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COMMENTARIES ON

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THE CLASS STRUGGLE CONTINUES

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Comments on

"TANZANIA: THE CLASS STRUGGLE CONTINUES"

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OPPRESSED OF THE WORLD UNITE !

YOU HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE !

BUT YOUR CHAINS !

YOU HAVE A WORLD TO WIN !

EDITORIAL

This issue consists of papers written in response to the paper by Issa G. Shivji "Tanzania : The Class Struggle Continues", issued by the Institute of Development Studies at the University. As our readers will immediately realise this is a continuation of a debate that has been going on in this Journal and elsewhere.

The purpose of the debate has been to clarify the many issues that have arisen since the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration which proclaimed socialism as its goal. There is no doubt that the proclamation of the Arusha Declaration at the beginning of 1967 was a very important landmark in the political development of the country. It was so principally because of the zeal and interest which the Declaration aroused among the Tanzanian people - the youth in particular - to start thinking seriously about socialism.

Since 1967, the pace that has been made in terms of clearer understanding of the issues and implications of socialism have been quite encouraging. It will be recalled that initially the enthusiasm hinged upon the nationalisation of foreign capital. The facts of exploitation and domination of the masses by capitalists were unmasked and popularised among the people - who in turn responded most enthusiastically to the call to stamp out all forms of exploitation and domination.

Increasingly, however, awareness has dawned upon the enthusiasts that nationalization by itself does not necessarily end exploitation and domination. On the contrary, they may simply take a new guise while they remain intact in essence - indeed, they might even be accentuated.

On the one hand, the struggle against the bureaucratic oppression waged so gallantly by the workers in the last three years which has been a direct manifestation that nationalization has not handed over to them the reins of control of the nationalised institutions. On the contrary, a bureaucratic class has grown in size and strengthened its grip on the working people - thus shifting the very process of liberation which the Arusha Declaration and the MWONGOZO particularly called for.

On the other hand, the increasing unmasking of the exploitation that goes on under the cloak of joint ventures, management and consultancy agreements, trade marks and patents, tourism, foreign trade and loans and so on, has brought home the point that exploitation can take many forms which at times can be very subtle. Hence, the necessity for vigilance and rigorous analysis of all policies and measures.

This we consider to be the greatest contribution of both, the Arusha Declaration and the MWONGOZO in Tanzania : they have exposed to the people the realities of capitalism and socialism.

That is where the importance of this debate comes in. These realities must be further analysed and exposed. Comrade Shivji's first contribution "Tanzania : The Silent Class Struggle" was a venture in that direction. It was first published in "CHECHE" (1970) a journal jointly produced by the University branch of the T.Y.L. and the now banned University Students African Revolutionary Front (U.S.A.R.F.). The author at that time was a

student at the University. Notwithstanding disagreements over detail, the basic ideas of The Silent Class Struggle represented the general ideological stand of progressive students and staff on the campus : a culmination of more than three years of ideological debate and struggles. The paper attempted to come to grips with and analyse the contemporary socio-economic changes in Tanzania using Marxist methodological tools.

Needless to say that the response it received was mixed. Some bureaucrats in the city looked upon it with unmistakable hostility whilst others thought it was raising non-existent issues since, according to them there are no classes in Tanzania and hence/is but absurd to talk of a class struggle; silent or otherwise! At the University it was welcomed, but not uncritically by progressive students and staff whilst others cast suspicious, if not hostile, looks on it. The ideological situation on the campus at that time was one of open, polarised conflict. Socialist ideas openly came into conflict with bourgeois ideology - both in the class-room and outside.

It is understandable that the non-progressive opposed it because they thought it talked about the "abominable" concept of "class struggle". But it is paradoxical that the widespread support it received from all shades of progressive opinions was perhaps, because it did not very much talk about class struggles in Tanzania as such (some progressives were happy to note that the class struggle being talked about was in fact a silent one!)

But the title was misleading for the theme of The Silent Class Struggle was to analyse the nature of the links of the Tanzania economy with the international capitalist system. It dealt with the changes in the forms and content of these links following the launching of the Arusha Declaration. More specifically, it examined the nationalisations of "commanding heights" of the economy that had taken place. What was the overall impact of these nationalisations and in what manner did they affect the direction of development of the Tanzaniaⁿ economy? Broadly speaking, the conclusion reached by The Silent Class Struggle was that only the forms but not the essence of the links with international capitalism had changed. Instead of nationalization leading to disengagement from the neo-colonial web, the trends were towards further entanglement through devices such as partnerships and management agreements with the multi-national corporations. The paper argued that under such circumstances, nationalization of means of production was not equivalent to their socialization but to further underdevelopment and expropriation of the surplus from the economy. In brief, The Silent Class Struggle analysed economic structures but did not seriously attempt a class analysis of the Tanzanian situation.

"Tanzania : The Class Struggle Continues" in a sense fills in that gap. But it is not exactly a complimentary work. For although, the basic ideas of The Silent Class Struggle are considered to be still valid, some of its analysis is either modified or rejected. In the present work, the author makes the pioneering attempt to explain... the social and economic events and trends in Tanzania in terms of class struggles.

The initial sections clarify and elaborate the Marxist concepts of class and class struggle. These concepts are divested of their mechanistic and static interpretations and are seen as dynamic and dialectical categories of profound importance for both the theory and practice of revolutionary struggle. In the later sections these concepts are used to explain the recent history and the present day trends in Tanzania.

The analysis is both provocative and controversial. But so far, it has only been accorded a cool reception. This may be due to inadequate circulation but mainly it is due to the politically sensitive nature of the contents. In an atmosphere of uncertainty the best tactic is to appear disinterested! Even amongst those who either claim to be or are genuinely sympathetic towards the struggle for socialism, the response has not been encouraging. This is definitely a reflection of the low level of ideological debate at the University of Dar es Salaam.

Absence of debate about relevant issues of the day is a consequence of political opportunism and can only lead to ideological stagnation. "The Class Struggle Continues" needs to be critically examined and thoroughly discussed. It is for this reason that we take pride in bringing out this issue containing commentaries on Shivji's paper. We believe that by opening our pages to this long drawn and still on going debate, we have made our contribution - though humble - to this clarification.

As has always been the case, there will be those who will level all sorts of charges against us. Such people would like to see everyone cowed down and refrain from discussing the most important issues of the day.

This is not surprising at all. Yet socialism entails class struggles as manifested in all aspects of social life - theoretical and ideological confrontations included. Hence the debate must continue!

"REVIEW OF TANZANIA: THE CLASS STRUGGLE CONTINUES"

By A.P. Mahiga

Tanzania: The Class Struggle Continues by Issa Shivji is another paper (106 pages) continuing and elaborating the class analysis of Tanzania begun in his earlier thought provoking paper Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle.

It is one of the several contributions to the on going debate on the theory and practice of socialist construction in Tanzania.

The paper is divided into four parts (a) The Theory of Class Struggle and Its Applicability to Africa (b) Class Relations in Tanzania (c) Class Struggles in Tanzania: The Rise and Consolidation of the 'Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie' (d) The Beginnings of the Proletarian Line.

The first part is a brief but lucid clarification of Marxist concepts and methodology of analysing social reality which have been misunderstood, or deliberately distorted by anti-Marxist scholars. The author states from the outset that the essence of class struggle which is the basic theme of the paper is a struggle of social classes for the control of state power; hence the obvious fear by the ruling class of this approach of analysing society. The concept of class is examined in both dimensions as the ownership of the means of production as well as the relations of production which include control and the manner of appropriating and disposing of surplus. The latter aspect is often overlooked in the definition of classes thus preempting the historical and political dynamism of Marxism.

Class Struggle is often identified with violence by bourgeois scholars and opposers of Marxism. The paper dispels the misconception. A distinction is made between class struggle in a revolutionary and non-revolutionary situation. In the former situation, the classes are aware of their class interests and solidarity which has been inculcated through education and organization. It manifests itself in an intense political struggle for the control of state power. Violence may be involved in such a struggle; it is rare for the ruling class to willingly surrender its power, but violence for the sake of it is not necessary.

In a non-revolutionary situation where political consciousness is low, class struggle exists and manifest itself in a low key manner usually at the level of economism only. The author does not give examples of such class struggle in a non-revolutionary situation, but such clashes are common occurrences in any factory or industry between employers and employees. They take the form of trade union demands or individual differences between an employer and an employee.

While on this topic of class consciousness, the author could have touched on the conspiracy by the ruling class to dampen and stifle class consciousness of the oppressed people by counter revolutionary propaganda and sabotage. This is a pertinent issue in explaining the absence of revolutions in situations where there are obvious class contradictions as in Western Europe and North America. Such machinations have worked, but their effect is only to postpone the political struggle.

The falsity of debating whether Marxism is applicable or inapplicable in this or that situation is soundly dismissed in the paper. Marxism is a scientific method of analysing social reality valid for all time and space. The author tackles the question of relevance of Marxism in Africa. He refutes the arguments that capitalism in Africa has not developed and that since development is low in Africa, the issue is production not distribution therefore Marxism is irrelevant! Through colonialism and subsequent imperialist incroachment, the author contends Africa has become an appendage of international capitalism, it is on the fringes of capitalism and that is why it is underdeveloped. An underdeveloped economy has its own capitalist characteristics which give rise to its own class patterns. They do not identically correspond with the classes in the mature capitalist countries of the metropolises, but they are classes all the same whose existence and relations have been fashioned by international capitalism.

It is not correct to claim that pre-colonial Africa was classless. A critical examination of any traditional African society would reveal various forms of dominant dominated relations among the different social strata. The onslaught of capitalism accentuated or transformed and in some cases obliterated those strata and gave rise to new forms of classes. I believe, however, that certain attitudes of the pre-colonial society have persisted into the contemporary times after the pre-colonial base has been supplanted by capitalism. It is a historical fact that values and attitudes of a preceding historical era do linger and continue to influence ideas and behaviour of the new era. Feudal attitudes lingered into the era of capitalism and bourgeois values and attitudes do not only prevail in socialist countries but they are potent enough to cause concern to socialists.

The precolonial attitudes of mutual obligation in society, duty to work by every member of society and working together still persist and influence the behaviour and relations of most people in the rural areas. These attitudes would have little chance to survive for a long time when brought face to face with capitalist mode of production and relations. But since capitalism only marginally affected the rural areas in Tanzania, pre-colonial attitudes still survive.

The pre-colonial attitudes are what we call Ujamaa in Tanzania. The three principles of Ujamaa outlined above, do not contradict the basic principles of socialism although they are weak in the distribution aspects of socialism. There is nothing un-Marxist to capitalize on and incorporate Ujamaa attitudes into the socialist programme provided we graft those attitudes on a genuine socialist base in the context of modern technology.

The author contrasts the characteristics of classes in Africa and those in the metropolitan capitalist countries. The petty bourgeoisie is the ruling class in Africa. Unlike the petty bourgeoisie in classical Marxian literature, the African type controls state power although it does not control the economy. The state maintains law and order and is the custodian of foreign economic interests. The political base

the ruling class in Africa is the underdeveloped economy, cannot overemphasize the political control which the petty bourgeoisie has on the state. The control is not total, often it has to be sanctioned and proped up by outside powers which control the economy. In effect, the imperialist powers rule by proxy in Africa through their subservient clients, the petty bourgeoisie.

Conflicts do arise sometimes between the petty bourgeoisie and their metropolitan bosses over the management of the economy. They range from simple misunderstandings to serious breaches of relations when the appropriation and appropriation of profits is interfered with. Since the relationship is that of a patron and a client, the outcome of conflict between the two often results in a reversal of policy, a coup d'état in favour of the patron. If the ruling class is progressive and courageous enough and is out for a showdown, it may be the beginning of disengagement from imperialist entanglements.

The small size and weak consciousness of the proletariat in Africa is acknowledged by the author, but he also reckons the significant role which the workers played during the independence struggle. It is wrong, the author tells us, to assume that a socialist revolution can only be brought about by a large developed working class. There are more peasants than workers in Africa; there are, in addition, the lower strata of the petty bourgeoisie who are potentially revolutionary. A socialist revolution can come about by the alliance of these classes led by proletarian ideology.

The rural base of most wage earners in Africa enhances the forging of an alliance between the workers and the peasants. By the same token, the rural connections of the ruling classes in Africa, their ethnic affiliations and nationalistic appeals have tended to vitiate and temporarily camouflage the contradictions between the workers and peasants on the one hand and the petty bourgeoisie on the other. This factor ought to be taken into consideration when discussing the classes and class struggle in the African setting. The paper does not.

Another factor worthy of consideration when articulating proletarian ideology in Africa and the Third world is a whole in the post-independence era, is to concretize imperialism after the colonizers have physically 'departed'. The people continue to see the symbols of American or British imperialism in the form of their factories and manufactured goods, but it is an impersonal relationship out of which an ordinary peasant or worker cannot make an immediate connection with imperialism as he was able to do with the colonizer. The immediate target ought to be the petty bourgeoisie who is the visible local agent of imperialism. Sometimes we get too preoccupied with the external factors at the expense of internal ones which external forces have to operate with.

The author concludes the first part by a critique of the concept of elite/mass dichotomy. It is a valid observation. I think the critique against the concept of elite is at the same time a critique of the concept of mass which

the author continues to use in the paper. We cannot speak of masses without implying the existence of elites.

Part two of the paper deals with class relations in post independence Tanzania. It is introduced by an analysis of the vertically integrated export oriented colonial economy of Tanzania. The peripheral nature of the economy and hence its underdevelopment is well spelled out. The accumulation of commercial capital without its transformation into industrial capital is taken as the single important characteristic of a vertically integrated export oriented economy. The argument of the author that by the time of independence the Tanzania economy had more or less been integrated in the capitalist system is oversketched. There were vast rural areas which were hardly touched by the cash economy neither as exporters of migrant labour nor as food producers for the plantations.

Underdevelopment in colonies does also include the total neglect of certain areas which are either too expensive to open up or are not of immediate benefit to the colonial economy. A good part of south western and south eastern Tanzania fell into this category. The peasantization of these areas, i.e. the tying of these areas to international capitalism was completed after independence.

The class categories in Tanzania are debatable. The distinction between the Asian commercial bourgeoisie and the African petty bourgeoisie may be a useful approach of understanding the class ramifications in Tanzania. But they can both be classified under the general rubric of petty bourgeoisie. Although the two perform different functions in the economic and political realms, they are essentially appendages to the metropolitan bourgeoisie. The relationship between the two groups has been dominated by conflict rather than cooperation except in few cases where an alliance was perceived to be of mutual benefit to both. The conflicts are intra-class, they appear to be separate class antagonisms because of the chasm of colour and race, which has kept them separate and distant.

It is true that the Asian bourgeoisie had property but no political power in both the colonial and the post colonial periods but it is questionable to argue that "it did not nor did it expect to partake of political rule" (p. 42.) The Asian community did not attempt to acquire political power but it acted as a strong political pressure group on the colonial government. It was capable of influencing legislation in its favour, it opposed TANU by withholding its membership and support. U.T.P had several Asian supporters and sympathisers.

After independence, Asians showed considerable interest in TANU politics. They stood as candidates for parliament. Some were elected too. The interest in politics under the banner of TANU was a continuation of the pressure group politics similar to that played under the colonial rule, but this time they had to identify themselves with the majority of the people - the Africans. At the same time there

was a proliferation of charitable donations by the Asian community for different projects as gestures of good will and support to the independent government of Tanzania. The donations coupled with 'gifts' to prominent individuals were certainly not without political pay offs.

The Asians could not afford to be politically apathetic. Concern for their communal identity and the protection of their commercial interests necessitated shrewd political moves which to an ordinary observer appeared non-political. Had the Asians opened the door to admit aspiring African petty bourgeoisie into the commercial racket, there would not have been a serious conflict between the two groups. Before the Arusha Declaration the Asians had exercised enough leverage on politicians and senior bureaucrats to continue their domination of the commercial sector. There was a mushrooming of Asian sponsored light industries some belonging to financial magnates such as Madhvani and the Aga Khan.

A small number of Africans were offered token directorships in some of the concerns, but the majority of the up-coming African traders were jealously excluded. The only alternative they had was to seek the assistance of the government to promote their commercial ambitions. Among the aspiring African businessmen were politicians and civil servants. Fortunately the Arusha Declaration began to deal a blow to both groups. The Asians are feeling the actual weight, their economic interests have been affected, but for the majority of the Africans the Declaration whittled their aspirations which had not fully come to fruition.

The author observes that at the time of independence there was not a kulak class of any political significance. There were, however, prosperous farmers in the Moshi, Bukoba and Rungwe areas who were potential Kulaks. There was not any conflict to speak of before the Arusha Declaration between the Kulaks and prosperous farmers on one hand and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie on the other. Most of the bureaucrats were sons and daughters of the farmers, they ploughed back some of their holdings to improve and consolidate their family holdings. Agricultural extension services, credit and marketing facilities were given as priorities to prosperous farmers. After acquiring a house or house for rent most politicians and senior civil servants were embarking on land speculation and ownership as absentee landlords. The Arusha Declaration and the Leadership Code contained those budding ventures.

The author gives sound reasons why the petty bourgeoisie in Tanzania was most suited to lead the Uhuru Struggle in addition to the immediate material gains which they expected to get. It is also correct to regard the uhuru struggle as some form of class struggle. The entire colonized people are one class against the colonizer class. The force of nationalism covers up, at least for sometime, class cleavages which exist among the colonized people. This factor explains why in most cases the people accepted unreservedly the leadership of the petty bourgeoisie although they had no progressive social and economic manifestos. In spearheading the uhuru struggle, the petty bourgeoisie played a progressive role. It created a situation which would unveil and expose the internal contradictions in the former colonies.

Although the author maintains that bureaucratic bourgeoisie in Tanzania was not anti-capitalism soon after independence, we have to admit that it certainly pursued a radical foreign policy which was anti-imperialism. The confrontation with a particular imperialist country (in the Tanzanian case - Britain) rather than with collective imperialism as a whole is understandable. Since the colonizer had more linkages with the colony than any other imperialist power, there were bound to be more points of friction.

It did not take long however, for the Tanzanian leaders to realize that a meaningful radical foreign policy had to tackle imperialism in totality. In a space of two years Tanzania had serious diplomatic conflicts with Britain, the U.S.A. and West Germany. The radical foreign policy of the mid-sixties served as a useful means of politicizing the pro-western and apathetic sections of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the people as a whole against all forms of foreign domination particularly in the economic sphere. That awareness increased the appreciation of the Arusha Declaration when it came in 1967.

In the paper, the author expresses disappointment at the failure of the African leadership to go beyond the "seeking of a political kingdom" when demanding for independence. He admits that even the most progressive among them could not see beyond Fabianism. Today, some of them are getting closer to Marx. As time went by, the challenge of grappling with underdevelopment, has revealed the reality of the situation. They have come to realize that the political Kingdom alone and a radical foreign policy are not adequate weapons against imperialism; social and economic transformation on socialist lines is a must. This outstanding ability to learn and understand the forces of exploitation and to make a genuine attempt to deal with them should not be underestimated especially in the Tanzanian context:

The ability and will of the leadership to continue learning from social reality and the experiences of other people and to maintain its commitment to pursue a socialist line is a crucial factor in the socialist transformation of Tanzania. To learn from social reality and to apply the correct ideas is the essence of the scientific approach to social problems.

The class struggle between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the commercial bourgeoisie in the third section of the paper is well argued and substantiated. The citizenship bill, the drive towards Africanization of the civil service and the encouragement of marketing cooperatives were measures primarily aimed against the Asian businessmen. There were also elements of racial overtones in the struggle. The few African traders in the country who had "made it" like the Asians were often spared and sometimes given the protection of the government. Slogans like "sisi kwa sisi", "Mwafrika store" etc. were in vogue at this time and African peasants and workers turned out to support the up-coming African businessmen simply because they were black. The Africans took the opportunity under the umbrella of the government to register their disgust at the racial practices of the Asian community. It was a mild disgust anyway.

In the struggle between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the commercial bourgeoisie, the former did not make much headway before the Arusha Declaration. The commercial bourgeoisie was well entrenched and subtle enough to counteract and neutralize the measures introduced by the government against it. They continued to dominate the commercial sector and to influence the government in their favour.

One notable feature during this time is the apparent absence of a clear cut struggle between the peasants and workers on one side and the petty bourgeoisie on the other, there were, of course, numerous isolated incidents at individual level, but no concerted class confrontation. The rise of nationalism, the racial appeal against the Asian community and the absence of a proletarian ideology are among the factors which gave rise to deceptive harmony between the workers, peasants and the petty bourgeoisie.

The author draws our attention to the Turner Report which claimed that the workers were prospering at the expense of the peasants. This was certainly a case of driving a wedge between the workers and peasants in the fight against capitalism. The major issue which should have been raised was the widening gap between the urban and the rural areas. The siphoning of the surplus from the meagre peasant incomes into urban centres did not directly benefit the workers. It went to developing the urban infrastructure to serve the foreign owned industries, to pay the fat salaries of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, to build their posh residential quarters and to finance imported consumer goods to meet their expensive tastes.

The minimum wage for the workers was not enough to carry workers' family for a month and saving was impossible. At the time when the minimum wage was set, a fresh graduate earned ten times as much as a factory worker apart from the other remunerations which the graduate had and the worker did not. A fresh graduate complained of "those big people who earned three or four times more than him but did not have as much formal education as he did". The little which the workers were paid constituted a tiny portion of the total value of their labour. Most of the surplus was taken by the capitalists. The Turner Report distorted the truth and misled us by suggesting that the workers were exploiting the peasants.

In the fourth section the author summarizes the significance of the Arusha Declaration and the Leadership Code. He describes the Leadership Code as "a self-restraint on the part of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie" rather than a measure imposed from below. The observation is correct. The Code would have had more success if the people below had the power to enforce its provisions. The Arusha Declaration is also a 'socialist decree from above' for the majority of the people. We noted earlier that among the petty bourgeoisie there can be some people who are progressive and revolutionary. Marx, Lenin and Castro were not workers or peasants but they embraced and articulated a proletarian ideology and committed their lives to the liberation of oppressed people.

When an ideology comes from above as the Arusha Declaration and the Leadership Code did, it is absolutely

important and necessary that it be understood to and internalized by the people below, halfhearted measures to involve the people would make one as good as a pie in the sky. When the Party (TANU) adopted the Arusha Declaration and the Leadership Code, it declared it to be for the benefit of the people. Considerable efforts have been made to involve the people in decision making and control of the various national institutions. Continuous intensive political education spearheaded by ideologically committed political cadres ought to be seriously taken by the Party.

We are still far from the socialist goals which we have set. The means we employ to reach the goals are debatable and sometimes questionable. We have been disappointed at some of the outcomes in our experiment, but some of these shortcomings cannot be avoided in this period of transition. There are no ready made answers and even if there were, they need to be applied to a situation which is different from situation X or Y. Nevertheless, we should not be complacent and use the excuse of being in a transitional stage to avoid the challenge of making the experiment succeed. We cannot afford either, to be arm-chair critics without getting involved into practical problems.

The philosophical formulation of the Arusha Declaration touches on the basic ideals of socialism. It condemns the exploitation of one class by another, it admits the existence of classes in Tanzania and therefore the existence of class struggle. It proposes that to build and maintain socialism the major means of production and exchange ought to be owned and controlled by the workers and peasants. It also stresses that the ruling Party should be a Party of workers and peasants. If the Arusha Declaration has turned out to be merely radical state intervention in the economy and has led to the consolidation of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie as the author points out then the fault has arisen during the implementation process. Distorted and confused implementation may in the long run, lead to distortion of the basic formulations. It is therefore necessary to continue elaboration on the basic principles in order to expose loopholes and distortions which arise in the implementation. Shivji's paper is a contribution to that endeavour.

The impact of the Arusha Declaration on the commercial bourgeoisie makes an interesting reading. Its disintegration can be noticed even by the most casual observer. The extent to which it was entrenched into the economy was felt when it almost wrecked the economy when it was being uprooted. The after Arusha policies were succeeding while the previous ones had failed. The Declaration affected the African petty bourgeoisie as well, including the politico-administrative type who were branching off into business. They were frustrated, but unlike some of the Asians they cannot leave the country nor do they have enough resources to oppose the government.

The fact that a section of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie was able to come out with a policy which is against its own interests and aspirations shows that the Arusha Declaration goes beyond the interests of that class. Deprived of the opportunities to engage in business, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie's security lies in preserving the status quo.

usually one would not expect it to welcome measures which threaten its present position. However, the majority of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie looks nervous and insecure. The progressive part of it is in the throes of evolving an alliance with the workers and peasants which is a threat to the majority of them. The future trend of socialism in Tanzania will depend on the outcome of the contest between the progressive section of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in alliance with the peasants and the workers on one hand and the bulk of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie which wants to consolidate itself with the other.

The distinction between the status quo bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the progressive bureaucratic bourgeoisie is very important. The latter has persistently advocated a socialist line although of a gradualist nature.

This group has given the Arusha Declaration a dynamic character. From mere nationalization of some industries and financial institutions in 1967, the Party launched "Ujamaa vijijini", workers participation, Mwongozo and the latest programme to train Party cadres. The success of these programmes may fall short of our expectations, but they show that there has been a group which has been pushing for a socialist line.

Contrary to the line adopted by the progressive bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the status quo bureaucratic bourgeoisie has been scared of radical socialist policies. While shouting the rhetoric of socialism, it has flagrantly violated the Leadership Code, it has resisted and frustrated workers participation, it has used ujamaa villages to acquire individual farms etc. One thing it would not do, is, to publicly oppose socialism for under this banner it gets all the spoils it needs.

We cannot dispense with the status quo bureaucratic bourgeoisie. It has the know how which is essential for day to day running of the state machinery. It commands power and influence over policies and decisions which it can use to promote its interests. One of the effective ways to check and control it is for the Party to give power to the people on the lines of Mwongozo. It is no mere coincidence that Mwongozo is one of the most feared documents and the most distorted one by the status quo bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

Mwongozo was a landmark in the effort by the progressive bureaucratic bourgeoisie to transfer power to the people. It is a victory over the status quo bureaucrats and a decisive politicizing document over the people. Like the Arusha Declaration, it was a set of proposals from above but mainly devised by the people below. The workers for example, have understood and accepted it enthusiastically. It has heightened their consciousness significantly. They have been able to provide their own leadership. They have fearlessly challenged bourgeois arrogance in management and they have finally come to grips with the crux of the contradiction between employer and employee by demanding the taking over of the ownership and control of business concerns for the benefit of the nation as a whole.

The pace at which the workers' consciousness has developed surprised both the Party and their trade union (N.U.T.A.). It

seems that the move had not been anticipated. One wonders why the workers' grievances could accumulate driving them to the point of taking over a factory without the established machinery of airing grievances to detect the problems and solve them in time. It does not appear that there is a systematic training programme for the workers for higher administrative responsibilities to prepare them for eventual control of industries. Without the training, such workers' moves will seem as anarchic and undisciplined. Certainly, to the bureaucrats it is a dangerous precedent because it challenges the foundation of their power. Where would they be if in six months time the workers decided to control most of the industries and institutions in the country?

Sometimes Mwongozo has been misquoted by competing bureaucrats to serve their own ends. At this stage there are also bound to be competing individuals or factions of the management who may manipulate the workers for their benefit. Imperialists can also resort to the same trick to discredit our efforts. This is not to suggest that the workers are a docile lot who can be fooled around, but it is noting a common fact which can happen at a stage when the workers' consciousness is not solidly crystallized. We have to delve deeper than what the newspaper headlines tell us in order to understand the nature of the workers' grievances in each individual case.

Towards the end of the paper there is a section on Ujamaa Vijijini, the author raises important questions on the rural situation in Tanzania. The place of the agricultural sector in a nationally integrated economy is diagrammatically sketched. It is a useful guideline in a discussion of disengagement from international capitalism and the construction of an independent socialist economy. The need for political cadres to bring about rural transformation is stressed. It is often cynically remarked by some bureaucrats that we have no trained cadres to train other cadres therefore the call for cadres is self-defeating. The truth is that there are well meaning and committed people who are potentially outstanding cadres but they are frustrated and discouraged by bureaucratic red tape and vested interests. The bureaucrats are afraid of being exposed and embarrassed by the militancy and vigilance of the cadres.

I agree with the basic frame work of analysis which Shivji takes. I have added some details to his argument and in some places I have differed with him where I felt he had generalized or overstretched his arguments. His work is an honest attempt to portray the social reality of Tanzania. He is particularly critical of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie - a class which most of the readers including myself belong to. I would not be surprised if some people will not like his approach because it mirrors our shortcomings. It takes a courageous person to call a spade a spade and it also takes a courageous person to face criticism and self criticism.

The debate on socialist construction in Tanzania has been going on at all levels since this country adopted the Arusha Declaration. It should be encouraged in order to provide

light into the problems we are dealing with. We should bear in mind that our contribution to the debate would be more useful if we extend it beyond the realm of mere theorizing giving practical suggestions to the problems we are dealing with. It is necessary to get involved into actual situations to see the options and constraints which decision makers have to face. We cannot build socialism without a correct theory and our theories may have to be adjusted in the light of practical experience.

Shivji's paper has raised several theoretical and practical issues. It needs to be read carefully and debated in class rooms, offices, factories and shambas. It is a well written piece of work with impressive foot note work. It is necessary reading for both socialists and non-socialists in Tanzania and beyond.

THE SOUNDS OF SILENCE:
CLASS STRUGGLE IN TANZANIA

by

Aidan Foster-Carter

A new paper by Shivji is an important event; to be invited to comment upon it, an honour. To me, as a non-Tanzanian Marxist, it is a privilege (not a right, nor even a duty) to be able to participate in a vital debate on the most fundamental issues of strategy for this country: how to interpret Tanzanian reality, and how to change it. This, it should go without saying, is above all a task for Tanzanians themselves; not that others are unable to contribute, but it is crucial that the initiative and terms of the debate be firmly in indigenous hands. For that, surely, is the essential significance of the revolutions of this century, in which whole peoples - in China and Korea, Cuba and Vietnam, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique - have rejected the destinies mapped out for them by colonialist and Comintern alike, choosing instead to build their own strategies on the basis of their own Marxist understanding of their own predicament.

Perhaps the deepest significance of "Tanzania: The Class Struggle Continues" is that it has definitively seized that essential local initiative. Henceforth, every serious approach (Marxist or otherwise) to a macro-analysis of the Tanzanian situation must take Shivji as a starting-point. It was not always so: one of the minor ironies of neo-colonialism is that even Marxism tends to be expatriate-run! Mazrui's jibe of the "White Marxist's Burden" was a distortion, yet not an invention. Maybe this was a necessary stage - but that is not our concern here. What matters is that things have changed. So let it be quite clear that the role of a non-Tanzanian commentator is a marginal one. I know something of Marxism, something of sociology; I would certainly not presume, after less than a year, to know Tanzania. So what follows is really comment from the sidelines, to be treated by the actual players with appropriate scepticism.

It is already clear that I think the importance of "The Class Struggle Continues" can hardly be over-estimated. It is almost a model of what Marxist analysis should be, on a whole number of levels. First, it insists that Marxism is above all a methodology: not a set of fixed dogmas, not a theological system, but a number of related, creative principles whose application to concrete social structures is problematic - we do not know all the answers before we set out - but which if used successfully promises us not only understanding but, ultimately, liberation too. Shivji not only stresses this methodological core of Marxism; better still, he exemplifies it throughout the paper, as we shall see.

A second often submerged dimension of Marxism which Shivji resurrects is totality. Marxism insists that reality can only be understood in terms of wholes (modes of production, chiefly); whereas bourgeois empiricism maintains that we can only look at little bits and pieces of the reality, one at a time. The latter, of course, results in a fragmented vision. What is noteworthy in the Tanzanian context is that even avowedly Marxist writings are largely characterised by an implicit empiricism. Partly no doubt due to the individual-practical orientation of research procedures, there has been a proliferation of "field studies"

which even when UPLIFT for a Marxist perspective have rarely attempted to situate the particular phenomena they are looking at into a broader framework of analysis (I do not just mean a ritual nod in the direction of A.G. Frank and the "global capitalist system", but the overall specificity of Tanzania within that system). Here too Shivji is a pioneer.

This is related, I think, to a third aspect of Marxism - as a denaturaliser. Shivji rightly attacks what he calls "establishment Marxism", i.e. blind allegiance to the (often fickle) party line of some existing socialist country. Something of the same kind has surely been common in Tanzania too. The "missing totality" mentioned above may also have arisen from a reluctance to raise embarrassing - even dangerous - questions about the nature of the Tanzanian state; who runs it, and for whom. Instead, whether as tactics or mere tactfulness, there has been a vague assumption that things are on the right track; that Tanzania is different; that whatever specific shortcomings may be noted, the general direction of progress exists and is being maintained. (Again Mazrui has a word for it: "Tanzaphilia") Whatever its motives, this attitude has ultimately not advanced the scientific study of Tanzania. So it is good - though not surprising - to find that Shivji is completely free of it. His task, as he sees it, is to explain - which of course does not imply some stance of pseudo-objectivity, but rather a critical analysis of the laws of motion of Tanzanian society.

The way in which Shivji sets about this illustrates a fourth outstanding feature of his method: it is dialectical (if that word bothers you, let's just say "dynamic"; or, better still "it moves!"). He constantly emphasises that society does not stand still, and so cannot be analysed as though it did. Marxism is concerned, fundamentally, not with structures but with processes: movement and change, not fixity. Thus classes do not exist individually, as such, but only in relation to one another. Indeed, in one sense they do not "exist" at all: they are always in process of formation, transformation, or dissolution. Substantively, their relationship is characterised by struggle, on which more later.

Finally, the structure of the paper - one should really call it a book! - is also admirable from a Marxist viewpoint. His earlier paper, "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle", dealt with economic phenomena, but only sketchily with their social context - and rather statically at that. A next step, therefore, was to investigate theoretically such fundamental concepts as "classes" (various), "ownership", "elite", and the like. But this alone could have been abstract and academic, if not supplemented by an historical and practical application of these concepts to the actual course of contemporary Tanzanian history: which in turn gives us the political level. It should not be forgotten that Marx's own most creative work on classes was written in immediate response to complex contemporary events: the class struggles in France of 1848 and 1870. Shivji's approach is the same.

In all of the foregoing, it will be noticed that the distinctiveness of Shivji's approach can be seen against two different backgrounds: not only as Marxism against bourgeois ideology, but also as living Marxism against much dead wood that passes by that name. His innovative, critical, dynamic approach contrasts sharply with the bland repetition of ancient static formulae, which too often are still mechanically applied for ideological reasons in inappropriate contexts. Nowhere is this more clear than in the central issue of class struggle.

Thus a recent Soviet text states boldly: "Given a right policy, even abrupt shifts in a socialist revolution do not necessarily lead to an aggravation of class struggle". Such "aggravation", it appears, is what must at all costs be avoided: it occurs "when any one class attempts to overstep its prerogatives, dominate the other forces, and turn the national independence won by the united effort of the people to its own selfish advantage".¹ This is of course sheer liberalism, and like the related concept of the "non-capitalist road" has served to support regimes - at best in a precarious and temporary balance of forces, at worst thoroughly repressive - simply in the interests of Soviet foreign policy. Fortunately these ideas are not widely disseminated in Tanzania, so we do not need quite the fierce ideological struggle which writers like Frank have had to wage against the reformist "communist parties" of Latin America. However, there are battles to be fought on this left (?) flank as well as against bourgeois enemies, as will be seen when we examine points of substance below.

So Shivji's overall project is, I think, admirable. Its execution is hardly less so. I know he dislikes "celebrations", so perhaps this praise should be qualified a little while still discussing general themes. An academic critic could complain of occasional loose, even careless, formulations on quantitative social science (p.2), on elites (p.26) - but these are peripheral issues where some over-simplification hardly matters. More serious, perhaps, are some apparent omissions of reading. Shivji is obviously familiar with contemporary Marxist general theory at one pole, and the Tanzanian literature at the other. But there does exist also a growing body of "middle range" work, i.e. Marxist attempts to come to terms with specific problems of characterising "underdeveloped" societies - above all, class. In English alone one can mention the work of Dos Santos on class and dependence, Arrighi and Weeks on labour, Post on "peasantization", Meillassoux on class and bureaucracy, Brett on East Africa, Amin on class, and many more.² While some of this material is still very new (and it is no crime to have not read everything!), more familiarity with the work of others looking at similar problems might have provided valuable cross-fertilisation. As it is, one sometimes gets the impression that when expounding his account of class structures (e.g. the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie", which throughout the paper never loses those tentative quotation marks), Shivji feels he is very much alone in traversing new ground. Yet Meillassoux, for one, has had to tackle some very similar problems in the Malian case: for instance, there is an almost exact parallel in that the bureaucracy had to fight and conquer a commercial bourgeoisie.³

But this is a minor point, which anyway will be mitigated as the ongoing process of debate spreads ever wider and deeper. Let us now turn from generalities to substantive issues. There are at least two areas in which Shivji has made a major contribution to Marxist analysis. One is his oft-repeated⁴ theme of ownership. It has long been clear in practice that state ownership of the means of production is not in itself a sufficient condition for socialism; but as a theoretical explanation Shivji's contrast between the formal-juridical and the substantive-social is original and valuable.

The other outstanding achievement, this time more concrete, is his treatment of the role of the Asian community. Of course it has always been Marxist axiom that "race relations" are analytically subordinate to economic class relations, but it has to be admitted that in empirical studies this has often been hard to show.⁵ But Shivji provides a subtle and thoroughly

convincing account of the primary class position of this group, which in turn serves to explain its role in colonialism and its post-Archa denials.

Two other areas, of existing debate, are also clarified in this paper. One is the crucial role of the state in all types of underdeveloped polity (this is obviously related to the previously mentioned issue of ownership). The other is the question of an elite's "becoming" a class. Here Shivji joins battle with Szentes, such the most heavy-weight of his previous critics, who maintained on theoretical grounds that the elite cannot reproduce itself and can therefore have no long-term existence as an independent class, since its only asset - education - is increasingly eroded by social mobility due to educational and economic expansion.⁶ Shivji responds with a careful empirical analysis, showing how class entrenchment is proceeding whether or not it accords with a a priori East European doctrine. This could in fact be supplemented on theoretical grounds too: studies show that social (i.e. individual) mobility may strengthen a class system - by co-opting potential rebels - rather than breaking it down. And the education system plays an important part in this process. Szentes quaintly believes that only a "hereditary aristocracy" in control of the state can guarantee its own reproduction in this way, as in the "Asiatic Mode of Production"; yet he seems to forget that at least in Mandarin China there was an element of education-sponsored mobility, namely via examinations, which can hardly be said to have weakened the social system.⁷

Elsewhere, Shivji makes two (related) re-formulations which seem to me to be largely on the right lines. Arrighi's criticism of Frank, that he subordinated class relations to colonial relations instead of vice versa, ran the risk of creating a false dichotomy; and Shivji rightly remarks that such dialectically interpenetrating categories are just not the kind of things that could stand in relations of dominance/subordination to one another.⁸ In similar vein he later queries one of the boldest yet oddest of the late Amilcar Cabral's theses, namely his apparent view that national struggle wholly replaced indigenous class struggle during the colonial period.⁹ Maybe in the extreme case of Portuguese colonialism the lines were as clear-cut as this; but elsewhere the relationship must be seen in terms of more complex interpenetration. (Meillassoux is particularly interesting here, with his stress on the survival in Mali of almost the whole edifice of pre-colonial multi-dimensional social stratification, not only through the colonial period, but even into independence - by no means unchanged, of course, but by no means transformed either).

There are also some re-affirmations of old themes, not original but well worth repeating. It should go without saying that there are classes in Africa, contrary to still repeated denials! Likewise, the twin fallacies beloved of the late Tom Mboya¹⁰ - that the struggle for development is more man versus nature than man versus man, and that therefore production must be given priority over egalitarian distribution - can never be too often exposed for the elitist ideology that they are.

Finally, in this catalogue of virtues, there are two "asides" on aspects of ideology which deserve pursuing in their own right. One concerns nationalism. An unexpected and striking aspect of Tanzania to the foreigner (this foreigner, anyway) is a recurring streak of strident nationalism, sometimes shading into xenophobia. Too often this is simply equated with "anti-imperialism", and hence assumed to be progressive. Yet Shivji puts his finger on the political limitations of Tanzanian anti-imperialism: I would paraphrase him by saying that it is

seen in practical rather than structural terms; the struggle is
hostile in fact to the capital exploiter, either the
British or the local bourgeoisie and the
winding in the form of capitalism as a system (the idea of
book by G.D. Cox), and with it the conviction that this system
has its centre in the land, (not mentioned among the united in
Mwanuzi); however, internally, the prevailing theory disseminates
the capitalist instead of capitalism; and above all the ideology
and in part is a small link in the chain of exploitation - but
of course the link most often cut by the people. As
Smith points out, these explanations serve a positive function
for the bureaucratic bourgeoisie; but obviously, it is clearly
imperative for progressive forces to raise the level of consciousness.
These and equally exploitation with a foreign chain are most easily
superseded by the "vanishing act" of neo-colonialism.

I have left my criticisms till last. Most of them are
incidental, but then there are two major omissions with which I
shall conclude.

It was not to be expected that we could all agree yet on a
single definitive terminology for classes in "underdeveloped"
countries. Shivji's position has changed somewhat since his first
paper. Those who were there dubbed the "economic bureaucracy"
are now, it seems, the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie"; and the conflicts
they then had with the "revolutionary leadership" seem now to have
been blurred in a unity of top people. We are now given a much
more detailed breakdown of the "petty bourgeoisie" into different
categories. Yet on the evidence available it is not clear just
how operational these divisions and sub-divisions are; either in
terms of the way people subjectively see themselves and others and
behave accordingly, or in terms of different objective relationships
to the means of production (the differences appear to be at most
only quantitative, not qualitative). The important question for
a Marxist, after all, is whether these groups exist as classes
for themselves or merely in themselves. So one misses the vital
operational component, so prominent in Cabral's class analysis.¹¹
Admittedly in Guinea-Bissau the criterion can be much simpler -
"for or against PAIGC?" - while in the very different Tanzanian
situation there is as yet nothing so clear-cut. Nonetheless,
future investigations should take as their starting point class
actions; what type of groups carry them out, on what basis,
otherwise there is always the danger of slipping back into formalism.

There are other apparent changes in position as between
"The Silent Class Struggle" and "The Class Struggle Continues".
The third (as well as "bureaucratic capitalism" and "neo-colony
par excellence") type of neo-colonial situation used to be "state
capitalism"; but this seemed to have little relevance to Tanzania
as well as suffering from internal inconsistency, so it is no
loss to find it dropped as a separate category now.

More serious is an apparent unsignalled shift on the "labour
aristocracy" question. In "The Silent Class Struggle" Shivji
quoted with apparent approval Arrighi's thesis that foreign
capital-intensive investment creates such a group.¹² Yet the
detailed analysis of working-class action (strikes, &c) in
"The Class Struggle Continues" is not based on any such distinction
between different kinds of workers. For that matter, we even
learn (p.105n) that sections of the petty bourgeoisie were among
the strikers, and elsewhere (p.82n) that "for all practical
purposes the 'lower level' (of the petty bourgeoisie) is much
closer to workers". Is there, then, on the one hand a "labour
aristocracy" section of the proletariat who may be expected to
side with the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and on the other hand a
lower section of the petty bourgeoisie whose class interest is
the opposite? If so, this should be clarified, not least because

of the urgent practical implications. If the experience of Cabral and others is anything to go by, this disaffected petty bourgeois group may be of strategic significance. The sociological concept of "relative deprivation"¹³ should not be forgotten here: those lower salaried Form-Four leavers, who at the moment complain of earning no more than a messenger, may eventually if the upper echelons cannot absorb them make common cause with those equally excluded.

A number of diverse points are perhaps worth mentioning. Shivji's attitude towards the concept "élite", while correctly critical, seems at times to go beyond this into something like exorcism! It does not help much to be told that "the élite theory is basically 'elitist'" (p.28). Nor do Saul and Szentes necessarily deserve criticism for using the word: it is after all a pre-sociological term of at least some descriptive value. What is important is not words but concepts. Shivji in fact misses some of the more modern and insidious versions of élite theory, such as the functionalist theory of stratification (which claims that inequality is essential in order to motivate the best people into the most vital jobs), although this kind of assumption is far more likely to prevail locally¹⁴ than worn out war-horses like Mosca whom he does attack.

On a different tack, is it quite fair to the "national bourgeoisie" (or "lumpenbourgeoisie", as Shivji would like to call them) to claim (p.20) that their slogans of nationalism and freedom were "merely echoes of the ideology of the metropolitan bourgeoisie without their social or economic substance"? This seems to imply that there was never a progressive role for this group, although later (p.88ff) Shivji does give credit to the historically positive (though limited) achievements of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Yet surely the winning of even "flag" independence is a step forward in history: not of course unambiguously so, as Cabral remarked, yet it would be perverse to call it anything else.

Then there is the peripheral but vexed question of socialist countries, and how Marxists are to analyse them. This deserves a paper in itself,¹⁵ and Shivji has some incisive remarks in a long footnote (pp.80-81). Yet to be told right at the start (p.2) that "the only countries which officially still hold high the banner of class struggle are probably China and Albania" is not really very helpful - indeed, the metaphor seems to be covering up for the lack of a real theory. I am sure Shivji would agree that the last thing any Marxist should do is take up a party line in favour of every policy of another socialist country, however much one may admire it: that way lies the pathetic and tortuous self-abasements that used to characterize (and to a certain extent still do) the Western communist parties in their efforts to justify everything the Soviet Union's leaders ever did. It is this self-prostitution and abnegation of independent thought which gives a limited plausibility to the reactionary charge that Marxism is "foreign" ideology. I do not for a moment believe that Shivji

is anywhere near such a position; but such currents are in the air (I was amazed last year in a seminar to hear a (Western) sociologist more or less put a brake on an incipient discussion of socialist countries, by simply insisting that "at any rate they are anti-imperialist". As if there was nothing more to be said about them!) On the contrary, I would urge that one of the prime duties of Tanzanian socialists is to study, in detail and critically, the positive and negative lessons of other socialist countries' experiences. I do not mean to reproach Shivji for not doing something he never set out to do - but if one were going to do it, a facile division into "goodies" and "baddies" would not be a scientific way to begin.

But this, as I said, is not Shivji's main concern. I want to finish by discussing some other issues which he did not raise - but which, this time, I very much think he should have. Crucially important as Shivji's paper is, it urgently needs to be supplemented in two ways, both internally and externally. First, there is a nagging question which begins to arise early on, and grows in the reader's mind until by the end it is a thundering roar: BUT WHAT ABOUT THE PEASANTS?? Neglect of the rural sector was one of the weaknesses of his first paper, and it cannot be said that the few pages scattered around in the second one (44-6, 48-9, 66-70, 97-101) really fill the gap. Granted that certain modes of "peasant-ism" can be reactionary (e.g. the Turner Report, cited by Shivji), it nonetheless simply will not do to relegate 95 per cent of Tanzania's population to the analytical periphery. This is precisely the mistake that all too many Marxists (and not the kind that Shivji generally likes, quite rightly) have tended to make on doctrinaire grounds in so many different countries.¹⁶ I know that as far as theory is concerned (pp.23-5) Shivji is firmly in the Mao/Cabral camp, insisting that what is important is proletarian ideology, and that the great physical force may well be largely peasant. But when we get into the more empirical sections, we find that it is the workers' struggles that take pride of place. However interesting and dramatic these are, especially to someone living in Dar es Salaam, it is quite impossible to draw any strategic conclusions without some general survey that would situate the Tanzanian proletariat in the national social structure. Even if we only accept the formula of the peasantry as "most reliable ally", it is surely crucial to study in detail the emerging class contradictions in the countryside, and their implications for future strategy: for it is here, ultimately, that the decisive battles will be fought. The kind of analysis required will doubtless be complex, given Tanzania's notorious regional and other differences; but this does not mean the task should be postponed, rather it makes it the more urgent.

A related omission where classes are concerned is any discussion of the "lumpenproletariat". While not wishing to revive certain discredited and clearly ideological bourgeois notions concerning the absence of a proletariat in Africa,¹⁷ it cannot be forgotten that this class (or any class) did not

spring into existence fully formed; and specifically, that in a country rapidly transformed by colonialism we should expect different patterns, including some survivals of older forms which may remain important over a fairly lengthy period of transition. Thus it must be of some significance that "two thirds of workers ... were born in a rural area ... and most of them consider some village ... outside Dar es Salaam their 'real' home..."¹⁸ Clearly in a country like Tanzania the linkages between urban and rural dwellers are such that one cannot assume their separation as the basis of one's framework. For other writers on African classes, the mediating factor has been the "lumpenproletariat": in different ways both Cebal and Panon (using the term in a rather different sense from Marx's) see in these urban dispossessed the essential revolutionary link between town and country.¹⁹ Yet Shivji nowhere discusses the lumpenproletariat: in fact I do not think he even mentions them. Future debate must widen the arena of enquiry here.

The other major area of omission that calls out to be mentioned is the international plane. It is nearly forty years now since Franz Borkenau, observing how German and Italian fascist intervention tilted the balance of the Spanish Civil War against the progressive forces in favour of counter-revolution concluded that the age of revolutions free to evolve according to their own laws was over. All subsequent history has confirmed his verdict:²⁰ the internationalization of capital in its many forms shows no signs of diminishing, and even the advanced capitalist countries are increasingly interdependent. (The vulnerability of all of them to the difficulties of just one are illustrated by the now seemingly permanent currency crises). How much more must this be true of "underdeveloped" countries, whose proper characterisation is precisely their dependence on others? Shivji astutely shows how political independence has brought, not the abolition of dependence, but its multilateralisation: from one exploiter to many!

But the corollary of this, surely, is that any analysis purporting to lay a foundation for forecasting the future direction of Tanzania's progress cannot afford to neglect the world capitalist economy. The sort of consideration I have in mind here is that discussed at some length by Szentes, in one of the most convincing parts of his paper.²¹ Like Laclau's important criticism of Frank,²² Szentes insists that more important than the (truistic) continuity of imperialism is its changing basis over time: from primary production to processing, export orientation to import substitution, primitive labour-intensive techniques to modern capital-intensive ones. Not everyone might accept those or any specific judgments; but it is essential to be aware of the existence of a big debate on the precise nature of contemporary imperialism, and to try and work out the implications of different theories as they affect Tanzania.²³ After all, as Szentes points out, a militant who clings to the classic view - the swine are plundering our raw materials - is liable to be duped by the "new industrialisation" visible now in many "third world" countries; whereas someone aware of the technological changes in the productive forces, such as

increased use of synthetics and advances in cybernetics and automation, will neither be surprised nor impressed by the seeming volte face of capitalist countries encouraging "industry" in the "third world".

Shivji does not really raise these issues at all. They may not seem crucial to his theme. Yet someone who affirms (p.18) that "the only historical option open to the present African ruling classes ... (is) **TO DEVELOP UNDERDEVELOPMENT UNDER IMPERIALIST HEGEMONY**" - incidentally his sole use of capitals in this paper - would surely be well advised to investigate just what kind of underdevelopment the imperialists are nowadays trying to get their agents to develop. If not, it is hard to formulate realistic alternative strategies. Meillassoux set an example here: though his main task is an analysis of Malian internal class structures, he insists that at least those classes created by colonialism are "the dependent and terminal part of European society," and that political independence and power to the bureaucracy were not the result of domestic class struggles so much as of a favourable international environment.²⁴ This can, admittedly be taken too far: it is ironic that those who in colonial days were forced to learn Western history should now be told by Marxists that they must still focus their analysis on the West! The exaggerated nature of some "dependence" theories has indeed provoked a justified reaction; and it is in the last resort another of those false dichotomies to counterpose "internal" and "external" factors. Yet a total analysis, such as Shivji's, cannot afford to neglect the international capitalist economic environment - just as one of the main planks of revolutionary strategy must be precisely to refuse to let that environment dictate our lives any longer, and to "disengage" from it.²⁵ After all, the main thing is to know exactly what one is disengaging from!

However, the international environment should not be pictured solely in economic terms. Although the fundamental movements occur on that level, history is made and fought in political struggle. Shivji does an outstanding job in this respect on Tanzania's first decade. But any extrapolation of future trends cannot ignore Tanzania's position internationally, above all in respect of the liberation struggles to the South. Spain may not be an exact parallel (I surely hope not); but the experience of Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic, and more recently of Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia, may be worth our attention. Both leaders were overthrown, and their countries plunged into war, when the tempo of neighbouring liberation struggles (respectively in Cuba and Vietnam) became too strong for imperialism to be able to tolerate "neutral" régimes any longer. Without wanting to be unduly alarmist, and bearing in mind that we are talking about the long run (perhaps two or three decades), it would surely be naively optimistic to predict a quick life for Tanzania in this respect either. The advance signs are already in evidence: the murders of Mondlane and Cabral; the deaths of more than 20 Zambians in mine explosions along the Southern border in recent months; the attempted invasion of Guinea two years ago; the reported alliance between the Portuguese and Oscar Kambona, with the latter visiting Mozambique; the growing calls in white Southern Africa for Israeli-

style "retaliatory strikes", official or otherwise, against Zambia and Tanzania ... These are the straws in the wind, and I see no way it can become anything but stronger. We have seen the process many times, most recently in Vietnam: as the liberation forces get closer to victory, an increasingly desperate imperialism loses whatever inhibitions it may have and and begins to lash out wildly. (In North Vietnam, for instance, the criminal depths of bombing crucial dikes actually during the rainy season were only attained in 1972, when the Americans had plainly lost the war.²⁶)

At this stage one can hardly predict the precise forms which the assault may take: invasion, coup, economic harassment, bombing, internal subversion, sabotage - the possibilities and combinations are numerous. What is quite certain, though, is that whatever happens will cast a flood of cold, clear light on the stage and direction of developments in Tanzania so far. We shall see which leaders will fight to the end, and which would rather compromise; we shall see whether urban or rural populations remain passive in the face of a coup (like the two million members of Nkrumah's C.P.P. in Ghana), or whether they protest or even take up arms - there could hardly be a more pointed test of the real penetration of political education and militia training to-date; we shall see whether ujamaa villages form centres of resistance, or disappear as though they had never been.

All this, though speculative in detail, is in outline neither imaginary nor implausible. My point here is that such considerations are bound to play a decisive role in the future development of Tanzania, and so it will not really do for Shivji to proceed as if they did not exist. Indeed, hard thinking along these lines may before too long be seen as quick literally a matter of life or death! For it is necessary to beware of a certain spurious long-range optimism, which maintains that imperialism is everywhere on the retreat and final victory is only a matter of time. As Rodney emphasises, it is precisely "the timing of the victory which is at issue";²⁷ and this timing is crucially dependent on the success or otherwise of concrete revolutionary strategies. Even paper tigers can have a powerful last twitch: Spain has had nearly forty avoidable years of fascism, with no end in sight; in the Middle East, if there is one thing so certain as the fact that Israel is ultimately doomed, it is that right now there is absolutely no force in sight to do the actual "dooming"; there is the continuing American savagery in Indo-China; and here too in the liberation of Africa it is a steep and uneven ascent. I hope that all who debate Shivji's paper will give due attention to these questions. They would not be the first group of militants forced by external aggression into "defending" a "revolution" which hitherto they had felt to be largely non-existent, but which the very act of "defending" may actually serve to create.

1. I. Iskenderov et al., The Third World (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), p. 188
2. T. dos Santos, "The Concept of Social Classes", Science and Society, Vol 34 No. 2 (1970);
 Idem, "The Structure of Dependence", American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 60, May 1970+; G. Arrighi, "Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective", Journal of Development Studies+; J. Weeks, "The Political Economy of Labour Transfer", Science and Society, Winter 1971; K. Post, "Peasantization and Rural Political Movements in Western Africa", European Journal of Sociology, (1972); C. Meillassoux, "A Class Analysis of the Bureaucratic Process in Mali", Journal of Development Studies (1970)+; E.A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa (Heinemann, 1973); S. Amin, "The Class Struggle in Africa" (Africa Research Group reprint, Cambridge, Mass.).
 Further reading will be found in the bibliography to my paper "Neo-Marxist Approaches to Development and Under-Development" (mimeo.)
 Those marked + are available on stencil in the Sociology Department while Amin's is in the Development Studies reader, First Year, No. 1.
3. Meillassoux, op. cit., p. 1 and passim (mimeo.)
4. As well as "The Class Struggle Continues" pp. 3-6 and "The Silent Class Struggle", see his recent paper "Capitalism Unlimited: Public Corporations in Partnership with Multinational Corporations".
5. In addition to Cox's classic work and Segal's readable survey, both cited by Shivji, there is discussion of class and race in J. Rex, Race Relations in Sociological Theory (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), and S. Zubaida (ed.) Race and Racism (London: Tavistock, 1970).
6. T. Szentes, "Status Quo and Socialism", in I.G. Shivji et al. Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle (Lund: Zenit reprint, 1971), p. 87ff.
 (Apart from this Swedish edition, the debate on Shivji's first paper is reproduced in L. Cliffe and J. Saul (eds.) Socialism in Tanzania Vol. 2: Policies (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1973), and is due to appear in book form from Tanzania Publishing House.
7. Meillassoux (op. cit.) also sees the Malian bureaucracy as beginning to turn itself into a class, though his analysis is much less detailed than Shivji's.
8. "The Class Struggle Continues", p. 19 (which gives the reference to Arrighi).
9. Ibid., pp. 50-51.
10. See the debate between Mboya and Mohiddin in the March and May 1969 issue of the East Africa Journal (reproduced in EASE reader, Vol. 5).

11. "BVLBI analysis of the Social Structure in Guiné", in Revolution in Guinea (London: Stage One, 1969).
12. p. 12 Zenit edition.
13. W.G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice (Penguin edition, 1971).
14. For an illustration from Kenya, see the interesting paper by K. Prewitt, "The Functional Theory of Stratification and the Ndegwa Report" (E.A. Social Science Conference, Nairobi, 1972).
15. I hope a step in this direction will be made in the coming year, with a course on socialist societies which will include open seminars on specific countries and problems.
16. In Eastern Europe, for instance: see D. Mitrany, Marx Against the Peasant (New York: Collier-MacMillan, 1961). By contrast, the revolutionary activities of peasants are illustrated in E. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (London: Faber and Faber, 1971).
17. E.g. W. Elkan, Migrants and Proletarians (London: Oxford University Press, 1960). A decade later, Elkan is unrepentant: cf. his paper "Is a Proletariat Emerging in Nairobi?" (Nairobi, East African Social Science Conference, 1972), which closes with the rhetorical (?) question: "And who is wanting a proletariat anyhow?"
18. M. von Freyhold, "The Workers, the Nizers and the Peasants" (Dar es Salaam: Department of Sociology, 1972, mimeo.) p. 1. See also the same author's "The Workers and the Nizers" (Ibid.). It is a little surprising that Shivji should write so much on class in apparent unawareness of this substantial body of empirical and theoretical work, done from a Marxist perspective, based on a survey of Dar es Salaam in 1968.
19. See F. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 103; A. Cabral, op. cit., p. 48. For some interesting comments on the lumpenproletariat of Brazzaville, from a perhaps more traditional Marxist viewpoint, see the interview with the late Lt. Ange Diawara in Eldridge Cleaver, Revolution in the Congo (London: Stage One, 1971) pp. 39-41. Diawara, incidentally, was killed earlier this year while leading a guerrilla band that had taken to the countryside after an abortive left-wing coup against the Ngoubi régime (which proclaims itself to be Marxist-Leninist!). This is but one of many all too little known African experiences that Tanzanian militants would do well to analyze and ponder on. A general discussion of the lumpenproletariat will be found in an article by P. Worsley in Socialist Register 1972.

20. The contemporary historical process is dealt with in D. Horowitz, Imperialism and Revolution (London: Penguin Books, 1971). I have tried to tackle some of the theoretical problems of Marxist accounts of "external" influences in "Marxism and the 'Fact of Conquest'" (Nairobi: East Africa Social Science Conference, 1972).
21. Op. cit., pp. 67-74 ("Changes in the international division of labour")
22. E. Laclau, "Capitalism and Feudalism in Latin America", New Left Review, 67 (May-June 1971).
23. This is much too wide a topic to discuss here. A brief sketch will be found in my "Neo-Marxist Approaches...", op. cit. section 3(b)(i), "Imperialism". The issues are thoroughly debated by the authors cited there and in the bibliography.
24. Op. cit., p. 3, 12. Meillassoux if anything goes further than Shivji in his dispassionate, even cynical attitude towards the bureaucracy: "One of (their) first steps was to infiltrate the national economy through the creation of a nationalised economic sector. This was done under the label of 'socialism', which provided them with a convenient ideology to bring the economy under their control, supposedly of course on behalf of the entire population. 'Socialism' permitted them to put the bureaucracy into the position of a managerial board of a kind of State Corporation". (Ibid., p. 13)
25. Granted the reservations of Rodney and Szentes concerning the use of this term, I think it is still of use in connoting the essential implication of a genuine alternative development strategy. (See W. Rodney, "Some implications of the question of disengagement from imperialism", in Shivji et al., op. cit., pp. 49-53; Szentes, ibid., pp. 93-95). The positive tasks of disengagement are nowhere better explored than in C.Y. Thomas, "Issues of Transition to Socialism in Tanzania-type Economies" (Dar es Salaam, Economic Research Bureau paper, 1972).
26. Y. Lacoste, "The Geography of Dike Destruction", Le Monde/Guardian Weekly, August 12th, 1972, p. 12.
27. Ibid., p. 53.

11. "Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guiné", in Revolution in Guinea (London: Stage One, 1969).
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27. Ibid., p. 53.

STATE FORMATION AND CLASS FORMATION IN TANZANIA

By Walter Rodney

Scientific socialist analysis is by its very nature historical analysis, since it must lay bare the process by which social relations and institutions come into being. Consideration of the political economy of Tanzania has so far been limited by a blurred historical profile. In certain respects, the recent contribution by Issa Shivji on "Tanzania: the Class Struggle Continues" helps to sharpen the focus on the evolution of classes in colonial Tanganyika and subsequently. In any event, his substantial interpretation offers once more the opportunity to deepen and extend the discussion. My own comments do not constitute a review of "Tanzania: the Class Struggle Continues"; but they derive directly or indirectly from Part Two and, to a lesser extent, Part Three, both of which deal with the evolution of classes and the state.

In introduction his section on "class relations in Tanzania", Shivji highlights the role of the state as follows:

"One thing that stands out sharply is the central, decisive and almost omnipotent role played by the state and state apparatus in these struggles. This is not to say that economic interests have had no effect. But the economic interests of the ruling class have had to be established and buttressed by state power."

Shivji then goes on to quote Régis Debray commenting on the analogous Latin American situation to the effect that the ruling class transforms the state not only into an instrument of political domination, but also into a source of economic power. This juxtaposition of state and ruling class is indeed central to an understanding of the Tanzanian political economy, and the relationship between the two ought to be elaborated with more care and precision.

There is always a dialectical relationship between the state and the ruling class, to such an extent that the one helps to define the other. The state is always a source of economic power for a given class and not merely an instrument of political domination. However, the usual pattern exemplified in the last two or three hundred years of world history is that the ruling class is already economically powerful when it comes to seize the reins of state power. Besides, the state which was controlled by the bourgeoisie in Europe in the nineteenth century was a solid affair, with antecedents stretching back to the feudal period and beyond. In Tanzania and Africa as a whole, both the state and the ruling class are weak and embryonic phenomena. Under these circumstances, one has to be extremely careful to avoid the anti-historical error of purporting to recognise a mature and finished social formation at a given point 'A', when in fact they assumed their definitive form many years afterwards at point 'B'. Shivji cannot be exculpated from this error when he writes of classes in Tanzania maturing during the colonial period and immediately afterwards.

By way of analogy, one could consider the fluid social situation of eighteenth century France on the eve of the Revolution of 1789. The rise of capitalism produced a variety of socio-economic strata inter-penetrating the existing juridically defined social orders of declining feudalism. Among these were landlords who were farming on a capitalist basis, merchants, bankers, ship-owners,

owners of overseas slave plantations, wealthy professionals and a few manufacturers. These were the forerunners of the bourgeoisie proper, who helped prepare the conditions for their own self-fulfillment by occupying and transforming the feudal state. These fractions of the bourgeoisie-in-the-making in France in the eighteenth century were more numerous, more wealthy, more politically influential and probably more conscious of a common class interest than their counterparts in colonial and post-colonial Africa. Yet, they did not solidify as a class under the leadership of the manufacturers until the middle of the nineteenth century, because their reproduction was dependent upon technological changes which took many years to come into full effect.²

During the course of their long evolution, the French bourgeoisie (and their counterparts elsewhere in Europe) first played a progressive role in leading all sections of the population in the struggle against feudal backwardness. Subsequently, on achieving a measure of economic and political power, the bourgeoisie in turn showed its repressive and reactionary nature towards the workers and peasants. Attention here is being drawn to their embryonic character in the eighteenth century, their seizure of the state machinery, the conditions of their reproduction, their national leadership role, and their ultimate transition to a reactionary stance. All of these are pointers in reviewing the Tanzanian and African political situation.

In dissecting the Tanzanian bourgeoisie, Shivji identifies a 'commercial bourgeoisie', a 'petty bourgeoisie' transforming itself into a 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie', and a group of 'kulaks' - in addition to the metropolitan capitalists. The most instructive portion of his analysis relates to the commercial bourgeoisie who originated mainly from the sub-continent of India. Previous studies of the 'Asians' in East Africa have tended to obscure their class role, Shivji's account brings out their overall socio-economic function as well as the divisions within their own ranks. He feels justified in placing them all in the category 'commercial bourgeoisie' because of the caste system prevailing among them and because of important economic and familial ties running through the community. This argument is valid, but it should not be inconsistent with indicating that in colonial Tanganyika Asians virtually monopolised most middle-level civil service jobs and middle class professions, with the 'Goans' being very prominent. The fact is that there was a certain perverse symmetry in the colonial social structure of Tanganyika territory, constituting a pyramid whose base was black and which ascended through brown to white. This applied to education, the courts, the civil service, the police force, the hospitals, housing location and a range of other things. The scope for conflict with African aspirants was therefore just as manifold as the spheres in which Asians were the middlemen.

Another characteristic of the Asian commercial bourgeoisie on which emphasis is rightly placed is their dependency vis a vis the metropolis. Like the few white settlers in Tanganyika, Asians looked to Britain and the local administration for protection and the promotion of their interests. In so far as they were property owners, they sought the protection of the police judiciary and prisons at the expense of the African masses. In their capacity as civil servants and professionals, they also depended upon the colonial government to guarantee them differential access

to jobs and to education over and above the heads of Africans. Shivji notes that this immigrant element constituted a political ward under the guardianship of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, he is primarily concerned with their economic nexus of imperialism rather than the political relationship between the Asians and the colonial state power. Probably, that is why he makes only passing reference to the 'political apathy' of the Asians. An important inference which must be drawn out is that the Asian commercial bourgeoisie could not possibly have played a progressive role in breaking the old colonial bonds. For the most part, they were vocally or passively hostile to African nationalism, or at best uninvolved in the Uhuru struggle.

The Asians were not destined to be an enduring part of the locally-produced petty bourgeoisie in Tanzania and East Africa. There were transient historical factors which afforded them the opportunity to play certain roles which Europeans and Africans (the colonisers and the colonised) were then unwilling or unable to perform, but of course nothing in the mode of production enshrines race as a factor in class selection, and racial hierarchisation within the system of production and distribution comes where the politically dominant class is of a given race. Asians never wielded political power in East Africa, and were therefore constrained to come and go at the dictates of those who held such power. Furthermore, Asians shared with Europeans the class and racist prejudices towards Africans; and they accepted both European superiority as well as African inferiority, so as to retain their niche within the society.⁵ This complex of begoted attitudes and objective socio-economic interests clashing with those of the up-and-coming African petty bourgeoisie holds the key to the demise of the Asian commercial bourgeoisie in the post-independence era.

Asians in Uganda have recently had a traumatic dislocative experience, involving their physical removal in large numbers. However, one of the more revealing aspects of Shivji's study is the illustration of a slow trend towards their disappearance as a commercial class in Tanzania. To the extent that this is accompanied by an actual reduction of numbers, this is a measure of their evaluation as to whether they can continue living in the society without any hope of acquiring wealth through commerce. Meanwhile, the African petty bourgeoisie has long since given notice of its growing power and influence - the elbowing out of Asians being one manifestation. Clearly, the social origins of this group are of the utmost importance; and here, unfortunately, Shivji does not do a great deal to reduce the widespread prevailing ignorance. The behaviour of the modern African petty bourgeoisie has been exposed by the startlingly accurate insights of Franz Fanon; but so many commentators have discussed this class without reference to its quantitative dimensions in Africa as a whole and in respective territories. Data is lacking in any studies of Tanzania concerning their numbers, earnings, growth trends and avenues for class solidarity. In the absence of such information, it is easy to lose a sense of proportion and to make generalisations about the colonial period based on the situation as it is now or as it was in other colonial models such as the Gold Coast and Nigeria, which are slightly better-known. Shivji's table on the composition of the Tanzanian petty

bourgeoisie at the time of independence is reproduced below to serve as a basis for examination of these shortcomings.

upper level (Intelligentsia)	- intellectuals, teachers, higher civil servants, prosperous traders, farmers, professionals, higher military and police officers.
middle level	- middle government salariat, junior clerks, soldiers, etc.
lower level	- shopkeepers, lower salariat in the services sector and generally lowest grades of the salariat. ⁴

The first weakness is lack of precision. This level of analysis makes it imperative that terms such as 'middle government salariat' and 'lower salariat' should be related to given numbers of people earning salaries in a stated bracket. Imprecision leaves room for assumptions based on external models, since these categories are well documented in metropolitan societies; and the implication is that their differentiation from the African masses was more substantial than was the case. Earnings by colonials were not simply dictated by their place in the machinery of production and administration. Rather, their limits were set by racist values and the arbitrary decision by the European colonisers as to what constituted a 'living wage' for Africans at different levels. Hence the gap between earnings of Europeans and Africans who happened to do the same jobs. In any event, far more needs to be said concerning the African salariat, the cost of living and their life style.

A second weakness deriving from the first is the tendency to gloss over differences between the situation in Tanzania today and that which prevailed at the time of the Uhuru struggle. This of course defeats the objective of tracing the growth of the particular social formation in question: namely, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Right up to the period immediately after the second world war, there were no 'upper level (intelligentsia)' among the Africans of this country. Even in the last five years of the struggle for independence, one would be hard put to find any African personnel in the 'upper level' of earnings in colonial society. There were extremely few university graduates and senior secondary school teachers. Higher civil service posts were controlled by whites, and they admitted a sprinkling of Asians; middle civil servants and professionals were mainly Asians; wealthy Africans traders were a handful, using any meaningful criterion of 'wealthy'; while higher military and police officers were exclusively European. Shivji asserts that during the independence struggle the leadership in TANU, trade unions and co-operatives was mainly 'upper level', and he cites Bienen to support the case. However, this particular source does no more than indicate that a sizeable proportion of the leadership had experience in 'administration'.⁵ Further research into their substantive posts would certainly demonstrate that 'upper level' is a misnomer in this context.

The third shortcoming in the composition of the African petty bourgeoisie as related in the above scheme is the questionable differentiation of the lower level salariat from the proletariat and peasantry. It is well known that office workers constitute a quasi-proletarian force in the capitalist metropolis, distinct from the factory workers only in some nuances of life style and because of their greater propensity for ideological self-identification with the bourgeoisie. Our own experience under colonialism will have taught us that the junior clerks were and still are no different from the actual producers, transport workers, building workers or other service workers in earnings, living standards and world-view. It therefore flies in the face of facts to categorise them firstly with the petty bourgeoisie and then with the commercial bourgeoisie and the kulaks.⁶

After making allowances for the non-existence of the 'upper level' and the inadmissibility of the 'lower level', the petty bourgeoisie of colonial Tanganyika turns out to be nothing more than a few individuals in the middle ranks of the civil service. As a group, they had no control over production and no peculiar means of reproducing themselves. However, like the small working class, they had a capacity for organisation, which was an advantage over the mass of peasants. They had a firmer grasp of the tenets of bourgeois democracy than any other section of the community. In a colonial context, this was a progressive attribute and made it possible for the petty bourgeois elements to advance their own self-interests without then conflicting with those of the masses. On the contrary, they actively championed the masses on key issues such as the fight against colonial agricultural regulations. In vying for state power, the African petty bourgeoisie sought to replace both whites and Asians in the public service, in the professions and ultimately in business. Therefore, they could make common cause with workers and peasants whose labour was exploited by Asian retailers and produce buyers, by European and Asian employers, by the government as an employer, by the government as law-maker, and above all by the external bourgeoisie of whom they were more vaguely aware.

The point has been made elsewhere that the dominance of a single party in Tanzania has its roots in the incompleteness of class formation. This is a valid observation, provided it is not transmuted into a general explanation for the existence of single party states on the African continent.⁷ The emergence of classes gave rise to the multi-party system in Europe not merely because particular classes needed vehicles for their expression but also because the size of the bourgeoisie produced a situation of diversity, within which two or more bourgeois parties presented alternatives for running the capitalist system and vied with each other for the spoils of power and office. In Africa, too, nascent class interests often hid behind ethnic and regional factors in accounting for multi-parties in given colonies. In Uganda, the quasi-feudal land-based class within Buganda created its own political instrument, and the same occurred in Northern Nigeria.⁸ The examples of Ghana and Southern Nigeria are even more instructive, because there the petty bourgeoisie was large and subject to tensions between the wealthy and the not-so-wealthy and between those who were entrenched for several decades and those who were nouveaux arrivés. The fact that the early Tanzanian petty bourgeoisie was too weak to be differentiated helps largely to account for the non-emergence of competing parties or (more accurately) for the ephemeral nature and abysmal failure of political groupings which did try to raise their heads in the period when TANU demonstrated that it was de facto the only party

in the country.

Having dealt with the commercial bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, Shivji turns to the (African) kulaks of the rural areas. Again, the discussion is sketchy, because so little of the empirical work has yet been done. The tendency in the literature to date has been to assign only marginal significance to the better-off peasants who emerged by the late 1950s. Further research will probably enhance their importance as an up-and-coming sector in the colonial period, though it is unlikely that they would be held to constitute a class in their own right. Indeed, a simpler and more realistic categorisation would be to regard African kulaks as members of the African petty bourgeoisie, the urban sector being recruited in part at least from the ranks of the rural sector. Shivji notes correctly that attempts to create a strong 'yeomanry' in colonial Tanganyika were late, insubstantial and unsuccessful. It is also true that the 'lower' peasant-based TANU then and subsequently maintained intermittent hostility towards kulaks. However, there is also reason to believe that the wealthier peasants realised their potential within the framework of the co-operatives - the failure of the settlement schemes notwithstanding. Shivji's statements are tentative with respect to the 'important contradictions at the time of independence between the emerging bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the kulaks'. In effect, he suggests a line of enquiry, but such an enquiry would be enriched by bearing in mind the alternative hypothesis that there were important reconciling interests and probably close familial ties.

In connection with the kulaks, Shivji also overlooked the 'traditional chiefs'. Colonial powers adopted varying attitudes to the already existing political and socio-economic hierarchy which they found throughout Africa. Tanzanian societies were then less differentiated than many in most parts of the continent, but there were political authorities whom the British promoted under the system of indirect rule, purporting to present it as a form of African local government, but it did have some practical difference from direct rule.⁹ One of these was the ease with which 'traditional chiefs' were able to join the mainstream of new class formation by controlling access to land required for growing cash crops and by gaining education for their children. The policy of the colonial government of providing education first and foremost for the sons of chiefs was followed with great consistency in Tanganyika the second world war, and obviously its consequences would have been apparent for many years thereafter.¹⁰ Incidentally, the highest paid Africans in colonial Tanganyika were not civil servants but the important African 'chiefs' in the Native Authority system, notably in Bukoba. Where they lacked wealth they still had influence, which was both in favour of the nationalist movement as well as against it. In looking for the strands that merged to produce the present 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie', attention should definitely be drawn to this element.

Whether the bureaucratic bourgeoisie is already a class in Tanzania and (if so) the moment of their definition are issues beyond the scope of the present commentary. What is certain is that today they are very much in evidence, so that they have rapidly grown during the post-colonial era. Shivji is quite aware of the rapidity of transformation in this period, so mine is a difference of emphasis in placing the period of gestation almost exclusively in the last decade. The agency which produced this rapid growth is the state power. To elaborate on this cardinal point, it is useful to reconsider the colonial 'state'.

Politically and militarily, the colony was at once an extension of a given metropolitan state. However, by their very social existence, British colonial administrators carried out the wishes of the British capitalist class in one way or another. This helps explain the otherwise paradoxically large interest of independence which the colonial administrators acted. This has been noted for many parts of Africa, and Tanganyika was no exception.¹¹ In an extent, therefore, the colonial administration acted as a state, co-opting the machinery of violence as well as reflecting to a certain extent sectional or class interests. White settlers in Tanganyika received favoured treatment, but this fell far short of the settler orientation of the Kenyan or Rhodesian colonial administrations. Asians in Tanganyika were also protected, as noted before. The overall economic connection with European capital is not sufficient to explain the specific forms taken by Tanganyikan or any other colonised society, because the colonial 'state' wielded decisive influence.

Shivji professes to find difficulty in accepting Cabral's statement that colonialism mutes the hitherto prevailing contradictions and drags the whole colonised people into a completely new trajectory; namely: "it made us leave our history and enter another history". Innumerable examples could be found to illustrate this position in colonial Tanganyika. Clashes between youths and elders, between different ethnicities and between different social formations such as pastoralists and cultivators were forms of the incipient class struggles of the past, in addition to the more overt clash between peasants and landlords in the quasi-feudal areas such as Bukoba. Colonialism halted or diverted all of these. As new classes were formed through the incorporation of Tanganyika into the world imperialist economy, the colonial power also ensured that it was the constant mediator of their struggles, so that the energies of all could be subsumed by the larger system. It was colonial policy which determined the absence of an African landed bourgeoisie in Tanganyika and controlled the rate of replication of other social groups, notably the bourgeoisie. Cabral says simply and profoundly, "In the colonial period it is the colonial state which commands history".¹² Besides, because the manipulative colonial state favoured no single stratum consistently, it created conditions under which the whole people (excepting white settlers and Asians) struggled against the ruling class of the colonising power.

From the outset of British colonial rule in Tanganyika until the late 1950s, the local administrators showed a profound hostility towards the educated African. Their experience in India and to some extent in West Africa had imbued them with strong prejudices against the lawyer-types who challenged the British on the latter's own terms of being educated and 'fit to rule'.¹³ There was continued insistence in the history of Tanganyikan education against the supply of education which would produce the white-collar class, to the extent that the supply of basic primary literacy was in danger of being crudely equated with 'classical education'.¹⁴ The colonialists also expressed the fear in Tanganyika that the creation of a surplus over demand for educated workers would lead to the unemployed becoming 'communists'. These reasons among others led to a most parsimonious attitude towards spending on education. The petty-bourgeoisie led the fight for more education from the colonialists, especially at the primary level, and in so doing they were advancing the interests of the masses as a whole.

At the same time, the small group of Africans with more formal schooling saw the possibility of capturing the state for themselves. Once they achieved this, the state was a ready instrument for developing themselves as a class.

These comments will end with a brief reference to Shivji's discussion of the conditions of reproduction of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in more recent times. He weights heavily the role of the state in this process. We are in agreement on this basic point. However, the inter-connections are not clearly established. For the purposes of more detailed research in future, the following areas are suggested. Firstly, the 'Africanisation' which came into vogue from about 1962; secondly, the increase of higher education; thirdly, the extension of the state structure through nationalisation and decentralisation; fourthly, the expansion of the party with respect to governmental functions; and fifthly, the overhaul of the state coercive machinery in the wake of the army fiasco of 1964. The latter two points offer a revealing comment on the dialectical nature of the relationship between the state and the petty bourgeoisie in the period of their joint emergence, because the colonial 'state' apparatus which overnight became an independent de jure state suffered from the fact that the preponderance of sanction and force lay outside the boundaries of the colony. In Tanzania, as elsewhere, the strengthening of the state has gone hand in hand with the emergence of privileged classes who themselves depend inordinately on the state machinery for power and accumulation.

The Women's Movement in Tanzania

- ① Shows how the working class in Tanzania have ^{become} ~~achieved~~ political consciousness through the ~~struggle~~ ^{by} the ~~struggle~~ ^{struggle} leading to workers' strikes in industries and from 1960s to 1970s and in 1973 the ~~large~~ ^{large} ~~scale~~ ^{scale} factories from the capitalists. These strikes were mainly against the managers & bureaucrats. & ~~later~~ ^{later} these for the replacing them with others. The workers thought that if they replace them then maybe there would be any abuses of commandism from the top management. The gov. took a strict measure against the workers for going on strike & thus dismissing the workers. Then the workers used another method of locking out the managers. Instead of going on strike & bringing a loss to the govt. 2nd phase C.G. subband. → ~~anwar~~ → ALAF

- ① Their aim were also towards ~~the~~ benign use of state property by the bureaucrats.
the state. Q. 9 Bottom - Answer Top two fac.
- ② 2nd Phase

- (2) 2nd Phase
Workers rose against Capitalists
of the few industries & demanded to
take over & run themselves; This
really showed how the workers had
confidence, brave & courageous & ^{new} political
consciousness. → Pravist Pravist

- (3) ~~But~~ the press reports also have
do not report the true facts which are in

favours of the workers. The Workers had also no faith in NUTA or the workers committees that they would take any step in favour of them. In case of Lubbe Industries they completely refused to have their case handled by NUTA.

By these examples, Henry shows how the workers' political consciousness is being oppressed by the Capitalist in other cases also by the fact realised that the leaders of the NUTA or TANU ~~are~~ have been very corrupted.

These strikes were mostly organised by themselves & not through the workers Comm or NUTA.

Shows the manner of organisation that made it possible for the workers to make these spontaneous actions of striking & taking over of the factories.

Concludes that the struggle in Tanzania is between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie & the working class because the former class holds the ^{economic} levers of the country.

Notes.

1. Issa Shivji, "Tanzania: the class struggle continues", Development Studies Department, University of Dar es Salaam (1973), p. 32.
2. For a succinct scientific analysis of the French Revolution, see George Lefebvre, The Coming of the French Revolution, Vintage (1967). Marx touches on the subsequent evolution of the French bourgeoisie in a number of works, notably, Class Struggles in France.
3. This approach was well illustrated by the comments and attitudes of Indian members of the Tanganyika Legislative Assembly.
4. Issa Shivji, op. cit. p. 42.
5. Henry Biene, Tanzania, Party Transformation and Economic Development, Princeton (1967). Close reading of this source makes it clear that the majority of TANU leaders were low-level administrators. See, e.g., pp. 46, 52, 115, 123, 124.
6. At a later stage of his discussion (on p. 82), Shivji qualifies his categorisation of the lower-level petty bourgeoisie as follows: "It is very much in the formal sense that this category is included under the petty bourgeoisie, otherwise for all practical purposes the lower level is much closer to workers". The precise significance of "the formal sense" escapes me.
7. See e.g. Tamas Szentes, "The Status Quo and Socialism" (comment on Issa Shivji, The Silent Class Struggle) and passing comment on this specific point in Kwesi Botchwey, "The function of law in the historical process: the dynamics of public corporate activity in contemporary Africa", presented at the University of Ghana, Accra (May 1973).
8. Most studies on African political parties obfuscate this issue. For exceptional approach, see Richard Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, Princeton (1963).
9. See, e.g., Michael Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule, Hutchinson (1968) (for comparison of British indirect and French direct rule).
10. Walter Morris-Hale, British Administration in Tanganyika from 1920 to 1945, University of Geneva, thesis No 192 of 1968 (1969).
11. William Friedland, "The Evolution of Tanganyika's Political System", Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs (n.d. but c. 1964).
12. Issa Shivji, op. cit., pp. 50, 51.
13. See Ralph Austen, "The Official Mind of Indirect Rule: British Policy in Tanganyika, 1916-1939", in Prosser Gifford and Roger Louis (eds), Britain and Germany in Africa, Yale (1967).
14. This was pointed out by Mwalimu Nyerere when he made his first speech as a nominated unofficial Member of the Tanganyika legislature in January 1954.

CLASS, STATE AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE AFRICAN
PETTY-BOURGEOISIE AND THE INTERNATIONAL BOURGEOISIE

A Short Comment on Issa Shivji's
"The Class Struggle Continues"

by

Kwesi Botchway

Who are our enemies? Who are
our friends? This is a question
of the first importance for the
revolution.

....Mao Tse-Tung

No credible revolution can be waged without an analysis of the class formations within the state. Such an analysis is a necessary pre-condition of a clear identification of the enemy of the oppressed classes (in our case, the workers and the peasants) and their potential allies. It serves to draw a dividing line between the antagonistic classes. It is for this reason that Shivji's studies on the dynamics of the class struggle in Tanzania are of the utmost importance. It is for the same reason that we must understand the dimensions of the "class struggle" in Marxist theory. At the risk of belabouring the obvious, let it be said that if Marxist-Leninist theory is to provide, as it must, the theoretical weapon for the African masses in their struggle against bourgeois and petty bourgeois oppression, it is important that its science (historical materialism) and its philosophy (dialectical materialism) be thoroughly grasped and defended against enemies and enthusiasts alike. My comments relate to the function of "class" and "state" in the Marxist theoretical system, and the issue of the relationship between the African state and international capitalism.

Since most objections to the concept of the class struggle are basically anti-materialistic (i.e., idealist) let us briefly clear some of the self-perpetuating prejudices about the materialist conception of history.

Philosophical idealism argues that the world—the material world—has no independent existence and therefore does not have its own laws of development. Factories, houses, the army, the courts, etc. are products of ideas, that is, of non-material things. Development is the result of changes in men's ideas. Contrary to popular imagination, idealism, philosophic idealism, to be exact, has nothing to do with individual moral positions. A person is an idealist not because he wishes to see all 'wrongdoing' come to an end, but because he looks for the

active force in history is the unfathomable richness of the human mind. Idealism is thus the backbone of all bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sociology. In the literature on political economy, its champions are men like Meier and Baldwin who shamelessly assert that we are underdeveloped because our traditional societies are stagnant, and that as a result we lack "entrepreneurial skills" and other growth agents like "rugged individualism", etc. We are in the realm of speculation and mysticism.

Materialism, on the other hand, asserts that it is the changes in the material conditions of life which bring about changes in man's ideas and corresponding changes in political institutions. That is, in order to explain the course of history, we must not look into changes in man's ideas, but into the facts of history. History must therefore start from man's natural existence and determine from an examination of his ACTIONS, the manner in which he modifies this existence. We leave the realm of subjectivism and fantasy (What is consciousness? What is knowledge? Do I exist? "uncaused cause"! etc.) and introduce objectivism (a study of objective facts) as a basis for the interpretation of history. Thus a person is "materialist" not because he desires an abundance of worldly goods but because he interprets history by an examination of the facts of history. The dialectical materialist looks at history not as an immutable reality, but as a movement; he views historical phenomena in their origin, growth and decline. (Dogmatism is thus absolutely incompatible with dialectical materialism as a method of interpreting history.) Without dialectics, "the application of the theory (materialism) to any period of history would be easier than the solution of a simple equation of the first degree." (Engels' words)

The continued distortion of dialectical materialism is attributable in part to a self-perpetuating ignorance ^{of which} a typical example is offered by Professor Seligman, one time President of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. He writes: "All human progress is at bottom mental progress; all changes must go through the human mind. There is thus an undoubted psychological basis for all human evolution." in the Economic Interpretation of History, Columbia, 1903). Here is pure nonsense. In one and the same breath, our author is affirming and denying the materialist conception of history. All changes in man's material condition "must go through the human mind"; clearly therefore, they do not originate from there, and if they do not, then surely human progress cannot be "at bottom mental progress."

More important than the ignorance which is often the basis of Marxism, the rejection of the materialist conception of history is, in our view, a vigorous assertion of a bourgeois class position. Our meaning will become clear in the ensuing pages.

Class and State

The concept of a "class struggle" is the most distorted and abused concept in all Marxist theory. In part, this is no doubt because it is, as Shivji points out, rather elusive; Marx begins to discuss a formal definition of the term in the last chapter of the Third Volume of Capital. What is commonly taken as a formal definition (See Shivji's page 4) is in fact not a formal definition at all; it is merely an introduction to the discussion, for a couple of paragraphs later, Marx writes: "The first question to be answered is this: What constitutes a class?— and the reply to this follows naturally from the reply to another question, namely: What makes wage-labourers, capitalists and landlords constitute the three great social classes?"

The manuscript breaks off before a formal definition is given. From the little that is said in these closing paragraphs, from his earlier writings (The German Ideology, for example) and from the inexorable logic of Marxism as a theoretical system, a number of relevant observations may be made.

In the Marxian theoretical system, 'class' is an analytical category; on a purely theoretical plane it cannot be anything besides a theoretical expression of a category. The important thing is that it is a theoretical expression of a social relation (Marx chastised Proudhon for failing to comprehend this). A class is made up of persons who, independently of their will, share certain objective material interests. Membership of a class is not by volition; if it were, the working and the peasants could terminate their misery by simply deciding that they were not workers and peasants! The English factory worker who daily imagines that he is Queen Elizabeth's consort does not thereby alleviate the drudgery he must suffer everyday. The concept of the class struggle is not disproved by the fact of oppressed workers denying their oppression; on the contrary, this phenomenon is the most brutal affirmation of the bourgeoisie's dominion over the working class. Louis Althusser points out an important distinction, implicit in the concept of the class struggle between "class instinct" and "class position". The class instinct is latent and of course subjective; a class position, on the other hand, is objective and may be 'acquired'. When a "South African trade Unionist", Miss Mvubelo, pleads with liberal democrats in Europe to curtail hostile propaganda against apartheid and invest in South Africa if they really want to "help the workers there", she is advancing a bourgeois class position. Her class instinct is buried under years of intimidation, humiliation at the hands of a literally fascist regime kept in power by the same 'powers' who exploit our diamonds, etc., and draw up production plans for our nationalised industries. By the same token, the "African scholar" who asserts that Marxism is irrelevant to Africa, is thereby stating his class position in unmistakable terms. This is so

if he professes to "understand" the plight of the African workers and peasants.

Finally, it is important to understand that Marxism does not merely assert that there is a class struggle which would, without any aid, lead to the elimination of the oppressor class. The struggle does not exist only "in principle" (Lenin: The State and Revolution). The class is a social group sharing a homogeneity of basically economic interests: the struggle is a political struggle; it is nothing else. The oppressed classes cannot end their oppression unless they seize control of the State (It is significant that Marx formulated the theory of the class struggle from a study of the struggles of the contemporary classes—the proletarian struggles of 1848 - 1849) and 'smash' it. What then is the State and what is the nature of the African State?

The 'state', unlike 'class', is quite clearly brought out in Marx's writings. In his own words, it is "the bureaucratic-military machine." (Letter to Kugelmann, April 12, 1871). The focus of bourgeois distortion here has always been the statement by Engels that the State "withers away." The nineteenth century revisionists argued from this that Engels had repudiated revolution. The distortions notwithstanding, the position is clear. The state is not an inevitable social institution. It is the product of commodity exchange. Through it the ruling class, the bourgeoisie in capitalist society, maintains the "law and order" necessary for the continued private appropriation of 'surplus'. When the oppressor class is overthrown (as in the Bolshevik revolution) the state as an instrument of coercion at the hands of the bourgeoisie is 'abolished'. It must be obvious now why the debate about the functioning of the state apparatus has not begun even in the most progressive African countries.

It will also be appreciated that only the bourgeois function of the state is abolished by a revolution. In the period of the transition, the state as a "special coercive force" will exist for the suppression of "Kulaks", revisionists, liberal democrats, etc. It "withers away" through a logical mitigation of its coercive function. The so-called 'anarchists' demanded that the 'state' be abolished directly after the revolution and for the reason that antagonistic classes will still exist after the revolution, Engels admonished that this could not be done. The 'opportunists', on the other hand, spoke of a "free people's state"; Engels admonished that while this may be useful for political agitation, it must be recognised as a contradiction in terms: We cannot talk of "free coercion". (Kruschev's 'all people's state', would have met with the same objection. The class struggle does not end merely by the abolition of private ownership in the means of production.)

The special characteristics of the state which are relevant for a proper appraisal of the character of the African state are (1) it is territoriality. (Marx and Engels, and later Lenin had too much sense to fool with metaphysics); (2) it must, during the course of its

life, be in the constant employment of a ruling class wielding power primarily in its own behalf. There cannot be a ruling class without a 'state', or there cannot be a 'state' without a ruling class.

My view is that the African 'state' is typically the appendage of the metropolitan state (the erstwhile colonial monster) where economic and political links are maintained after independence, or a confluence of metropolitan states where there has been a diversification of trade and political links (as in Tanzania). Although for peculiar historical reasons there are emerging "national bourgeoisies" in countries like Ghana and Egypt, we may say that the typical African state is controlled by a petty bourgeoisie that does not have the material base requisite for an assertion of its independence as a class; it lacks the material base precisely because the productive forces are not developed. Its objective class interest is the perpetuation of neo-colonialism. An important consequence of its material weakness is that the petty bourgeois state depends on some metropolitan state for the supply of the means with which to defend itself (the army, the police, the air force, etc.)

Furthermore, the ideology of the international bourgeoisie basically rules the petty bourgeoisie. (Except in times of crisis, the ruling class rules by persuasion through its institutions of learning, churches, powerful radio stations, etc.) The wholesale subscription by the progressive African regimes of concepts like the "Separation of Powers", "Rule of Law", "Prompt and adequate compensation", in short, the "colonial mentality" is itself the function of their historical relationship with the international bourgeoisie.

To be sure, in some instances, the African state bureaucracy has acquired attributes which may on their face be at variance with the liberal democratic ideology of the international bourgeoisie. It may, for instance, invade the unsullied realms of "judicial independence". These "superstructural conflicts", as we may call them, are the inevitable products of the internal class struggle. (The relationship between the local petty bourgeoisie and the international bourgeoisie is itself political and as such dialectical.) The intensity of the conflict depends on the nature of the internal class struggle, the strength of the workers (the peasants) and the clarity of their consciousness as a class. The petty bourgeoisie may even take truly revolutionary positions (it may, for instance, expropriate the assets of a multi-national firm) but this will always be done from considerations of political expediency. The history of the African petty bourgeoisie in post-colonial Africa clearly proves that it will at best wage a bourgeois revolution designed to maintain a caricature of the welfare state—"a development whose sole driving force is the calendar, wearing with constant repetition of the same tensions and relaxations; antagonisms that periodically seem to work themselves up to a climax only to lose their sharpness and fall away

without being able to resolve themselves." (Marx)

In this rather long and winding comment I have deliberately kept myself within the realm of theory. My aim has been to probe into basic Marxist theory and to demonstrate by a general look at the contemporary historical phenomena that it offers the only methodology by which we can fully explain our continuing oppression, petty bourgeois assertions to the contrary notwithstanding. My only excuse for putting the average reader through this laborious exercise is that Marxism has become such a heavy weight that it is no longer safe to assume the most elementary understanding of its concepts.

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