotiation, the Portuguese will be enabled to intensify their war against Angola and Mozambique. But if the fatalism of this hypothetical argument is accepted we will none of us have independence - not Angola nor Mozambique nor my country. Because if Angola wins her independence first, 70,000 troops will come into little Guiné and occupy all the villages, and the same if Mozambique is freed. No, it's a false problem. The Portuguese know very well if they are thrown out of one of the three countries it will be the end of them in the other two as well. Public opinion in Portugal will demand the wholesale liberation of the African territories, and even the Portuguese troops will refuse to fight.

You may recall that France, trying to prevent the liberation of Algeria, gave independence to the other colonies, to avoid having to fight there as well. It might be independence in name only, but the very fact that it was given strengthened the fight in Algeria. The struggle for independence is a process that cannot be reversed.

Question: You have also been quoted as being willing to discuss independence for mainland Guiné without the Cape Verde Islands. How do you defend this statement against the charge that it is potentially a betrayal of one-fifth of your constituency?

The press is in fact slightly mistaken about our position on the Cape Verde Islands. At my press conference I was asked: "What will your position be if the Portuguese decide to grant independence to Guiné without the Cape Verde Islands?" My reply was: "We are ready to negotiate and we will answer this question if and when the Portuguese ask it, not when you do." The Portuguese you see, have launched some trial balloons in order to ascertain our position in advance, but obviously we can't answer except directly to them during negotiations. However, we are ready to discuss the issue, as we said. This doesn't mean we shall concede it; we are the African Party



for the independence of Guiné and the Cape Verde. But we know that there can be more than one way of achieving the same aim, just as we know that even twins are not born at exactly the same moment. That we can assure the comrades who put this question, is that we shall not cease our struggle before the total independence of Guiné and the Cape Verde Islands. We are one country, one people.

Question: You have said you would be prepared to talk to the Portuguese. What is your position vis-a-vis 'dialogue' with the racist regime in South Africa?

The problem is what kind of dialogue and with whom? We consider it to be a real betrayal for the head of an African state to want a dialogue with the racists of South Africa, disregarding the rights of the people of that country. And don't muddle Banda up with the idea of dialogue. Banda isn't having a 'dialogue', he is the servant of the South African racists. We are in favour of any kind of initiative from the independent African states that will facilitate negotiations between the South African racist regime and the nationalists in South Africa. But we do not recognise the right of any head of state in Africa to negotiate with the racist regime in the nationalists' place. Our position on this is quite clear and we could not adopt any other.

But I hope this problem of negotiations is fully understood. The aim of the struggle is negotiations. We do not criticise the Vietnamese people for negotiating a peace treaty with the American imperialists: to do that would show one understood nothing of the struggle.

Question: What light has your experience of the armed struggle thrown upon theories of armed struggle current in the last decade?

We think that our experience is our experience. It's very difficult to say how our experience can help others, although we are sure it can be useful for others to study it so as to understand the priorities in their own countries, not necessarily by adopting other people's policies.

There are, of course, general laws of the theory of armed struggle for national liberation. These laws cover, for instance, those contradictions I mentioned earlier. Firstly, that we cannot counter-attack the enemy on his home ground (up till now, anyway; perhaps the anti-imperialists will give us planes and warships so we can go to Portugal and finish this whole business off). Secondly, the contradiction that the colonial forces have to disperse themselves to assure domination, but in doing so become vulnerable.

But every theory of armed struggle has to arise as the consequence of an actual armed struggle. In every case practice comes first, theory later. Yet it's wrong to suppose that it can be entirely empirical, for each struggle contains something shared by all other struggles and something which it creates for itself on the basis of the general experience - just as with art, if you like. Picasso is a very great and original artist, but he is also the product of other artists who preceded him. It's the same with the armed struggle. If you really want to advance the struggle, you must make a critical assessment of the experience of others before applying their theories, but the basic theory of armed struggle has to come from the reality of the fight.

Let me put it like this: it's possible for a scientist, working away in a closed room, to think about all the relations between the planets and stars, taking into account all the forces and movements and cosmic dynamics, and to speculate that another planet exists. For the liberation movement these armchair methods are impossible.



No-one could create the theory of the struggle for liberation without participating in the struggle. There are of course some people - and very brave they are too - who write manuals of guerrilla warfare without having taken part in a guerrilla war, but that's not our fault. All the true manuals of guerrilla war have been written by people who have taken part.

So, to summarise my answer to this question: if you have to wage a guerrilla war please study the real, the concrete conditions that face you. Be familiar with the experience of others, but try to find your own solution, your own method of fighting.

Question: Besides nationalism, is your struggle founded on any ideological basis? To what extent has the ideology of Marxism and Leninism been relevant to the prosecution of the war in Guiné-Bissau? What practical peculiarities, if any, have necessitated the modification of Marxism-Leninism?

We believe that a struggle like ours is impossible without ideology. But what kind of ideology? I will perhaps disappoint many people here when I say that we do not think ideology is a religion. A religion tells one, for example, that Christ was born in Nazareth and performed this miracle and that and so on and so on, and one believes it or one doesn't believe it, and one practices the religion or one doesn't. Moving from the the realities of one's own country towards the creation of an ideology for one's struggle doesn't imply that one has pretensions to be a Marx or a Lenin or any other great ideologist, but is simply a necessary part of the struggle. I confess that we didn't know these great theorists terribly well when we began. We didn't know them half as well as we do now! We needed to know them, as I've said, in order to judge in what measure we could borrow from their experience to help our situation - but not necessarily to apply the ideology blindly just because it's a very good ideology. That is where we stand on this.

But ideology is important in Guiné. As I've said, never again do we want our people to be exploited. Our desire to develop our country with social justice and power in the hands of the people is our ideological basis. Never again do we want to see a group or a class of people exploiting or dominating the work of our people. That's our basis. If you want to call it Marxism, you may call it Marxism. That's your responsibility. A journalist once asked me: "Mr. Cabral, are you a Marxist?" Is Marxism a religion? I am a freedom fighter in my country. You must judge from what I do in practice. If you decide that it's Marxism, tell everyone that it is Marxism. If you decide it's not Marxism, tell them it's not Marxism. But the labels are your affair; we don't like those kind of labels. People here are very preoccupied with the questions: are you Marxist or not Marxist? Are you Marxist-Leninist? Just ask me, please, whether we are doing well in the field. Are we really liberating our people, the human beings in our country, from all forms of oppression? Ask me simply this, and draw your own conclusions.

We cannot, from our experience, claim that Marxism-Leninism must be modified - that would be presumptuous. What we must do is to modify, to radically transform, the political, economic, social and cultural conditions of our people. This doesn't mean that we have no respect for all that Marxism and Leninism have contributed to the transformation of struggles throughout the world and over the years. But we are absolutely sure that we have to create and develop in our particular situation the solution for our country. We believe that the laws governing the evolution of all human societies are the same. Our society is developing in the same way as other societies in the world, according to the historical process; but we must understand clearly that stage our society has reached. Marx, when he created Marxism, was not a member of a tribal society; I think there is no necessity for us to be more Marxist than Marx or more Leninist than Lenin in the application of their theories.



Question: Can you comment on the realities of classes in Africa? How suitable are the correct ideological weapons of class analysis for African liberation movements, social revolution and unity?

First of all, the question about the realities of class in Africa is too wide a question. Although we are in favour of unity from the Mediterranean to the Cape, we must recognize that there is not "one Africa". Historically, economically, culturally, Africa is not one. The class situation in one country is very different from that in another. Moreover, it is not for me, at this stage of the struggle, to analyse the realities of classes in other countries.

As far as Guiné is concerned, our analysis of the class and social structure of our country has been made; it is published in Revolution in Guinea,\* the book produced by our friend Richard Handyside. I'm not just making propaganda for his talents as editor: you'll appreciate there isn't time for me to make a full class analysis of Guiné now, especially when it is already available. I would simply like to remind those who put the question about ideology that when we began to mobilise our people we couldn't mobilise them for the struggle against imperialism - nor even, in some areas of Guiné, for the struggle against colonialism - because the people did didn't know what the words meant. You have no difficulty in understanding what imperialism and colonialism are, but we who were suffering the effects of colonialist-imperialist domination didn't know what it meant.

So we had to mobilise our people on the basis of the daily realities of suffering and exploitation, and now, even the children in Guiné know what colonialism and imperialism are. Again, we couldn't mobilise the people of Guiné under the slogan of 'land for those who work the land', because our people take for granted the fact that everyone will have land since there is no shortage of land. As a slogan it may have strong ideological content, but it doesn't happen to be relevant to Guiné. It is essential to link ideological weapons to the reality of the situation. It is right that those who fight should forge a correct ideological weapon for their country. But it is very difficult, I repeat, to define a general correct ideological weapon for all African countries.

Question: What are the class differences between the town people and the country people in Guiné, and what effect do these differences have on (a) the organisation of the party and (b) the methods of liberation?

Again, the full answer to this can be found in Revolution in Guinea. I would however like to make just this point, that towns in Guiné are not like your towns, with centuries of existence as crystallised cities behind them. A majority of our townspeople are first-generation - half peasant - and a large proportion of them still have their parcel of land in the rural areas, to which they return to work periodically, alternating between town and country. There are thus more links between town and country in Guiné than in Europe or indeed in many other African countries.

So there is no great contradiction between the urban worker and the rural worker as far as the African labourer class is concerned. However, within the urban population there are several different groups, or layers. There is the colonial class, which mainly refers to the Portuguese administration but also includes certain Africans; there is the petty bourgeoisie; there are the white-collar workers in the state administration and in commercial business; there are the workers, who are not a working class as exists in Britain, but who are wage-earners; and finally there are those who live from hand to mouth.

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\* by Amílcar Cabral, Stage One, 1969.



In the countryside, there is no homogeneous rural society in Guiné, as Revolution in Guinea explains. Classifications cannot be made on a national basis, as everything is complicated by the fact that there are several different ethnic groups, ranging from the Balante to the Fula, with wide differences of social structure. Between these two extreme types there are many variations of social organisation.

That is a summary of the differences between town and country people in Guiné, but I would like to emphasise that even in the towns the people are influenced by these rural or tribal structures: a Balante is a Balante even in the town, and a Fula the same. Though it remains true that the creation of towns has radically transformed our country, as for example did the introduction of money.

What effect does this social analysis have on the decisions of our party, once we have studied all the links between the structures? Well, I could talk about this subject for hours - the links between, and the effects of, the social structure on the organisation of struggle and of methods of liberation. - But I will have to refer you again to Revolution in Guinea.

[At this point, though there were many more questions and an enthusiastic audience, the meeting ran out of time and had to end.]

They will continue to perpetuate crimes against our people, they will make more attempts at destroying our Party and our struggle. But all in vain. For no crime, no force, no massacre in word or deed of all the criminal Portuguese colonial aggressors will be able to stop the march of history the irreversible march of our own African people of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands towards their independence.

AFRICAN CARNAL



10-10-10

Let us first look at the situation  
that we are facing at present.  
Let us first look at the situation  
that we are facing at present.  
Let us first look at the situation  
that we are facing at present.  
Let us first look at the situation  
that we are facing at present.  
Let us first look at the situation  
that we are facing at present.

I think that, if we are to have any chance of success  
in our work, we must first of all have a clear  
idea of what we are trying to do. We must have a  
clear idea of what we are trying to do. We must have a  
clear idea of what we are trying to do. We must have a  
clear idea of what we are trying to do. We must have a  
clear idea of what we are trying to do. We must have a  
clear idea of what we are trying to do.

Let us now turn to the question of the future.  
Let us now turn to the question of the future.

10-10-10

Let us now turn to the question of the future.  
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SITUATION IN SUDAN

by

Horace Campbell

In March of 1972 the Addis Adaba Agreement marked the end of a long bloody conflict between the Southern Sudanese and the Northerners. This conflict which cost the lives of more than 500,000 blacks in the South is very important for brothers and sisters who want to rid Africa of (i) Imperialists and (ii) balkanisation of our mother land.

The nature of the conflict is of particular importance because the struggle was at times billed as a struggle between Arabs and Africans or between Christians and Moslems. Also for brothers and sisters who subscribe to the trend of Pan-Africanism the conflict is especially relevant in so far as the Southern leaders saw themselves as black nationalists fighting against Arabs - who they claimed were co-operating with the Egyptians and Soviets to decimate them.

The Southern Sudan as a region is larger than France. Sudan which is the largest country in Africa has over one million square miles. It is comparable to the size of Europe. However, the Sudan is one of the 25 poorest countries in the world, according to the United Nations. The Southern Sudan is twice as poor as the rest of the Country. At the same time the Southern Sudan is one of the most fertile regions of Africa lying as it were in the basin of the Nile. Some people in the South in 1973 still go naked. The communication is very poor. The roads are impassable in the rainy season, it takes three to four weeks to get a message from one part of the Southern region to the next. In other words the Southern region by any standard is poor and undeveloped.

Meanwhile, the other parts of the Sudan are more developed in terms of the level of living of the people. The Northerners who are mostly Africans who have been acculturated into Arabic and Islam, see themselves primarily as Arabs, linked to the peoples of the Middle East, instead of the South and the rest of Africa. Even Northerners who in spite of their pigment are of clear African extraction have internalised Arabic culture and have a very chauvinistic attitude to their brothers in the South.

The problem of history and culture is also compounded by the problem of the slave trade. Slavery and slave markets was the prerogative of the Northerners. When the South was first opened to external influences in the 1820's the Northerners plundered the South for slaves and ivory. While it must be remembered that slavery was a result of an external demand to which the Arabs were responding, many came to constantly refer to Africans as "abeed" or slaves. However there were Southern tribal leaders who similar to other parts of Africa co-operated with slavers. In other words, there have been historically Africans who worked against their own people for their own interest.

The memories of the slave trade is still fresh in the mind of many Southerners. The arrogant Northerners and the Southerners shared a mutual distrust. This distrust however was a secondary contradiction which in time and co-operation could have been dealt with. The British however, used this



[illegible][illegible][illegible]

It is a fact that the Government of the United States has been very successful in its efforts to bring about a more equitable distribution of income and wealth in this country. This has been accomplished through a combination of progressive taxation, social insurance, and public works programs. The result has been a more stable and prosperous society, with a higher standard of living for all citizens.



The first of these is the fact that the majority of the population of the United States is of European descent. This is a result of the immigration of large numbers of Europeans to the United States in the past century. The second is the fact that the majority of the population of the United States is of European descent. This is a result of the immigration of large numbers of Europeans to the United States in the past century.

The above information was obtained from the files of the FBI, New York Office, dated 10/10/61, and is being furnished to you for your information. The Bureau has no further information regarding this matter.

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The military was a national war time by Southwestern states  
involvement. It is difficult to state the military was engaged  
in the spirit of intervention in the United States and was  
the only way to achieve unity in the nation. The military  
again required all Southern states. The war was  
fully was profitable from the point of view of the military and  
professional staff. It was a policy of intervention in the nation.

In the smaller regressive members of the same in the  
hole drove thousands of Southerners into exile. The re-  
fugees were divided into two groups. They were the masses of  
poor Southerners who tried to get out as well as to escape.



bouring countries. There were also the Southern elite who organised the Sudan African National Union. These Southerners with support from various church groups and Western "philanthropic" organisations specialised in presenting petitions to the UN and the OAU calling for independence while they lived in luxury in the capitals of Kampala, Leopoldville and Nairobi.

However, by 1963 there were a group of Southerners who decided to resist the Northern army by fighting force with force. These Southerners mainly ex-soldiers who had mutinied in 1955 at Torit formed themselves into the Anya-nya. This group was never co-ordinated. The size of the South was ideal for their activities. The resistance movement could not provide protection for women and children, consequently, many innocent people were killed in the cross-fire between the military government and the Anya-nya, many villages were burnt. This also led to the increase in the number of refugees. The military government refused to see the Southern problem as a political problem. The worsening situation led to serious political unrest in Khartoum, the capital of the Sudan which finally led to the overthrow of the military government. A caretaker government was formed in October 1964. This government convened the Round Table Conference of March 1965 which sought to negotiate the problems of the South. This conference was attended by observers from friendly African countries, while the Southern leaders pressed for a Federal status for the South this conference brought to the front extreme division among the Southern elite.

The Southern Protestants refused to co-operate with the Southern Catholics. Both groups financed by external forces wanted to be in a position to place their religious denomination in control of the South if a peaceful settlement resulted from the attitude of the new government. The conference however, ended in deadlock. The Southerners called for a plebiscite while the Northern parties promised a programme of Southernisation of government posts and the expansion of educational and religious facilities, including a University for the South.

In spite of these promises the conference failed. There were a number of reasons for the failure. First the Northern political parties did not have a mandate to implement the decisions of the conference. The Southern leadership was hopelessly divided. There were the Protestant and Catholic leadership which preferred the safety of exile. There were also those who called themselves the Southern Front who chose to co-operate with the weak Northern bureaucrats who formed coalition governments at the same time very few of these politicians had any close relationship with the freedom fighters who were still in the bush.

The failure of the Round Table Conference ushered in a new era of hostilities. On July 9th 1965 there were killings and burnings by the Northern army. Most of the African section of Juba the capital of the South was burnt to the ground. Three days later 76 people were gunned down by Northern soldiers while at a wedding reception. This new outbreak led to a decision by a group of committed students from the South who were at that time at Khartoum University, to return to the South and attempt to give some ideological direction to the movement.



Meanwhile, the Southern bourgeois politicians in exile decided to return to the South to keep in touch with the movement. The Catholic church through Father Saturnino bought a large supply of weapons from the Siaba rebels who had fled from the Congo after an attempted rebellion against Mobutu. The Southern exiled leaders brought all their fratricidal problems back into the South. Some of the leaders using their narrow tribal base created serious confusion and sometimes bitter clashes between the different tribes.

Out of this confusion the grassroots leadership decided to call a convention at Angudri in August 1967. These young men led by Gordon Mayen and Barri Wanji established the Southern Sudan Provisional government with Asgrey Jaden as President. This group attempted to bring unity to all the fighting forces in the South while trying to bring the freedom fighters under civilian control. However, this effort at all class unity failed because of the cleavages of many leaders with Western organisations led to their looking to these organisations for funds and supplies, instead of building a base among the people.

Moreover, the Catholic church seeking to control any political movement in the South totally refused to support the SSPC. In the long run the fragile unity attempted by the grassroots elements failed because of the connections of some of the leaders with outside forces. The complex tribal and religious mix of ministerial appointments was to fail within a year. Later in 1969 this group called another conference at Balgo Bindi. This conference changed the name to the Nile Provisional Government. There was also a resounding statement against foreign interference within the movement. At the Balgo Bindi convention the Eastern Commander who was by that time the conduit for funds refused to serve under Tafeng, the proclaimed Commander-in-Chief. Lagu the Eastern Commander returned to his area and announced the formation of the Anya nya National Organisation under his own leadership.

In the North however, political events were to change the whole nature of the struggle. In May 1969 after five years of political coalitions in Khartoum, there was a military coup led by General Nimeiry a Sudanese Nationalist. When Nimeiry came to power he employed all rhetoric about Arab socialism. He saw himself as the Nasser of the Sudan. As a nationalist with the support of the communist party, he nationalised a number of imperialist companies which were extracting surplus from the Sudan.

Nimeiry at the same time said he was anti-imperialist turned more to the socialist camp. He proclaimed himself to be resolutely anti-Israel. and committed more Sudanese troops to the frontline against Israel. Nimeiry talked of Federation between Egypt, the Sudan, and Libya. In 1970 he attempted unsuccessfully to act as a mediator between the Palestinians and King Hussein of Jordan during the bloody conflict of the fall of 1970. The Israelis had destroyed Egyptian planes before they left the ground in 1967. Consequently Nimeiry gave the Egyptians a base for their aircraft and submarines in the Sudan. An Egyptian military academy was also set up in the Sudan.

Nimeiry also got military aid from the Soviet Union. After the nationalisations Nimeiry toured countries in Eastern



Europe seeking aid. He did not seek to re-organise his colonial dominated economy such that the living standards of all the Sudan could be raised and that the uneven economic development which led to the Southern conflict could be solved. Nimeiry promised regional autonomy to the South and appointed a minister of Southern affairs.

The foreign policy of Nimeiry brought the South in the middle of the Middle East conflict. The Southern Provinces became a veritable second front for Israel against Egypt. All the Western powers were now fully for the South given the anti-imperialist rhetoric of Nimeiry.

Israeli arms and supplies began to pour into the Southern Sudan at an increasing rate. The Israelis working with General Lagu changed the whole nature of the movement in the South. General Lagu with Israelis supplied ammunition and money was able to bring most of the South under his leadership. All the efforts for a self-reliant movement went by the board. The Israelis dropped supplies of medicine and food to Lagu's camp. Lagu had daily contact with Tel Aviv by Radio.

Previous to the Israelis involvement the policy of the Anya nya was to have small 'hit and run' battles with the Northern army. The Southerners were now involved in open battles with the Northern army. This led to the death of many more civilians. The Northern armies using Soviet Mig 21 and Soviet MI 8 helicopters flown by Egyptian pilots, were able to counter the offensive of the Anya nya. The Israelis operating from their base in Northern Uganda and Ethiopia pressured the Southerners into many suicidal frontal attacks.

The Israelis were not the only foreign elements in the South. Rolf Steiner the German born mercenary worked with another group of Southerners who were opposed to Lagu. Steiner whose trial later in Khartoum brought out the extent of Western involvement in the South had fought in the Nigerian civil war on the side of the Biafrans. He was recruited to fight in the South by German Protestants. He was a despicable European mercenary.

The statement at Steiner's trial in 1971 showed that the British, French, Italians, Germans, Americans, Australians, Israelis and a host of Western countries had helped to finance the Southern conflict. He even cited the work of the peace corps and American professors working at Makerere University, Kampala, in their role of giving funds to the Southerners.

By 1971 General Lagu formed the Southern Sudan Liberation Front under the command of the Anya nya armed force. Lagu was Commander-in-Chief. By that time the progressive elements who had earlier initiated moves to make the movement a truly grassroots movement were squeezed out. The genuine problems of the Southerners were being exploited by the West. The Israelis manufactured posters proclaiming Arab-Soviet genocide in the Southern Sudan. Efforts to make the movement self sufficient were now by passed for shoddy Israeli and American goods.

Once more the masses of Southerners were being used like a political football.

The Southern Sudan Liberation Front under Lagu was pro-



bably the only liberation group in Africa to proclaim themselves resolutely anti-communist and pro-West. The Southern opportunistic leadership forgot that it was the years of European underdevelopment of Africa which was the primary contradiction in the Sudan. The secondary contradiction of black Arab conflict could be overcome by enlightened Arab leadership, but up to today such leadership has not emerged in the Sudan.

An abortive communist backed coup against Nimeiry in July of 1971 brought about a reversal of the foreign and domestic policy of Nimeiry. The coup failed. Nimeiry showed his true colours. The Soviets were quickly expelled from the Sudan. Nimeiry sought closer relationship with the West. His very pro-Arab nationalism began to subside.

Meanwhile militarily Nimeiry was faced with a stalemate in the South after his expulsion of the Soviets he had difficulties receiving spare parts for his military equipment. It was at this stage that Nimeiry sought to bring an absolute end to the Southern conflict. By this time General Lagu with Israeli and American help had been in more or less firm control of the South. The grassroots elements which convened the 1967 convention were in the eclipse. Lagu was at that time calling for political recognition of the SSLF as equal to the Sudan government.

After the abortive coup, through the intercession of the World Council of Churches preliminary contact was made between the Southern forces and Abel Alier, one of the Southern bureaucrats in Nimeiry's cabinet while the rank and file of the Southern Anya nya forces believed that a long struggle would bring them total independence and believing that the rainy season of 1971 would cause serious reverses for the Northern army. Western powers in their new accommodation with Nimeiry were in no mood to continue to support the South. Nimeiry was now their ally. Consequently Lagu and a few Southern exiled leaders rushed to Addis Adaba in February 1972 to sign the peace agreement.

The agreement provided for little more than the Southernization programme of the Round Table Conference of 1965. The former grassroots Foreign Minister of the Nile Provisional Government called the agreement a sellout by the Southern elite and the Western powers. The Addis treaty created an administrative decentralised Sudan where the Southern elite would be free from competition for positions with Northerners. The Southern region was granted regional self government. The first Ministers of this Southern government were called directors. However, they successfully lobbied for Nimeiry to change their title to that of Ministers with full privileges and the same salaries as those ministers in the Central Government.

The regional ministers were to be elected, but so far they have all been nominated by Nimeiry. The list of ministers reads like all those Southerners who in their safety of exile were calling for nothing less than complete independence were now in their element as the new Southern elite.

The agreement was hailed by most African countries as a step towards unity of the continent. However, the World Council of Churches was probably correct when they called the agreement a victory for the World Council of churches and the West. The sad truth is that the masses of people in the South have been used by the Western powers for their narrow anti-communist interests. The Israelis also used



the people of the South as cannon fodder. Full responsibility must rest on the small group of opportunists who are now in Juba satisfied that their hegemony will go unquestioned.

The foreign missionaries are now back in the South, a year after the agreement refugees straggled back to a war-torn South. Travelling through the South in January 1973 I saw all the signs of oppression among the masses of our people. None of the schools were yet opened a year after the agreement. The Southern leaders enjoyed high salaries with their children in school in Nairobi, Kenya, one even went to Kampala shopping for his Mercedes Benz.

The roads of the South are still terrible. However, the road from the airport to the City of Juba was paved so that when Haile Salassie came for the celebrations, he would see the 'progress' of the South. This road represents the only paved road in the whole of the South. This served the needs not of the masses of the people but for the few Southern elite now exploiting their narrow tribal base in the hope that in coming elections they would be guaranteed their bureaucratic posts.

On a visit to Juba the capital of the South, there is a climate of inertia among the elite. They hardly go to their offices and are always going to Khartoum for consultation. The people are still poor and many go naked. In and around the city there are more than two million heads of cattle, yet there are shortages of meat. In a very fertile country more than US 100 million dollars worth of vegetables are imported every year. The Sudan with a population of more than fifteen million people has to import labour every year because the masses of the population are still locked in their self sufficient subsistence economy.

The whole impetus for the unity of the Sudan is now being pushed by the Western powers. In 1972 Robert McNamara of the World Bank toured the South and promised substantial aid. The government of the Sudan published a list of more than fifteen major projects in 1972 all financed by the imperialist metropolitan powers. The same people who Nimeiry proclaimed was trying to divide his country were now in control of the country. Nimeiry was to later go to England to promise compensation for English property, showing once more that the imperialists know that class nationalists with no popular support will always be tools of the imperialists.

Nimeiry's foreign policy to the satisfaction of the Americans and Israeli expansionists are now about turn. In 1972 he recalled his troops which were serving in Egypt at the war front. He expelled the Egyptians from the Sudan. His re-approachment with the Americans was complete. They re-opened diplomatic relations. The U.S. in return gave 16 million dollars through the UN for the refugees. However, this aid is in the form of surplus American food which with proper organisation could be produced in Sudan.

The climate of dependence in the South was best reelected at the conference on refugees held in Juba in January 1973. The Southern elite literally begged the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to extend their aid programme which was due to expire in June 1973. There is no incentive for local initiative. The former Anya nya soldiers are silenced.



They have been absorbed into the Sudanese National army. General Lagu is also absorbed into the very army two years earlier he had sworn to fight. The elite are in their bureaucratic posts. Meanwhile the masses remain trapped and manipulated by this elite.

The agreement has not wiped away the hostilities of the masses of the Southerners. Many Northerners are also against the agreement. The Addis truce will remain as long as the West is in control in Khartoum. But there is a long tradition of radicalism in the Northern Sudan. The communist party has only gone underground. Most Sudanese do not take too kindly to the new marriage of Nimeiry and the forces which historically has exploited the Sudan.

The British and the Americans who before were urging the Southern leadership to separate are now urging them to unite with Nimeiry. Nimeiry went to kneel before the Pope in 1972. The Catholics are now back in the South "civilising the savages".

The Southern conflict represents the serious limitations of crass black nationalism. Such nationalists do not deal with the sufferings of the masses of black people. They are for their narrow self interests. The problem of the Sudan is the problem of Africa, that is low and uneven economic development. A serious and committed socialist regime in the North could begin to deal with economic problems which festers into tribal and regional problems. However, with the absence of such a socialist regime, the hostilities between the North and South will break out in some form or another again.

The problems of the South will not be solved by the imperialists. Their lackeys who are now in control are insensitive to the problems of the people after all many have for too long been in the safety of exile. Progressive Africans should hope that as in the words of one of their bitter grassroots organisers "that when the conflict" breaks out again we will have to deal with the black bourgeoisie first.

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We want no volunteers and we shall turn them back if they present themselves. Foreign military advisors or commanders, or any other foreign personnel, are the last thing we shall accept. They would rob my people of their one chance of achieving a historical meaning for themselves: of recapturing their own identity.

CABRAL



CIA ACTIVITY AGAINST AFRICA

by

A Correspondent

The activities of the CIA have been dealt with in many papers and books which have exposed more or less comprehensively the nature and the mode of operation of this U.S. intelligence organization all over the world. One such revealing work is the interesting book "The Invisible Government" by two American authors D. Wise and T. Ross.

According to official information, the CIA is under the control of the "National Security Council" and thus subordinated directly to the President of the U.S.A.

Its functions are stipulated as follows in the "National Security Act" of the 18 September, 1947:

1. Giving advice to the "National Security Council" and to the President on intelligence questions which concern national security;
2. coordination of the foreign intelligence activity of the Government;
3. composition and distribution of intelligence information within the Government;
4. carrying-out of intelligence activity of general importance, i.e. functions which comply with all parts of the intelligence services;
5. carrying-out of other tasks concerning national security ordered by the "National Security Council" from time to time.

The fifth point which can hardly be surpassed in "harmlessness" calls for the special attention of the African countries which are fighting for genuine independence. This point grants to the CIA the privilege to carry out secret actions and operations against all states of the world.

The aims and the methods of the CIA have been so disreputable that already in the summer of 1948 the "National Security Council" had to issue the secret instruction NSC 10/ which allowed special operations provided that they are secret and "restricted" enough for the Government to be able to deny any association with them with plausible arguments. Nowadays such "secret action" is carried out by the "Office of Special Operations".

Aims and Tasks of the CIA in Africa

It is the main task of the CIA to support the US Government in safeguarding its "national" interests. The American aims with regard to Africa are determined by the economic, political and strategic interests of the USA in Africa and play a very significant role in the global policy of this aggressive power.

Economically the USA aims at the creation of the most advantageous conditions for the investment of its capital, the realization of large profits, the securing of strategic raw materials for American industry and the expansion of the markets for profitable sale of its goods. Moreover, the USA endeavours to bind the African countries as subordinate partners without equal rights to that part of the capitalist



world market which is dominated by the American monopolies.

Politically the USA strives for such influence in the African states which ensures the support of the American foreign policy in the international arena and in Africa. In the process of exercising an influence in the African states, the USA often comes into conflict with the interests of other Western states. Therefore, as the respective concrete circumstances may require, the USA appears as an opponent of colonialism (if thereby the influence of the former colonial power can be diminished) or as its defender:

Besides the delivery of raw materials for its industry, the USA has military and strategic interests in Africa which secure the control of such important areas as the Mediterranean, the coastal areas of the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. This is a matter of acquisition of air force and navy bases as well as other types of military installations in the African states. On the whole the strategic aim of Washington consists in the gradual incorporation of the African countries into the military apparatus of the USA and NATO. As a result of the growing development of military technology, the number of countries of strategic interest to the USA will obviously increase.

If these tasks are considered in their entirety, it becomes evident that they form part of the endeavours of the USA to achieve world domination. Already in 1946 this aim was outlined by the US President Harry Truman who stated: "The USA is a powerful country. There is no more powerful country than the USA. Being in possession of such a power, we have to take over the lead of the world."

The former US State Secretary, Dean Acheson, expressed still more frankly that the USA does not "pursue any philanthropic aims but its own interest in its programme of aid for underdeveloped countries."

#### The Role of the CIA in the Implementation of the American Foreign Policy

"The CIA which openly or secretly makes use of the most different methods, including wire tapping and incorrect electioneering practices as well as blowing up of bridges and armed intervention, became the most important instrument for the implementation of the American policy and one of the most important organs of the American Government." (New York Times, 26 April, 1966).

The transformation of the African countries into economic, political and strategic appendages of the USA is a very complicated task which even such a mighty superpower as the USA cannot implement with legal means alone. In addition, this aim is very unpopular with the African peoples and the world public, and it is at flagrant variance with the official declarations of the USA concerning its support of the ideas of freedom, justice and respect of human rights so that the USA is forced to implement it secretly by means of the practice of secret warfare. That accounts for the transformation of the CIA into an instrument of the foreign policy of the USA and the special importance of its assigned role.

On the basis of the general international aims of the USA in Africa, the concrete tasks of the CIA on the African



continent can be characterized as follows:

1. Provision of comprehensive information on the situation in the African countries, their political and other aims, the opposition, the general feelings of the population, on individual persons of interest to intelligence services as well as on the activity of the official representations and intelligence services of other states in these countries.
2. Setting-up of the required agencies as well as implementation of other "secret operations" in order to exercise pressure on the governments of the African countries and, if the necessity arises, to prepare for a coup d'etat to liquidate disagreeable African governments.

The role of the CIA increased with the proclamation of the "new approach" policy of the USA concerning Africa. This is also shown by the instructions of the US Secretary of State W. Rogers who especially underlined the following special tasks of the American diplomacy and intelligence during the meeting of the chiefs of the American diplomatic representations and CIA residencies in the countries of East Africa, held in Addis Adaba in February 1970:

1. Securing of the strategic interests of the USA and the NATO.
2. Obstruction of the policy of the Communist countries and the spreading of Socialist ideology.
3. Struggle against the national liberation movement.
4. Penetration into the representations of the Socialist countries.
5. Cautious, but continuous substitution of the English influence by the American influence.
6. Securing of supplies for the war industry of the USA.

It can be supposed that similar tasks of the US diplomacy and intelligence are set in other African states with the only difference that in the French dominated countries of Africa the point 5 of this task can envisage the substitution of the French influence.

#### 200,000 agents

The work performed by the CIA in order to secure the international interests of the USA is carried out by the staff and the agents of a large department in this organization which was set up in compliance with the "National Security Act" of 1947. It is difficult to give the exact number of these "knights of dagger and poison". According to estimates of a former head of the CIA, L. Kirkpatrick, Jva., who was also the Inspector General of the CIA under Allen Dulles, this department comprises about 100,000 members and agents. D. Weise and T. Ross estimate them at 200,000. About 20,000 of them work in the USA, in the CIA headquarters and its branch offices in 20 American cities. The headquarters is located at Langley, ten miles from Washington on the shores of the Potomac in an eight-storied building which is called "Allen Dulles Mausoleum."

According to figures by Stuart Alsops in his book "The Center", the annual budget of the CIA for the year 1968



amounted to 500 million dollars. According to other estimates the budget is of the order of a thousand millions of dollars.

A section of the research and information department of the CIA, in which all geographic areas are represented, is directly concerned with African affairs. But also other CIA departments deal with Africa: The department of "Special Operations" or, as it is called by the CIA staff, the department for "dirty tricks" which carries out kidnapping, murder and other "delicate" acts; the department of "Propaganda" which deals with propaganda and misinformation as well as the support and formation of opposition parties and organizations abroad; the department of "Science and Technology" which is provided with most modern espionage equipment, ranging from miniature wire-tapping devices up to radar installations and U2 aircraft for air reconnaissance.

Abroad the CIA agents are concentrated in residencies and regional centres which are in charge of the regional groups and deal with all kinds of intelligence activity. The regional centres are guided by regional directors. Their agents travel to the countries which belong to their range of action.

In the large "key" countries of Africa the CIA residencies have up to 30 agents who are in charge of the local agencies. In addition, they are supported by hired Americans working in the respective countries. In such countries as Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, the Congo (Kinshasa) and Senegal where the largest CIA residencies exist, they have at their disposal specialists for interception and other espionage techniques as well as agents for reconnaissance abroad.

In Mombasa (Kenya) and on the military base of the USA in Kenitra (Morocco) there are even special schools for the training of agents recruited from the local population and aliens.

The heads of the American foreign institutions are obliged to give the CIA agents the required help. If necessary the latter make extensive use of the offices of the embassies, missions and other representations as well as the cars of American diplomats and other official persons for their aims. In order to establish contacts for intelligence and for other purposes of the CIA, the heads of the American institutions organize extended receptions, cinema shows, meetings, visits, cultural events and other forums suited for the activity of the CIA agents.

The CIA agents often make use of their wives or other Americans for the purposes of establishing connections, masking meetings and screening, for the diversion of the local security service etc. For this purpose the wives of the CIA agents undergo special training before departure abroad. The wife of the CIA resident in Morocco, Mrs. Welles, for example, is the head of the Association of American Women which is used as a cloak by the American intelligence service. In order to maintain connection with the agency, the CIA agent Allen Loggan who was Second Secretary of the US Embassy in Conakry in 1967 made use of his wife.

Formally the CIA residents are subordinated to the ambassadors or other high diplomats of the USA in the given country. In practice, however, they often violate this principle and work independently. Not infrequently the heads of the diplomatic representations of the USA themselves



are the CIA residents.

In 1966, for example, the ambassador Dr. William Leonard was the head of the CIA residency in Zanzibar. Later on he became an adviser of the US president. Francis A. Russel who was the head of the department for economic intelligence in the US State Department from 1942 to 1944 was ambassador and resident in Tunisia. At present the same double function is performed by the US ambassador in Mali, Robert Blake.

#### Under different masks

To mask its secret activities the CIA makes use of different representations and institutions of the USA at home and abroad; embassies, missions, consulates, the USIA and its branches, peace corps, trade unions; religious, cultural and students' and charity organizations; advisers, experts, private firms, and others. CIA agents also work in the military bases for the USA and the NATO abroad. For this purpose the CIA also sets up fictitious organizations. Representatives and agents of the CIA are included in American delegations which travel abroad in order to carry out special tasks.

The most common cover for the representatives and agents of the CIA is provided by the diplomatic representations of the USA which protect the agents by the rights of diplomatic immunity from possible troubles and offer advantageous, objective possibilities for their work. Therefore, as a rule, half the staff of these representations is formed by such "knights of dagger and poison", and sometimes, as the American journalist Henry Taylor observed, their number exceeds the number of the actual representatives of the State Department. According to his remarks the representatives of the CIA often occupy a whole storey of the embassy (sometimes even more) as well as some exclusive buildings, ranging from small rooms up to luxurious suburb villas. From 46,000 American representatives abroad, according to Taylor, 40,000 do not work for the State Department but for other organs, especially the CIA.

It has already been mentioned that the CIA in its feverish activity does not confine itself to the diplomatic cover but also makes use of dozens of organizations and institutions of the USA abroad. For these purposes the Information Agency of the USA (USIA) and its representations (USIS) offer good possibilities. By means of their libraries, cultural centres and picture shows they do not only influence ideologically the African youth, but the CIA representatives have also the possibility of studying thoroughly potential candidates.

The cooperation of the USIA with the CIA proved to be so useful that on the 4th April, 1970, President Nixon endorsed a special decision which obliges the USIA to perform together with the CIA and other agencies "some functions in the field of the preparation and implementation of the mobilization plans of the USA". In other words, it has to participate in intelligence tasks. By this decision the CIA got official authority to use these organizations as cover for its representatives and agents.

Harry How Ransom, a professor at the Vanderbilt University, wrote in the "New Republic" on the 11th December, 1965



"As one of the sneaking examples for the extent to which the CIA penetrated into other American organizations abroad in order to use them as a cover, the Peace Corps can be mentioned." Some American social scientists state that President J. Kennedy feared that the image of the Peace Corps would be impaired, and therefore did not allow the CIA and other intelligence services to make use of it as a cover. But his successor, President Johnson, cancelled this order and appointed D. Blatchford, previously head of the organization "Action" which is closely connected with the CIA through the Donner Foundation (whose head is the CIA agent F. Johnson) and the Free Labour Committee (see "Washington Post" of the 23 May, 1969) to the post of the head of the Peace Corps.

The intelligence activities of the "volunteers" of the Corps have been exposed in a number of African countries. Some of these countries (Mali, Somalia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and others) renounced the "services" of this organization. In Dahomey the CIA resident, the second secretary of the US embassy, Richard C. Bull, led a group of agents of the Peace Corps. In Uganda the head of the Corps, the CIA agent Canbey was expelled from the country. Active use was made of the Peace Corps in Senegal, Kenya and other African countries. During the debates in the parliament of Kenya on the 1 March, 1966, the deputy K. Munzi Munyi stated that according to information at hand the CIA made use of the Peace Corps in order to carry out subversive activity in Kenya.

Obviously the CIA is not afraid of the possibility that the economic and technical aid offered to the African states could be compromised, because it extensively uses the Agency for International Development (AID) as a cover for its activity. The staff of this agency included the professional spies Charles O. Wheeler in Uganda, Thomas F. Barron, director of the administration centre of the AID in Mali, Fred C. Hopper, inspector of the AID mission in Tunisia etc. Prior to his arrival in Tunisia in spring 1970 Hopper, previously a colonel in the reconnaissance service, secretly visited Somalia three times. The last time, early in 1970, his visit was connected with the preparation of a plot against the new regime.

The CIA which attaches great importance to the work amongst the youth penetrates actively into the different students' and youth organizations which maintain relations with the youth of other countries. In 1966 the American newspaper "Ramparts" gave a rather detailed report on this, and its revelations caused indignation throughout the world, including the USA. Colonel Stanley Grogan, the assistant of the former CIA director Admiral W. Rayborn, was forced to admit that the CIA recruits members and agents from more than 100 universities in the USA. Among others mention was made of the Institutes of Technology in Michigan and Massachusetts, the "National Students' Association" which has worked for the CIA already for fifteen years up to this time and has received 200,000 dollars per year through different private and fictitious funds, the "International Students' Conference" in Brussels, the "World Youth Chamber" with its branches in Algeria, Chad, Togo, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Gambia and in the Congo (Brazzaville) and which also maintains relations with youth organizations in Cameroun, Senegal and Sierra Leone.



At the same time "Ramparts" directed attention to use of the trade union organizations of the USA and the international contacts by the American intelligence service. Among others mention was made of the African-American Union Centre with its branch offices in Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria and Zambia. One of the well known specialists of the USA in the field of the trade unions, D. Mc confirmed in the American press early in 1969 that the part of the money in this centre is spent for espionage activity and anti-Communist propaganda". The African-American Institute of Labour is also closely connected with the

The American society for African Culture (AMSAC) is a typical example of "cultural" organization used as a cover by the CIA. Known Afro-American scientists, writers, artists and actors are members of this society. It regularly organizes conferences, "round table" meetings, and invites African culture and the development of cultural relations between the "black brothers" in Africa and America. In reality this society which is financed by the CIA has aims to intrude into the African national liberation movements as well as into circles of the intelligentsia of the independent African states. Therefore invitations to the conferences of the AMSAC are mainly extended to persons who are of interest for the CIA. So, for example, invitations to the spring meeting in 1963 at the Howard University in Washington were extended to Oliver Tambo, acting president of the African National Congress of South Africa,

and to other leaders of the liberation movements of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The invited persons were well looked after by the representatives of the black American bourgeoisie among whom there are many CIA agents. Some of them however are respected persons and have no connection with the intelligence service. They sincerely endeavour to develop friendly and useful relations with the African intelligentsia. They are used, however, against their will as cover for the espionage intrigues of the CIA.

One of the CIA agents in the AMSAC was the former assistant head of this organization, James J. Harris. This fact was revealed by the American publicists Dan Schlechter, Michael Ansara and David Kolodney in their book "The CIA: A Common Employer". The career of Harris is very informative. In 1948, with the help of the CIA, he was elected president of the newly founded National Students' Association (NSA) of the USA. Since its foundation this organization has been controlled by the American intelligence service. In the early fifties the CIA sent Harris as deputy general secretary of the World University Service to Geneva. This organization is also supported by the CIA. Thereupon Harris continued his studies by means of a scholarship of the Whitney and Ford Foundations. After graduating with an M.A. degree he returned to the USA where he was put in charge of the programme of assistance for foreign students which is an important weapon of the American intelligence service for penetration into the developing countries. Afterwards he worked for the AMSAC and then for the Ford Foundation, was its representative in the Congo (Kinshasa) and the head of the National School of Law and Administration which was used by the CIA for the screening and recruiting of Congolese students. In 1966 he was delegated by the CIA to the African-American Institute which is also financed



by the CIA. He is in charge of the programmes for African countries and is often in Africa.

Many private and fictitious funds and organizations have been mentioned as frequently used covers of the CIA, e.g. "American Friends of the Near East" with representations in Rabat, Tunis and Cairo; the "Association of Retail Trade Employees"; "Christian Association of Young Women"; "American Fund of Free Journalists"; the Kentfield and Tower Funds and further two dozens of similar organizations. In the middle of 1970, for example, in Algeria the director of the charity organization "Cafe", Neil Huff, and his deputy John Griffiths were unmasked as CIA spies and expelled from the country. These institutions used by the CIA receive special means from it for the development of international relations and for the granting of scholarships or travel funds to the USA to foreigners who are selected by the CIA for screening and possible recruitment. The funds available to the CIA are exempted from taxes.

Mention should also be made of the "Seamen's Club" in Casablanca which is supposed to be a section of the International Sailors' Club. In reality, however, it is a "club" of the CIA. In this club persons are screened or hired immediately. This activity is controlled by a certain Verbracken who is assisted by quite a number of prostitutes.

And eventually, the CIA is also connected with Zionist circles. The School of Technology in Conakry founded with the help of charity funds of the USA and Zionist circles became a hiding place for CIA agents. The teachers of this school Semen Feldmann, David Igbi and others, mainly Zionists, were delegated to this school on the recommendation of the CIA. The CIA agents Penelope Paked and Ben Odri worked as teachers at other educational establishments in Guinea.

There are examples that the American intelligence service makes use of religious organizations (Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant etc.). In Algeria, for example, the American missionaries of the Methodist Church developed an extensive propaganda activity among the youth and organized a so-called seminar "45 hours of liberty", in the course of which the participants were asked provocative and intelligence questions which concerned also the attitude of the young people towards the policy of the Algerian government.

In Senegal the CIA made extensive use of the mission of the Catholic Church for its purposes by supporting the opposition party "Sunugal" through it. In Ethiopia the American intelligence service operates under the cover of missions of the Adventists of the Seventh Day, of the Lutheran, Baptist, Catholic and other churches.

On the 11 March, 1971, in a speech at the meeting of the National Assembly, the President of Gabon, Albert Bernard Bongo, accused the Protestant Church. It had become evident that it received money from international Protestant centres (mainly located in the USA) and carried out a subversive activities in Gabon. The authorities requested the foreign pastor to leave the country immediately.

As to the subversive activity of the CIA carried out by means of utilizing the staff of American military missions abroad, there is a special secret instruction from



the headquarters of the US ground forces. A photostat of this instruction was published in the Turkish newspaper "Kim" (No. 396 from the 23rd February to the 1st March, 1966).

In this document it is said among other things: "In fulfilling their official duties, the military personnel of the USA who belong to the staff of military missions have access to certain intelligence information which is of great importance for the USA. In some cases the provision and timely passing-on of this information can promote the implementation of the national tasks of the USA. It is of national interest that intelligence information obtained by the US citizens is made available to the intelligence organs. Therefore, it is recommended that the members of military missions and the assistants of military attaches cooperate as closely as possible. On this basis the heads of the military missions will inform each other constantly on the character of the desired intelligence. The respective attaché will be used as a channel". Thus this instruction obliges staff of military missions to carry out orders of the CIA. The same newspaper "Kim" stated that some representatives of the US military mission in Iran are officers of the CIA.

Just as actively does the CIA make use of the apparatus of the US advisers for other questions, especially in the police and security organs. In May 1970 the security advisor John H. Terjelian, agent of the CIA, was expelled from Somalia. He as well as the likewise expelled American agents Allan P. White and John W. McDonald had recruited the former Prime Minister of Somalia, Abdirazakh Hussein, the former Minister of the Interior, Yassine Nour, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Police, General Mohammed Abeni and others and prepared a coup d'etat.

The CIA agent Harland Williams who already previously distinguished himself as a spy and adviser of the police in Teheran worked as chief adviser for security questions in Abidjan in 1962. In 1970 the CIA agent Edward Whitmann who stayed as adviser for civil aviation in Senegal was expelled from the country for interference with the internal affairs of the state. Whitman carried out an active subversive activity among the youth of Senegal. Already in 1956 he had been expelled from Czechoslovakia for subversive activity.

The CIA, of course is not afraid to make use of correspondents of telegraph agencies, television, individual press and radio organs. In Congo (Kinshasa) the correspondents of the Associated Press and Reuters were unmasked as CIA agents and expelled from the country, and in Uganda the correspondent of the newspaper "Time", Peter Forbat, was expelled.

Mention should also be made also of the private societies and firms under the numerous covers used by the CIA. In Somalia the director of the American Society "White Star Mining" (uranium production), Pruss Hatson, and the pilot of this company, Tipton, were unmasked as CIA agents. In Tunisia the CIA agent Silvester Forrell who afterwards became second secretary of the embassy in Nigeria worked as a representative of "Esso". In Algeria, the American intelligence service uses the firm "Sonatrach" and other companies as a cover. The chief inspector of the American textile mill in Sudan was unmasked as a CIA agent and ex-



pelled from the country in 1964.

There are firms which were founded specifically to carry out secret and delicate operations, as e.g. the delivery of weapons, the recruitment of mercenaries and diversion. In New York, 49 West, 47 Street, the office of the company "Datson International Cintel" is located which officially is concerned with capital investments in Africa. Head of this firm is a certain William Dutner. In reality the firm is a branch of the CIA. It has the task to organize diversions on the African continent.

There are some American firms which recruit mercenaries for special diversion groups and detachments for "special missions" in Africa and in other territories of the world. One of these firms is the "American World Travel and Service" which is managed by the CIA agent Thierry de Bonney and which has branches and recruiting centres in several countries. The mercenaries recruited by this firm were assigned to the units for "special missions" which were used in the Congo (Kinshasa) against Lumumba and in Biafra on the side of the separatist army of Ojukwu. They are fighting in Angola and Mozambique where they support punitive expeditions of the Portuguese.

The stores of the company "Interarmco Limited" occupy large areas in the vicinity of the CIA quarters in Langley. This firm has specialized in the purchase and sale of weapons and military equipment, comprises 17 companies and has offices in London, Geneva, Monte Carlo, Helsinki, Buenos Aires and Pretoria. Head of this firm is the American Samuel Cummings who has his permanent residence in Monaco. During the Korean War, according to the American press, Cummings worked in the CIA, "quitted" suddenly this institution and founded the "Interarmco" in 1953, which disposes of a capital of several hundreds of millions of dollars at present. It is said that there are more weapons in the stores of "Interarmco" than at the disposal of the whole British army, and that even rockets and supersonic aircraft can be acquired. However that may be, it is known that the CIA makes use of this organization in order to effect weapon sales or deliveries to its partners, among others to some oppositional organizations in the African countries which will be dealt with afterwards.

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It is not from the numbers of soldiers killed, vehicles destroyed or planes shot down that we finally assess the progress or setbacks of our forces. It is in the establishment of the structure of people's power, in the people's consciousness of where their interests lie, and in their determination to defend the power which actually fulfils the interests of the people, that true significance and progress of the Revolution are to be found.

SENORA LACH L



YOUTH AND LEADERSHIP: THE CASE FOR TANZANIA

by

R.R. Mtengo

There is a general conception that the role of the Youth lies somewhere in the distant future. More often than not some politicians, teachers, lecturers, our agrars and some parents tell the Youths: "You are the future leaders" as though there was a demarcation of time and space when the Youth would assume that sacred role in society. This sounds like the protestant ethic in Europe which, among other things, encouraged accumulation of capital instead of spending, implying that those who saved would live a perfect life beyond the skies. At the same time others started accumulating, and this gave rise to capitalism. Under that system one finds a larger section of the population working very hard expecting to rise and lead a perfect life when in fact the capitalist expropriates the surpluses. Until now, the capitalist countries have created irreconcilable contradictions in their society.

The conception then, of the future leadership of the Youth needs some recapitulation at this stage. The Youth do not have to wait until the 'right' time comes. It has to be remembered that even in traditional society the youngest children assume leadership responsibility amongst themselves as a process of learning within their society, and the type of leadership they have, changes according to their ages, grades or stages; this leadership matures as the Youth assumes more mature role in society. These children in this traditional society learn what their elders do, and at the same time, are given responsibility at home, if not to care after other young ones at home, they look after calves - if they lead pastoral life - maintain a small vegetable garden and other roles which may be assigned to them. As they grow up, they are assigned other roles after, say, initiation, circumcision, marriage or age-grading and so on. The other group of the Youth, the school-goers, have other roles to play. The role introduced by the school system has been that of merely learning, "book worship" divorced from society: he has to be trained and he should also work under the supervision of a "boss" because the know-how has a monopoly in particular in the capitalist world. It is capitalism which brings in the conception of "wait for your turn - your leadership should come after my turn" in other words, you cannot enter the realm of exploitation while the exploiter is still exploiting. You are likely to disturb or interfere with the system, particularly when you do not share with them the same ideas.

The Youth is considered to be free from ideology, imbued with the spirit of destroying all ideologies merging sexual, moral, intellectual and political indignation. As a result Youths are likely to interfere with the bourgeois system.



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SAMORA MACHEL



by

R. R. Latango

There is a general conception that the role of the Youth lies somewhere in the distant future. More often than not some politicians, teachers, lecturers, burocrats and some parents tell the Youths: "You are the future leaders" as though there was a demarcation of time and space when the Youth would assume that sacred role in society. This sounds like the protestant ethic in Europe which, among other things, encouraged accumulation of capital instead of spending, implying that those who saved would live a perfect life beyond the skies. At the same time others started accumulating, and this gave rise to capitalism. Under that system one finds a larger section of the population working very hard expecting to rise and lead a perfect life when in fact the capitalist expropriates the surpluses. Until now, the capitalist countries have created irreconcilable contradictions in their society.

The conception then, of the future leadership of the Youth needs some recapitulation at this stage. The Youth do not have to wait until the 'right' time comes. It has to be remembered that even in traditional society the youngest children assume leadership responsibility amongst themselves as a process of learning within their society, and the type of leadership they have, changes according to their ages, grades or stages; this leadership nature as the Youth assumes more mature role in society. These children in this traditional society learn what their elders do, and at the same time, are given responsibility at home, if not to care after other young ones at home, they look after calves - if they lead pastoral life - maintain a small vegetable garden and other roles which may be assigned to them. As they grow up, they are assigned other roles after, say, initiation, circumcision, marriage or age-grading and so on. The other group of the Youth, the school-goers, have other roles to play. The role introduced by the school system has been that of merely learning, "book worship" divorced from society: he has to be trained and he should also work under the supervision of a "boss" because the know-how has a monopoly in particular in the capitalist world. It is capitalism which brings in the conception of "wait for your turn" - your leadership should come after my turn" in other words, you cannot enter the realm of exploitation while the exploiter is still exploiting. You are likely to disturb or interfere with the system, particularly when you do not share with them the same ideas.

The Youth is considered to be free from ideology, imbued with the spirit of destroying all ideologies merging sexual, moral, intellectual and political indignation. As a result Youths are likely to interfere with the bourgeois system.



The twentieth century has, however, witnessed a new phenomenon both in the capitalist and socialist camps - the youth protests against the existing order. In 1968, the President of Imperialist U.S.A., L. Johnson, was terrified by youth activism in U.S.A., especially when he knew that youth (student) movements at that time had already taken over the universities of 25 leading countries. Today, one can witness countless youth and student activism in the world, including Zaire, U.S.A., France, Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Senegal, India, Congo, China, Malagasy, Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania and, recently, South Africa.

Student activism has differed from one country to another, from one student movement to another even in one country. In some countries students have rejected school regulations - they have demanded democratization of their institutions. A few of them have refused the services and needed improvements made, including residential conditions, food and curricula. In other cases the youth movements collided with the bureaucracies or capitalist systems. In many cases the youth have been muzzled, detained, imprisoned, shot dead, expelled from schools and universities. A few youth movements have succeeded in bringing about remarkable victories like the cultural Revolution in China or the overthrowal of the Malagasy regime by students and peasant in 1972.

Why should the youth persist with such activism that costs them so dearly? Imprisonment, being thrown out of school, and death! Is it because these students have no ideology? The Cultural Revolution in China was an ideological revolution. The South African student unrests are ideological. The banning of Nairobi University Students Organization was ideological, and so was the banning of U.S.A.R.F. of Dar-es-Salaam in 1970. It is true that if the youth has not been socialized to the extent of accepting (if not assimilating) the values and norms of that society, such a youth would have to acquire different values that may conflict with those of his own society. But this does not imply that youths in the capitalist countries or in socialist countries do not get adequate socialization, neither does this suggest that the socialization would necessarily prevent the youths or anybody from rebelling against the established order. However, there can be unrest when a society is passing through a transition, when values and norms have to change; and such a wave transcends the whole society.

The youth, therefore, have committed themselves to the liberation of the down-trodden masses from the decadent systems. Some claim that both independence and revolution are good, but that peace is more precious; others think and abide by the notion that peace can be secured merely through submission without a bitter struggle, and yet others, especially those in the 'bandwagon' are prepared to engage themselves in slogans and shouts against such decadent systems like capitalism, colonialism, imperialism, bureaucracy. Both peace secured through compromise and submission and mere shouting against such systems, have very little effect upon the struggle; they only help to intensify the strategies being adopted by the oppressors.

The genuine peace, the respectable peace, is that which is achieved through the struggle; those who have been oppressed have to struggle to the end, to the last drop of their blood and to the end of their lives. Thus the only correct struggles in which the youth can fight and win are those aimed at eradicating general social and economic ills. In other words, the youth must fight for and with the masses. Otherwise they just engage in self-adoration. They must be revolutionary and militant, ever dedicated to the liberation which Che Guevara, Cabral, Londlane and others stood for.



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TANU membership in parastatals or private and government agencies where several TANU branches are opening, even in the villages where several members of TYL and TANU once paid their registration fee and have the cards, subsequent subscriptions are not being paid. Even the machinery for a follow-up through cell leaders becomes inefficient.

The University TYL members can still be categorized into those who are genuinely committed to youth work; those engaged in mere socialist rhetoric - who talk of joining forces with peasants and workers, but when national building activities are organized, this group never shows up. But TYL ticket or card is precious for securing scholarships and jobs, attending conferences, and in fact, some come to solicit TYL support for their election to DUSU leadership. After succeeding, they don't even seem to know the location of TYL offices. Under this apathy it seems unlikely to refer to a revolutionary youth in Tanzania. This does not however mean that among the Tanzanian Youth, there are no potential Revolutionary forces. There are plenty. But as the Party remains a mass Party without vanguard leadership, as the Party has no cadres, both TYL and the Party lack people who are ideologically clear, who can interpret the various Party objectives, the implications of the ideology and the pitfalls of our struggle.

Just as it was said above that the bureaucrats snatched the opportunity and used TYL to harass the people and so creating antagonism not only between TYL and the masses but even between the members of the Party, it is true that at present the Tanzanian socialist aspirants are facing a hard time against the bureaucrats in the band-wagon. Two major mistakes have been committed by the Party and unless they are corrected now it will take time for Tanzania to realise her socialist aspirations:-

(a) There is a colossal assumption that Tanzania has "nothing to learn of socialism or democracy", at the same time it is acknowledged that even after attaining political independence there was need to create a socialist society of workers and peasants. This certainly implies that already there are classes of exploiters and the exploited. But officially, in policy statements, nowhere is it mentioned that there is a class struggle that must be won in Tanzania even after the colonialists have left. But the struggle is on. Against whom? There are no capitalists. We hope that the current debate will help to bring out vividly the fact that we have the petty-bourgeoisie and we have the bureaucrats who are steadily tuned to the capitalist values and these people hold the monopoly of education, expertise and instruments of coercion, that is the police, the army and the judiciary which offer them protection and maintenance of their status quo. Examples of this type are numerous but recent strikes of workers in various factories are but a few examples of such conflicts; also the party officials have defined the "workers" as any paid employee (presumably including the mercenaries and the petty bourgeois bureaucrats) so when the workers want to put clause 15 of "KIWONGOZO" into effect they are told that the "Kiwanda" is for the workers including the expatriate or national managers who in fact are paid salaries and it is the latter group which manage and control the "Kiwanda" while the workers' councils and committees play a peripheral advisory role; not to mention that what is called Nationalisation of the "Kiwanda" is in fact often partnerization with capitalists.

(b) The Party has left the responsibility of socialist implementation in the hands of the bureaucrats who are neutralising the Party.



Under the circumstances, the socialist aspirants are cornered in such a way that they are silenced or politically destroyed. Others are frustrated or placed in positions where their contribution is subject to serious bureaucratic screening. Take a few of those whom some people had thought could help to organize the Party and raise political consciousness - many of them are taken into the bureaucratic machinery where they have to comply to the established order otherwise be fired. When fired, they are branded "vachunia tunbo", "wape-nda sifa", etc. This trend is paralleled with the position C.P.P. of Nkrumah's Ghana assumed; "Nkrumah was actually afraid of Ghanaian leftists or socialists. He did not want to place them in strategic positions of power, but tried to ignore them.. In the end he had more right-winger who after all did not like him and who therefore overthrew him". His right-wingers, like those in Tanzania, went for more foreign aid and expatriate advisers from capitalist countries to come to develop Ghana into a socialist society. In fact the position of foreign aid from socialist countries in Nkrumah's time was crucial, but this is not the case to-day, and Tanzania has no excuse for such a miscalculation.

Can we conceive of any role that the youth in Tanzania can play? Can the youth under the present ideological vacuum be called revolutionary? Can they lead any meaningful revolution? These questions are not easy to answer. There is not even one answer for them, and this article provides no answer other than provoke, stimulate debate and give suggestions on broad lines. To be sincere, the present Tanzanian youth is dominated by the ideological vacuum, is disorganized and the majority of them uncommitted; those who are committed merely hold peripheral bureaucratic positions in the Party or the government. Lack of ideological commitment is also lack of theory, bankruptcy of action and lack of understanding of the social environment and social forces.

This inadequacy has to be removed by a revolutionary vanguard organization which should fight for what the youth stands for. We, the youth, must have commitment and an awareness of our social environment in which we live, the social forces we have to confront during this struggle, and the strategies to sustain the Revolution. The conscious revolution goes hand in hand with theory and practice. Theories must be practical, and practice per se without theory is both uncensuous and unscientific.

This conscious commitment means that the youth have to avoid the capitalist division of labour within its own fronts; between those who do manual labour, those who are "arrogant, extravagant, contemptuous, oppressive" and those who "do the thinking" for others. The socialist revolution in Tanzania suffers from several setbacks, some of which we have mentioned; furthermore, the lack of defined roles, identified varied antagonistic forces, and many others. While the Arusha Declaration seeks to build and maintain a socialist "nation of peasants and workers" out of a society which "still contains elements of feudalism and capitalism" there is a paradox in which we tend to treat peasants and workers and the petty-bourgeoisie and bureaucrats on the other as being identical and non-antagonistic. We have therefore trusted the latter with all responsibility of continuing our socialist revolution despite their bourgeois orientation and interests in the status quo.



"One must admit that the revolutionary ideology is much weaker than the capitalist ideology on the African scene. This is partly because the imperialists and their lackeys have a virtual monopoly of the means of information and propaganda."5 Even when the African Revolutionary is prepared to attack capitalism, and if he is in power he will nationalize the capitalist enterprises; yet there is tremendous fear of Marxist Scientific Socialism which served to make the great Soviet and Chinese Revolutions which is the greatest threat to the bourgeois ideology"6

To have a coherent revolutionary movement in Tanzania we need a vanguard Party which will patch together our present scattered revolutionary resources and reorganize the revolutionary force from the grassroots. The vanguard Party should not be taken for a single party which in Africa is characterized by a monopoly of politics, reformist and elitist power mongery. The vanguard Party on the other hand sets up a completely new political structure in which power is conceived along organized peasants and workers councils and other democratic institutions. The vanguard Party becomes the backbone and trustee of the power of its democratized institutions which unlike those of bourgeois ideologies have an autonomy limited by social needs.

Until this juncture it appears as if we have only dvelt within the boundaries of Tanzania. Socialist revolution is an international struggle against international imperialism and national chauvinism. Imperialism has established itself as a system and has spread its tentacles far beyond its own boundaries, it has rejected national Chauvinism as an end and only employs it at time of capitalist economic crisis. The socialist Revolution then requires the support of other progressive socialist forces. Experience has shown that countries which have sought to develop socialism within the capitalist system have been strangled by the local lackeys in collaboration with the foreign bourgeoisie; those which have sought the assistance and co-operation of other socialist forces have not only survived, but have even managed to change the social and economic structure of their societies.

Tanzania cannot escape these realities. The present trend is that of playing a dual game with propensity to capitalist co-operation and support. There is need to intensify and extend international socialist co-operation and cultural exchange regulations. Youth interaction among socialist countries needs to be emphasized and exchange programmes would catalyze the process. We are aware that we have a bourgeois upbringing and we have acquired bourgeois values; if we hope that we can reform ourselves to become socialists without the assistance of other socialists, we are likely going to help the spread and entrenchment of the capitalist system in our society.

Let us then exploit the present opportunity where the Tanzanian youth are becoming more and more aware of their responsibility in building, maintaining and defending socialism, and their timely call to expose the reactionary forces operating in Tanzania and their call to join the liberation forces in the continent of Africa and those of the oppressed peoples of the World.

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3. The Arusha Decl. and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self Reliance, Dar es Salaam, 1969. 4. Ibid.
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BOOK - REVIEWSLITERATURE FOR THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

Some recent publications.

IN THE EYE OF THE STORM: ANGOLA'S PEOPLE by Basil Davidson,  
(Longman's, London, 1972), p.335

The veteran English writer of African history and supporter of the liberation struggle has brought his two concerns together in this book. He provides a background of the historical development of the people's of this part of Africa and then explores the effect when this development was interrupted by the centuries of Portuguese exploitation. He shows how the forced labour and political repression persist up to today, but also documents the growth of the liberation movement and the start of the armed struggle. His most dramatic writing covers the organisation and activities of MPLA and life in the liberated areas as he observed them on a visit in 1971. His conclusions: "here, in a variety of ways according to local circumstance, the concepts of a national movement which was also a revolutionary movement were manifestly taking shape."

THE REVOLUTION IN ANGOLA: MPLA Life Histories and Documents  
by Don Barnett & Roy Harvey, (Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1972), p.312

This is a different kind of account of the struggle by two earlier visitors. Much of the book consists of the life stories of individual guerrillas - a cross section of the liberation fighters from Dr. Augustine Neto, President of MPLA to 'Marsha', a 14-years old girl who had been fighting for a year already. These stories vividly portray the disruption caused by Portuguese colonialism in the lives of Angolans and of the brutality of efforts to suppress the liberation forces. They also provide documentation of a level of human courage and will too succeed that is enormously moving and impressive.

PORTUGUESE AFRICA AND THE WEST by William Hinter, (Penguin London, 1972), p.176.

A useful complement to these two studies of the liberation efforts within Angola is this short summary of the external forces which sustain the Portuguese in their 'ultracolonialism'. Hinter shows how the particular brand of colonialism that is followed by a backward country like Portugal inevitably has to rely on capital from the USA and more developed European countries - and on military support. This results first in Portuguese intransigence because a neo-colonial solution is not available to them, and also brings in international capital in support of the resistance. He is chiefly concerned to show the various ways that the US is backing the Portuguese - and indirectly South Africa.

WAR WITHOUT END: AMERICAN PLANNING FOR THE NEXT VIETNAM by Michael T. Klare, (Random House, New York, 1972), p.464 (paper)

It is precisely because of this US involvement in Southern Africa that this volume deserves very serious study by every one concerned with liberation in Africa. It develops the argument that: "Only through revolution can the people's of the Third World begin the process of development and acquire some measure of self-dignity; only through counter-revolution can the American business elite preserve its corporate wealth and power". It then goes on to document the various methods, the technology and the social engineering that the US has developed over the last few years for 'counter-insurgency': the use of social research rapid deployment tactics, electronic battlefields such as have been used to denude whole areas of Indochina, the use of mercenaries, support for political and military training, etc. Lest anyone be tempted to dismiss the idea of these techniques being used in Africa, George McGovern the defeated presidential candidate commissioned a study group which reported that the US had "fallen into league with racist and oppressive forces in Africa" and expressed the fear of "a repetition of the Vietnam experience" (New York Times, 5 November, 1972)



## BOOK REVIEW

By Dr. L. Skinner

## THE NEO-KIPLING SENTENCE OF THE PRESENT

OF EMPIRE by L.H. Gann and P. Duignan. Hoover Institution Publication 1967.

Ever since power politics had its origin, however, there has been no lack of demagoguery to justify its existence. The paid ideologists of the ruling class have included the court jesters and musicians of minute tribal states as well as the scribes and historians of modern imperialisms. The development of civilization and the acceptance of norms of international law and justice by most states has made the job of the defender of aggression an increasingly difficult one. More and more he has been forced to mask the intentions of his employer with fantastic moral justifications in order to assuage the conscience of a humanity growing less sanguine. By the 19th. century, imperialist wars have already become sufficiently unpopular to warrant the invocation of divine Providence in order to justify further blood-letting. Even so, it needed the pen of a good story-teller to do justice to the theme. Many offered their services but as usual only a few succeeded. One of the most outstanding was Rudyard Kipling, poet, short-story writer, and novelist. His fertile brain rose to the task of formulating the catch words that were to become the slogan of Western imperialism for the next decade. "The white man's burden" was to be the moral justification for a new spate of colonialist expansion stretching from the East Indies across Asia to the West Indian tip of the Caribbean. It was the motto meant to palliate the wounded humanity of Europe and bring out acquiescence from the black man in Asia, Africa and the Americas. It was to be the moral banner of the Golden Age of British imperialism extending into the indefinite future.

Unfortunately for Kipling and his masters, history has its own laws and the indefinite future of imperialism has radically shrunk to keep pace with mankind's growing conscience. Today, not only is the thought of war repulsive to decent people the world over, but the very idea of imperialism as a world system has been condemned by social scientists as the main retarding factor of civilization and the latent cause of its ultimate destruction. They blame it for the fact that technology and culture are operating at only about 10% of actual potential. When, therefore, a book appears claiming to rehabilitate imperialism in the 20th. century one is inclined to smile, shake one's head and put it quietly aside. When however, the said book is posted to you by the separate book clubs and continues to enjoy favourable reviews you are forced to take a closer look at its contents.

The book currently being given the big push by the imperialist press is entitled EMPIRE AND IMPERIALISM written by L.H. Gann and P. Duignan. It rehashes the Kiplingesque thesis of the 'white man's burden', combines it with the thesis contained in books like AFRICA IN THE VICTORIAN AGE (in which Britain is shown as being reluctant to expand her colonial empire in Africa), and arrives at the marvellous conclusion that imperialism has justified the Kipling dream of civilizing Africa at great pains and sacrifice to Europeans.



In the process of rehabilitating imperialism, the authors are forced to repeat all of the time-worn slanders of the Africans' inability and lack of civilization (claiming the technique, however, as their original approach). In this they are less adept than their predecessors and often get caught up in contradictions forced upon them by the half-hearted attempt to appear objective. For example, when describing the colonisation of South Africa by the Boers they are forced to admit that the white civilizers bought no new solutions to the problem of settling inhospitable land and were themselves forced to adopt the semi-nomadic extensive form of settlement practised by the Africans they had exterminated or dispossessed. (p.176) Or the confession that "Many expatriate clergymen and planters in Africa produced doleful accounts of the way in which black people supposedly idled through the day, supplied with the means of sustenance by bountiful nature. Such tales had little relation to reality: they were born of the difficulties experienced in turning tribesmen into wage-workers" pp.7-8. In fact, there is so much internal evidence to contradict the basic assumptions of the book that only the most courageous defenders of imperialism could have dared to include anything they did. The reason that they do, of course, is in order to prove how expensive the colonial investment is in terms of finance and technical know-how. But this investment, as history shows and as they themselves admit, came only towards the end of the 19th. century represented traditional Africa of the 15th century.

If their basic line for comparison is accepted, there is no doubt that the advances made since the 19th. century far exceed anything achieved in the 18th. But such comparison could be to argue in favour of the felon who had constructed a beautiful tombstone for his victim.

Most of part I of the book is devoted to proving that Europe did not envisage Africa in the 19th. century as primarily an area of capital investment. Granted that the Americas and Australia were more attractive to capitalist investment at the time, the conclusion does not necessarily follow that in terms of long-range planning Africa did not figure prominently on the financial blackboards of imperialism. Up to today Africa is not the chief sphere of West European capital investment. Nevertheless, only the blind could underestimate the importance of the continent for European financial interests. But large financial profits need not have been the only benefits to accrue to Western imperialism. As the authors admit, there was a strong lobby for emigration to the colonies in order to lessen the population pressure and social unrest in the metropolitan countries. (pp.11-12) Evidently, the situation was sufficiently acute to justify government subsidy of emigration even though commerce with the colonies was initially as unprofitable as claimed. But this claim itself is open to suspicion.

Even more spurious is the claim that the colonialists were motivated by altruism of the philanthropic kind to civilize the blacks. A close look at European society at the commencement of its contact with Africa is enough to disillusion anyone as to the high civilizing potential of Europeans in the 15th. century. At the same time that Hawkins was inaugurating trade between West Africa and South America, thousands of defenceless women were being burned at the stake in Europe for 'crimes' like "chasing the milk of neighbours' cattle to dry up in the udder". In England its if the sons of King Edward were being murdered in the Tower while unemployed troops were having their ears cut off for first offenses. Landless peasants could be enslaved and forced to work under the whip. "By Elizabeth's reign, any beggar over 13 without a licence was to be flogged and branded unless an employer could be found for him, or for a second offence, again unless somebody would employ him and for third offence executed without option". (p.21 THE HISTORY OF BRITAIN AFRICA by Hohn Hakeb). In South America in the 17th. century, the Conquistadores were still feeding their dogs on the butchered bodies of the Indians who either did not or could not reveal the fabulous gold caches being sought by the Christian civilizers. In the 18th. century child labour was still being employed in mills others were



ing kidnapped and sold into semi-slavery in the Caribbean. And while the civilisation is putting their best foot forward to their countrymen, are producing a large amount of goods to be used in the slave trade at the rate of \$250,000 per annum. (p.56 THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE by T.F. Burton) By contrast in Africa of the 15th. and 16th centuries, even though there might have been low productivity as Gann and Sulham claim, there was certainly no unemployment nor judicial crimes against the poor on the scale that there was in Britain. In fact, the justice, honesty and efficiency of African urban administration was a source of constant wonder to Arab and European travellers of the pre-colonial period (al-Idrisi in the 11th., Ibn Khaldun in the 14th., Orosio and Benedetto in the 15th., William Taverner and J.Lok in the 16th., not to mention the log books of Vasco da Gama himself and other captains).

The authors attempt to lessen the disaster of Western imperialism for Africa by reiterating the tattered arguments of native intercommunal wars going to the length of accusing the Masai of imperialism!! (p.81) This 'argument' I think, needs hardly any refutation.

In order to prove how 'right' imperialism was for Africa, the authors make lengthy excursions into Socialist and Soviet policy even going to the extent of citing Karl Marx's support for British imperialism in India. The fact is that Marx's obsession with the creation of a world proletariat as the precursor of the world socialist revolution often led him far of the mark in underestimating the positive aspects of pre-industrial societies. It is no reflection on his genius as a historian that even he was deluded by the gargantuan strides of the industrial Revolution and the upsurge of revolutionary activity in its wake. It is almost certain, however, that had he seen the outcome of colonialism in what is now commonly called the Third World or had he the ethnographic and historical documentation on pre-industrial societies now available, his conclusions would have been considerably modified. But even if Karl Marx condoned Western imperialism as a civilizing force, this does not provide a carte blanche for imperialism in Africa or anywhere else. Even if European thinkers of the day thought that Western colonization was wrong in itself" (p.18) this does not give caveat to imperialism. Neither a historian's nor class' historical utopia can serve as justification of social evil. The pertinent question, therefore, is not what the ruling class or even certain nations of a period think, but the effect of their thinking and action on the subsequent lives and history of the people of our planet. The authors, of course, give a credit balance to imperialism and this must remain the gist of any criticism of their book. If it is shown that the total effect of imperialism was negative, that it curtailed or stunted the natural growth of the peoples affected, then all rationalisations and plans to consider altruistic motivations are beside the point and may be dismissed with the wise adage: "The way to hell is paved with good intentions!" The research of the last 20 years has provided more than sufficient proof of the negative effects of imperialism in Africa. In fact, it is the growing strength of this research and its consequent effects of public opinion inimical to imperialist interests that provides the chief impulse for the writing of THE BURDEN OF EMPIRE and similar publications. Unfortunately, this book fails to live up to its promise of proving British imperialism an exception to the rule even within the very limited period of the 19th. to 20th. century. It fails to record a positive balance sheet unless, of course, one is prepared to take seriously the 'arguments' that the construction of roads, railways and hospitals was a fair exchange for the billions taken out of the continent and not question the facts that the roads, railways and hospitals were constructed for the benefit of the colonialists themselves, just as the initiation of the scientific study of the languages and history of Africa was motivated by the need for more efficient administration and imperialist control.

On the whole, the ancient vintage of the book's arguments and counter-criticisms could make it hardly worth mentioning it not for the obvious publicity build-up which it is enjoying - an indication that the battle for the minds of some intellectuals is a long and arduous one and a constant battle. The book is a good example of the slow motion of the mind in the